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Introduction
Over the past seven years, versions of this report,
Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health from Dis-
eases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism, have docu-
mented how investments in America’s public
health emergency response capabilities have led
to major improvements in our nation’s readi-
ness for an outbreak or emergency.  This
progress has meant that the country was much
more prepared to respond the H1N1 outbreak
than it was just a few short years ago.  For in-
stance, these investments have increased the
country’s vaccine manufacturing capacity, con-
tributed to a more robust stockpile of antiviral
medications, upgraded laboratories and surveil-
lance systems, and assisted in the development
of federal, state, and local preparedness plans
around the country.
However, the H1N1 outbreak also vividly
demonstrated the existing gaps in public health
preparedness.  Decades of chronic underfund-
ing of public health meant that many of the core
systems that would have been invaluable to have
in place during an emergency were not at-the-
ready when H1N1 emerged.  Congress and the
Administration provided additional band-aid
supplemental funds to respond to the crisis, but
these funds were largely dedicated to the im-
mediate needs, like vaccine purchasing and dis-
tribution, and were not sufficient to address
underlying gaps, such as hiring dedicated staff
to track, monitor, and respond to the pandemic
or updating electronic surveillance systems for
tracking and sharing information.  
The public health system’s response to H1N1 was
further challenged by the current economic cli-
mate.  State and local health departments around
the country were asked to do more with less dur-
ing the outbreak, as the recession stripped $168
billion, or one-quarter, from state budgets.  
The annual Ready or Not? reports have shown
that the band-aid approach the nation takes to-
ward responding to the emergency du jour is in-
adequate.  After September 11, 2001 and the
anthrax attacks, the federal government made
an unprecedented investment to quickly shore
up components of public health preparedness,
but the funding levels were not at the level re-
quired to fix the infrastructure.  Over the years,
as new emergencies and concerns emerge and
attention shifts, it often means resources are di-
verted from one pressing priority to another,
leaving other ongoing areas unaddressed.    In
addition, the progress that has been made since
September 11, 2001 has been undermined as
funding for preparedness has been cut 27 per-
cent since fiscal year 2005 when adjusted for in-
flation. Until public health emergency
preparedness receives sufficient and sustained
funding, Americans will continue to be need-
lessly at risk for a range of public health threats.
TFAH issues the Ready or Not? report to provide
the public and policymakers with an independ-
ent analysis about progress and vulnerabilities in
the nation’s public health preparedness.  The
report assesses the level of preparedness in
states, evaluates the federal government’s role
and performance, and offers recommendations
for improving emergency preparedness.
Little information is publicly and readily avail-
able from the government about the status of
health emergency preparedness in the United
States.  This report aims to foster greater ac-
countability for how effectively taxpayer dollars
are used to improve the nation’s readiness for
health emergencies.  Without this transparency,
it is hard for the American public to know how
well the government is protecting them from
the range of threats our nation faces.
The report:
 Informs the public and policymakers about
the status of public health preparedness in
the United States;
 Provides greater transparency for public
health preparedness programs;
 Encourages greater accountability for the
spending of preparedness funds; and 
 Recommends ways to help the nation move
toward a strategic, all-hazards system capable
of responding effectively to health threats
posed by diseases, disasters, and bioterrorism.
The H1N1 pandemic illustrated the great varia-
tion in levels of preparedness around the country.
Some communities were much more prepared to
respond to the outbreak than others.  In general,
some communities are better prepared for differ-
ent types of threats.  A hazard and vulnerability as-
sessment, for example, might identify hurricanes
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H1N1 HAS BEEN A REAL-WORLD TEST OF THE NATION’S PUBLIC
HEALTH SYSTEM.
The 2009 Ready or Not? report finds that the in-
vestments made to improve public health emer-
gencies over the past several years are
demonstrating a major payoff as the nation con-
fronts the H1N1 pandemic.  At the same time,
many core areas of public health preparedness are
severely lacking and in urgent need of modern-
ization to be ready for the next potential public
health emergency, while also performing the vital
tasks needed to protect our daily health.  Strength-
ening the public health workforce, health care
surge capacity, and disease tracking and surveil-
lance are major issues of continuing concern.  
Ready or Not? 2009:  Major Conclusions
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as a major threat in one part of the country, while
wildfires receive higher priority in another.  In an
era of limited federal and state resources, states
must align limited preparedness dollars with the
highest ranked threats.  However, H1N1 was a
vivid reminder that every community needs to
maintain a basic level of preparedness to cope
with unexpected disease outbreaks or other emer-
gencies that might emerge.
Variation in preparedness in and across states and
communities means that where people live can de-
termine how well they are protected from threats to
their health.  In the case of a pandemic or infec-
tious disease outbreak, one weak link in the public
health chain can result in disaster for everyone.  
This 2009 edition of the Ready or Not? report fo-
cuses on reviewing state and federal public health
emergency preparedness.  The contents include:
 Section 1: An examination of state-by-state pub-
lic health preparedness, in which states are eval-
uated on 10 key preparedness indicators, based
on input and review from public health experts.
 Section 2:  A review of federal preparedness that
includes information on the ongoing response
to the H1N1 pandemic, leadership and public
health preparedness funding, the replenishment
of national stockpiles of medical countermea-
sures and supplies, and the development of near
real-time biosurveillance systems.
 Section 3:  A discussion of health care system
preparedness, including the development of
surge capacity plans for staff, space, and sup-
plies, and the planning and development of
crisis standards of care to be used in a mass
casualty event.  The financing of health care
system preparedness -- an issue not addressed
by the current health reform legislation be-
fore Congress -- is also examined.
 Section 4:  Recommendations for improving
all-hazards and pandemic preparedness.
Ready or Not? 2009: Key Findings
Indicator Finding
1.  Mass Distribution -- State Antiviral Purchases 13 states have purchased less than 50 percent of their share of federally-subsidized an-
tiviral drugs to stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic.
2.  Hospital Preparedness -- Hospital Bed 10 states and the District of Columbia do not submit weekly data for at least 50 percent 
Availability Reporting of the hospitals within their jurisdiction to the National Hospital Available Beds for Emergen-
cies and Disasters (HAvBED) System as required by ASPR during the 2009 H1N1 response.
3.  Public Health Laboratories -- Lab Pick Up 14 states do not have the capacity in place to assure the timely transportation (pick-up 
and Delivery Services and delivery) of samples 24/7, 365 days to the appropriate public health Laboratory
Response Network (LRN) reference laboratory.
4.  Public Health Laboratories -- Surge Workforce 11 states and D.C. do not have enough staffing capacity to work five, 12-hour days for
six to eight weeks in response to an infectious disease outbreak, such as novel 
influenza A H1N1.
5.  Biosurveillance 6 states do not have a disease surveillance system that is compatible with CDC’s 
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
6.  Food Safety -- Detection and Diagnosis 14 states were not able to identify the pathogen responsible for reported food-borne
disease outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national average of 46 percent
(combined data 2005-2007).
7.  Medical Reserve Corps Readiness 9 states do not meet the Medical Reserve Corps readiness criteria
8.  Community Resiliency -- Children and Preparedness Only 20 states and D.C. have laws requiring licensed childcare facilities to have a multi-
hazard written evacuation and relocation plan, and verification that laws are implemented.
9.  Legal Preparedness -- Entity Emergency 18 states have not adopted entity emergency liability protections or have made no 
Liability Protection formal determination under existing law.
10.  Public Health Funding Commitment -- State 27 states cut funding for public health from FY 2007-08 to FY 2008-09.
Public Health Budgets
5Summary of Key Preparedness Improvements and Concerns
Federal legislation Progress:
and funding  The 2009 Supplemental for H1N1 (P.L. 111-32) included $7.7 billion, of which $5.8 billion was contingency
funding, for HHS to develop, purchase, and administer H1N1 vaccine, enhance influenza surveillance, and
assist state and local health departments with mass vaccination plans and H1N1 response.1
Concerns:
 Federal funding for public health emergency preparedness and hospital preparedness has declined 27 percent
since FY 2005 when adjusted for inflation.  While additional funding has been provided to respond to
emergencies, this is less effective than ongoing support for preparedness.
Accountability, oversight, Progress:
and transparency  As of November 2009, CDC had introduced new, evidence-based benchmarks for two of the five areas
identified for initial performance measure development: Incident Management and Crisis & Emergency Risk
Communications (CERC).  Work continues on outcome- oriented objectives for the remaining three priority
areas: Biosurveillance, Countermeasure Distribution, and Community Containment strategies.
 All 50 states and D.C. have state-wide strategic pandemic plans that were submitted to HHS for a federal
government review.  HHS released the state grades in January 2009 -- four months before the first wave of
the H1N1 pandemic.
 The federal government has been remarkably transparent with the American people about this pandemic
since it began last spring.  The federal effort appears to be well coordinated with all cabinet and subcabinet
officials working from the same playbook.  Public health officials have leveled with the American people --
making appropriate adjustments in recommendations as our understanding of the nature of the pandemic 
has evolved.  The same has held true as supply issues have arisen.  The constantly updated public health
information has led to some understandable confusion among the public, but it has reflected an honest
attempt to reflect the current state of knowledge.
Concerns:
 Three years after the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was signed into law mandating
the creation of evidence-based performance measures and objectives, neither CDC nor ASPR have put forth
evidence-based guidelines regarding the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises in terms of what 
outcomes are expected from each test, or how to use the lessons learned to enhance preparedness.
Gaps in “plans on paper” Progress:
versus reality of response  All states and D.C. have plans to receive and distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, and medical supplies
from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  
Concerns:
Despite years of planning, many state health departments have struggled with limited resources to develop mass
vaccination plans to receive, distribute, and administer the H1N1 vaccine, raising concerns about the ability of the
public health sector to collaborate with the health care system.
Laboratory improvement Progress:
 New technology developed in part with HHS funding was used to identify the novel influenza A/H1N1 virus in
California and quickly led federal officials to declare a public health emergency.  
Concerns:
 During the first wave of H1N1 in the spring of 2009, laboratory testing capability was quickly overwhelmed in
some states by the surge in specimens, which affected the ability of health officials to get an up-to-date, real-time
understanding of the progress of the disease across the country.
Biosurveillance Progress:
 CDC, together with state and local health agencies, was able to turn a novel approach to surveillance into a
real-time display of summarized daily data for influenza surveillance ahead of the second wave of the H1N1
outbreak.  As of October 6, 2009, 19 states and five local health departments were reporting data to the
Distribute system.
Concerns:
Despite a federal mandate, the United States continues to lack an integrated, national approach to biosurveillance
that is capable of responding to catastrophic health threats or to more familiar problems such as the contamination
of food supplies.  
 States report data to CDC on a voluntary basis and the quality of the data reported varies greatly among state
health departments, and even among programs in the same state health department.  
State public health Progress:
funding  As mandated by the 2006 Pandemic and All Hazards Act, as of FY 2009 public health and hospital preparedness
grant awardees must contribute five percent in non-federal funds to support the cooperative agreements.  The
contribution grows to 10 percent in subsequent fiscal years.
Concerns:
 A majority of states decreased funding for public health services in FY 2008-09 as the worst economic recession
since World War II led states to slash services, and often disproportionately slashed public health budgets
6Summary of Key Preparedness Improvements and Concerns
Management and contents Progress:
of the Strategic National  Prior to the H1N1 outbreak in the spring of 2009, the Strategic National 
Stockpile Stockpile contained pandemic flu countermeasures such as 50 million antiviral 
treatment courses, 105.8 million N95 respirator masks, and 51.7 million 
surgical masks. 
Concerns:
 CDC has deployed many of the pandemic flu countermeasures held in the SNS,
including the majority of the N95 respirators and Tamiflu pediatric suspension, 
to state and local public health departments and health care systems.  There are
no plans or funding to replenish the antivirals, N95 respirator masks, or surgical
masks before the third wave of the H1N1 pandemic.  
Vaccine industry Progress:  
 The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)
awarded one federal contract for $487 million last spring to Novartis for the
construction of the first U.S. facility to manufacture cell-based flu vaccine. That
facility is scheduled to open in December 2009, but will not begin producing
licensed vaccine until 2014.2
Concerns:
Despite HHS having spent more than $1 billion in federal dollars to enhance
vaccine manufacturing capacity, we are still reliant on old egg-based production
lines, which contributed to delays in production and delivery of the H1N1 vaccine.
Surge planning Progress:
and capacity  The Institute of Medicine published Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards 
of Care for Use in Disaster Situations: A Letter Report in September 2009, which
includes a five-step process for emergency planners to follow when developing
crisis standards of care.
 HHS is using an online tracking tool, HAvBED or the Hospital Available Beds 
for Emergencies and Disasters, to help health care systems and regions care for
a surge of patients in the event of a mass casualty incident.
Concerns:
 Few states have developed crisis standards of care, and there is no federal
clearinghouse to share information on best practices for planning and
development of crisis standards of care.
 There has been limited public outreach regarding how the U.S. health care 
system will function in a public health emergency, which could lead to confusion
and/or mistrust of the system if a mass casualty event were to occur.  
Community resiliency Progress:
 The Obama administration created a Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group
to strengthen disaster recovery and ensure a more resilient nation.  The Secretaries
of Homeland Security and Housing and Urban Development are co-chairing the
Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group composed of the Secretaries and
Administrators of more than 20 departments, agencies and offices.
Concerns:
 Low-income and racial/ethnic minority communities continue to suffer
disproportionately during public health emergencies.  Initial reports on the spring
wave of H1N1 revealed that African-Americans and Hispanics were hospitalized
at significantly higher rates than white Americans, most likely because they suffer
more from underlying chronic health conditions, like asthma and diabetes.  
7The U.S. public health system is responsible for protecting
the American people from a range of potential health threats.
An all-hazards public health system is one that is able to
respond to and protect citizens from the full spectrum of
possible public health emergencies, including bioterrorism
and naturally occurring health threats. An all-hazards system
recognizes that preparing for one threat can have benefits
that will help prepare public health departments for all
potential threats.
Under an all-hazards approach, the public health system
prepares for and is able to respond to unique concerns posed
by different threats. For instance, threats may be:
 Isolated at our borders, or regionally, or be national or
global in scope;
Of limited duration or occur in repeated waves; and
 Preventable and treatable through vaccines and medications,
or there may be no pharmaceutical interventions available.
Agroterrorism: The “…deliberate introduction of an animal
or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing
economic losses, and/or undermining stability.”3 Agroterrorism
can be considered a subcategory of “bioterrorism” and
foodborne diseases.
Bioterrorism: The intentional or deliberate use of germs,
biotoxins, or other biological agents that cause disease or
death in people, animals, or plants. Examples include anthrax,
smallpox, botulism, Salmonella, and E. coli.
Blast Injuries:  Explosions, whether deliberate or accidental,
can cause multi-system, life threatening injuries among
individuals and within crowds.  Blunt and penetrating injuries
to multiple organ systems are likely when an explosion occurs.
Also, unique injuries to the lungs and central nervous system
occur during explosions.
Chemical terrorism: The deliberate use of chemical agents,
such as poisonous gases, arsenic, or pesticides that have toxic
effects on people, animals, or plants in order to cause illness
or death. Examples include ricin, sarin, and mustard gas. 
Chemical incidents and accidents: The non-deliberate
exposure of humans to harmful chemical agents, with similar
outcomes to chemical terrorism.
Food-borne diseases:  Food-borne illness is caused by
harmful bacteria, viruses, parasites or chemicals that are found
in food and beverages and enter the body through the
gastrointestinal tract.  The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) estimates there are approximately 76
million pathogen-induced cases of food-borne diseases each
year in the United States, causing approximately 325,000
hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths. Examples include botulism,
Salmonella, E.coli 0157:H7, shigella, and norovirus.
Natural disasters: Harm can be inflicted during and after
natural disasters, which can lead to contaminated water,
shortages of food and water, loss of shelter, and the disruption
of regular health care. Examples include hurricanes,
earthquakes, tornados, mudslides, fires, and tsunamis.
Pandemic flu: A novel, potentially lethal strain of the
influenza against which humans have no natural immunity.
The current novel influenza A/H1N1 strain circulating widely
in the United States and around the world is the first
pandemic flu of the 21st century.  Historically, pandemic flu
occurs two to three times every hundred years or so.  In the
20th century the world experienced the 1918, 1957/58, and
1968 pandemic flu, although the severity of the disease varied
greatly among them.
Radiological threats: Intentional or accidentally-caused
exposure to radiological material. A terrorist attack could
involve the scattering of radioactive materials through the use
of explosives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction of a nuclear
facility, the introduction of radioactive material into a food or
water supply, or the explosion of a nuclear device near a
population center.
Vector-borne diseases: Diseases spread by vectors, such as
insects. Examples include the West Nile virus, Rocky Mountain
spotted fever, and malaria.  
Water-borne diseases: Diseases spread by contaminated
drinking water or recreational water, such as typhoid fever
and cholera.  According to CDC, over 1,000 persons become
ill from contaminated drinking water and over 2,500 persons
become ill from recreational water disease outbreaks annually
in the United States.4
Zoonotic/Animal-borne diseases: Animal diseases that
can spread to humans and in some cases, become contagious
from human to human. Examples include Avian flu, West
Nile virus, and SARS.  In 2000, the World Health
Organization (WHO) identified more than 200 diseases
occurring in humans that were known to be transmitted
through animals.5 Experts believe that the increased
emergence of zoonotic diseases worldwide can be attributed
to population displacement, urbanization and crowding,
deforestation, and globalization of the food supply.  
ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
EXAMPLES OF MAJOR EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
8The goals of 24/7 public health emergency eesponse include:
 Rapid detection of and response to emergency disease
threats, including those caused by bioterrorism.
 Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly diagnose an
infectious disease outbreak or to identify the biological or
chemical agent used in an attack.
 Surge capacity for mass events, including adequate
facilities, equipment, supplies, and trained health
professionals.
Mass containment strategies, including pharmaceuticals
needed for antibiotic or antidote administration and
isolation and quarantining when necessary.
 Streamlined and effective communication channels so
health workers can swiftly and accurately communicate
with each other, other front line workers, and the public
about 1) the nature of an emergency or attack, 2) the risk
of exposure and how to seek treatment when needed, and
3) any actions they or their families should take to protect
themselves.
 Communications must also be able to reach and take into
consideration at-risk populations.
 Streamlined and effective evacuation of at-risk populations
with special medical needs.
 An informed and involved public that can provide material and
moral support to professional responders, and can render aid
when necessary to friends, family, neighbors, and associates.
What it will take to achieve basic levels of preparedness:
 Leadership, planning, and coordination: An 
established chain-of-command and well defined roles and
responsibilities for seamless operation across different
medical and logistical functions and among federal, state,
and local authorities during crisis situations, including police,
public safety officials, and other first responders.
Well-funded core public health infrastructure:  Basic
public health systems and equipment, including laboratory
testing and communications that keeps pace with advances
in science and technology.  
 An expert and fully-staffed workforce: Highly trained
and adequate numbers of public health professionals,
including epidemiologists, lab scientists, public health nurses
and doctors, and other experts, in addition to back-up
workers for surge capacity conditions.
Modernized technology: State-of-the-art laboratory
equipment, information collection, and health tracking systems.
 Pre-planned, safety-first rapid emergency response
capabilities and precautions: Tested plans and safety
precautions to mitigate potential harm to communities,
public health professionals, and first responders.
 Immediate, streamlined communications capabilities:
Coordinated, integrated communications among all parts of
the public health system, all frontline responders, and with
the public. Must include back-up systems in the event of
power loss or overloaded wireless channels.
WHAT DOES ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE?
The federal role: Includes policymaking, funding programs,
overseeing national disease prevention efforts, collecting and
disseminating health information, building capacity, and
directly managing some services.6 Some public health
capabilities, such as the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), are
federal assets managed by federal agencies that are available
to supplement a state’s and community’s response to a public
health emergency that overwhelms or may overwhelm their
capabilities.  Public health functions are widely diffused across
eight federal agencies and two offices.
State and local roles: Under U.S. law, state governments have
primary responsibility for the health of their citizens.
Constitutional “police powers” give states the ability to enact
laws and issue regulations to protect, preserve, and promote
the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. In most
states, state laws charge local governments with responsibility
for the health of their citizens.  State and local health
departments and first responders are the front line in any
public health emergency.  
Some of the ongoing problems resulting from this diffused
structure include:
1. Lack of clear roles for the various state, local, and federal
agencies.
2. Differing responsibilities and capacities among the some
3,000 local health departments.
3. Limited coordination among the levels of government,
including determination of how federal assets would be
deployed to states and localities, and across jurisdictions,
such as sharing assets and resources among states.
4. No minimum standards, guidelines, or recommendations
for capacity levels or services are required of state and local
health departments. This results in major differences in
services and competencies across state and local agencies.
5. Lack of funding flexibility and comprehensiveness due to a
federal funding structure that is largely based on categorical
or program grants. These often restrictive grants also lack a
system of accountability.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH JURISDICTIONS
State-by-State Public
Health Preparedness
Indicators and Scores
All Americans have the right to expect fundamental health protections during public health emergencies, no matter where they live.  
To help assess health emergency preparedness,
this section of the Ready or Not? report examines
a series of 10 indicators of preparedness in each
state that, taken collectively, offer a composite
snapshot of strengths and vulnerabilities.  
While federal, state, and local health depart-
ments, and private health providers all have roles
to play in public health preparedness, states have
primary legal jurisdiction and responsibility for
the health of their citizens.7 In addition, the fed-
eral government provides funding for prepared-
ness to states.  Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has provided
nearly $7 billion in preparedness funding to
states and some major cities. 
States differ in how they structure, deliver and
fund public health services, and different states
have different strengths and vulnerabilities in ca-
pabilities.  States with multiple, high-density
urban areas may function very differently than
those with fewer residents spread across smaller
cities and towns.  However, all states should be
able to meet basic preparedness goals as defined
by federal health officials.  
This report was developed to provide taxpayers
and policymakers with information about how
well-prepared their states and communities are
for different types of health threats.  The Ameri-
can people deserve to know how prepared their
states and communities are for different types of
health threats, particularly when their taxpayer
dollars are being spent to support preparedness
efforts.  Currently, the American public is not
equipped with enough information to monitor
and hold public officials accountable for whether
their communities are adequately prepared.
Limited data is made publicly available to meas-
ure public health preparedness. In fact, despite
the allocation of nearly $7 billion in federal pub-
lic health preparedness funds to states and lo-
calities over the past six years, reliable, valid
performance measures to evaluate emergency
preparedness are still to be fully developed, de-
spite numerous commissions and studies that
were funded to create them.   In 2008, the CDC
issued a report on states’ preparedness, which
largely focused on the development of plans and
process indicators, and the data was outdated.8
(An updated version of this report is due out in
the spring of 2010.)  This was an important first
step, but more must be done.  In all seven years
of the Ready or Not? report, TFAH has called for
the government to develop national perform-
ance standards and to publicly release informa-
tion on a routine basis about states’ progress in
meeting those standards.  
This Ready or Not? report compiles indicators
based on the best publicly available data or data
received from surveying states directly.  Each
state receives a score based on 10 key indicators.
States receive one point for achieving an indi-
cator or zero points if they do not achieve the
indicator.  Zero is the lowest possible overall
score, and 10 is the highest.  (For more infor-
mation, please see Appendix C: Data and
Methodology for State Indicators.)
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SCORES BY STATE
Number of Indicators Color
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
WA
NV
AZ
CO
NE
ND
MN
WI
IL
KY VA
NY
HI 
MD 
DC 
DE 
NJ 
NH 
VT 
MA 
RI 
CT 
NC
LA
AR
MS AL 
SD
KS MO
TN
GA
SC
FL 
IN OH
WV
PA 
ME
MI 
IA
OK
TX
NM 
OR
ID 
MT 
WY
UT
AK
CA
9
(8 states)
Arkansas
Delaware
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Texas
Vermont
8
(11 states & D.C.)
Alabama
California
Colorado
D.C.
Kentucky
Michigan 
Mississippi
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Wisconsin
7
(11 states)
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
New Hampshire
South Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
6
(13 states)
Connecticut
Georgia
Illinois
Kansas
Louisiana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
Rhode Island
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming
5
(6 states)
Alaska 
Arizona
Florida
Idaho
Maine
Washington
4
(0 states)
3
(1 state)
Montana
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STATE PREPAREDNESS SCORES
States (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Purchased State health State public health State public State has State identified State meets State State has Increased or 
50 percent department lab has the health lab reports disease the pathogen the Medical requires all either maintained 
or more of submitted data capacity in place having enough tracking responsible Reserve Corps licensed enacted level of 
their share on available beds to assure the timely staffing capacity system to for reported (MRC) childcare entity funding 
of federally- weekly for at transportation to work five, collect and foodborne readiness facilities to liability laws for public 
subsidized least 50 percent (pick-up and 12-hour days for monitor data disease criteria. have a or has made health 
antivirals. of the facilities delivery) of samples six to eight weeks electronically outbreaks at a multi-hazard a formal services 2009 
within their state 24/7, 365 days to in response to via the rate that met written and official from Total 
to HAvBED the appropriate an infectious Internet. or exceeded evacuation determination FY 2007-08 Score
System as public health disease outbreak, the national and that existing to 
required by ASPR Laboratory such as average of relocation law provides FY 2008-09
during the 2009 Response Network novel influenza 46 percent plan. such 
H1N1 response. (LRN) reference A H1N1. (combined data protections.
laboratory. 2005-2007).
Alabama         8
Alaska      5
Arizona      5
Arkansas          9
California         8
Colorado         8
Connecticut       6
Delaware          9
D.C         8
Florida      5
Georgia       6
Hawaii        7
Idaho      5
Illinois       6
Indiana        7
Iowa        7
Kansas       6
Kentucky         8
Louisiana       6
Maine      5
Maryland        7
Massachusetts        7
Michigan         8
Minnesota        7
Mississippi         8
Missouri        7
Montana    3
Nebraska       6
Nevada       6
New Hampshire        7
New Jersey       6
New Mexico       6
New York          9
North Carolina          9
North Dakota          9
Ohio         8
Oklahoma          9
Oregon         8
Pennsylvania         8
Rhode Island       6
South Carolina         8
South Dakota        7
Tennessee        7
Texas          9
Utah       6
Vermont          9
Virginia        7
Washington      5
West Virginia       6
Wisconsin         8
Wyoming       6
Total 37 + D.C. 40 36 + D.C. 39 44 + D.C. 36 + D.C. 41 + D.C. 20 + D.C. 32 + D.C. 23 + D.C.
Low scores are not intended to lead to punitive
actions.  Much to the contrary, this report is in-
tended to help identify where sufficient resources
have not been made available by the federal or
state governments to support adequate public
health preparedness and where and how states
could improve or overcome obstacles to an all-
hazards approach to public health preparedness.
In addition, providing information about which
states have particular strengths allows others to
know which states to turn to for best practices and
models to guide their own preparedness efforts.
The indicators in this report were selected
based on:
 Reflection of a fundamental, systemic public
health need;
 Consultation with key experts about areas
important to serving basic public health
emergency needs; and
 The availability of state level data that were
verified through independent means or in
consultation with states.
TFAH is only able to assess states comparatively
where there are data available for all 50 states
and D.C.  Many states have taken action in other
areas of preparedness and developed strengths
or may be in the process of increasing certain
capabilities not reflected in this report.  
Data from these indicators were drawn from a
range of publicly available sources, including
CDC, ASPR, a survey conducted by the Associ-
ation of Public Health Laboratories (APHL),
the Office of the Civilian Medical Reserve
Corps, the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officials (ASTHO), public announce-
ments from states, and interviews with govern-
ment officials.
12
The Ready or Not? report has documented the
significant progress that states have made in
preparing for public health emergencies.  
The 10 indicators are adapted annually to reflect
changing expectations for preparedness and
changes in the state preparedness data that are
made publicly available.   Updating the indicators
each year allows the report to reflect a range of
preparedness issues, including emphasizing what
is of the highest concern in any given year, but all
of the issues are considered to be important and
integral parts of overall public health emergency
capabilities.  The report does maintain some
consistency between years to help balance
measuring ongoing concerns with new, revised,
or highlighted concerns.  For instance, in the
2009 report, six of the indicators were also used
to measure preparedness in the 2008 report.
And in the 2008 report, five of the indicators
carried over from the 2007 report.
Over the course of seven years, TFAH has
shown the advancements in a number of
important areas, including:
 Development of emergency response
plans  
 All states have plans in place for public health
emergency response, pandemic influenza,
and crisis and emergency risk
communication.9
 Distribution of medical countermeasures
 All states have developed strategies and plans
to receive and distribute SNS medical
supplies.10
 Expansion of laboratory capacity  
 All states have developed level three chemical
lab capacity and have agreements with and
access to a level one chemical lab equipped
to detect exposure to nerve agents,
mycotoxins, and select industrial toxins.11
READY OR NOT? DOCUMENTS PREPAREDNESS PROGRESS
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*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007, 2008, and
2009. **Note: In 2007, CDC switched from a green-yellow-
red stoplight model of evaluating state SNS plans to a
100-point scale, where 69 and above is deemed sufficient.
*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007, 2008, 
and 2009.
*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2008 and 2009. *Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2006-2009.
Examples of Key Areas of Progress
*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007-2009. *Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007-2009.
A. 2009 READY OR NOT? STATE-BY-STATE INDICATORS
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Indicators What the Indicators Measure
1.  Mass Distribution -- Antiviral Stockpiling -- The federal government has declared stockpiling 
Did the state purchase 50 percent or more of its antivirals to be a shared responsibility between the 
federally-subsidized antivirals drugs to stockpile for federal government and the states.  This indicator 
use during an influenza pandemic? assesses the state’s ability to provide antivirals to 
high-risk populations during an influenza pandemic.  
2.  Hospital Preparedness -- Hospital Bed This indicator demonstrates a state’s ability to track 
Availability Reporting -- Does the state health hospital bed availability during a public health emergency 
department submit data to the National Hospital and share that information with federal officials.  
Available Beds for Emergencies and Disasters 
(HAvBED) System as required by ASPR?
3. Public Health Laboratories -- Lab Pickup and This indicator reflects whether states have the capacity 
Delivery Services -- Does the state public health lab to deliver and receive laboratory specimens on a 
currently have the capacity in place to assure the timely 24/7/365 basis.
transportation (pick-up and delivery) of samples 24/7, 
365 days to the appropriate public health Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) reference laboratory?
4. Public Health Laboratories -- Surge This indicator demonstrates the ability of a state public 
Workforce -- Does the state public health laboratory health laboratory to respond to a pandemic flu or other 
have enough staffing capacity to work five, 12-hour infectious disease outbreak when the demand on the 
days for six to eight weeks in response to an infectious public health lab workforce is great.
disease outbreak, such as novel influenza A H1N1?   
5.  Biosurveillance -- Does the state use a disease This indicator assesses whether or not states track health 
surveillance system that is compatible with CDC’s threats in a manner compatible with the standards of 
national system, including integrating data from CDC’s National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
multiple sources, using electronic laboratory results (NEDSS).  This system makes it possible to quickly 
(ELR) reporting, and using a Web-based browser? identify and track outbreaks and share the information in
a consistent way across health agencies and states.
6.  Food Safety -- Detection and Diagnosis -- Did This indicator reflects the ability of states to identify the 
the state identify the pathogen responsible for pathogen responsible for food-borne disease outbreaks.
reported food-borne disease outbreaks at a rate that 
met or exceeded the national average of 46 percent 
(combined data 2005-2007)?
7.  Medical Reserve Corps Readiness -- Do the This indicator assesses the state MRC program on three 
Medical Reserve Corps units within the state meet criteria 1) the presence of a State Coordinator, 2) 
the readiness criteria? compliance with the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) guidelines, and 3) integration with the 
state Emergency System for Advance Registration of Vol-
unteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP).  
8.  Community Resiliency -- Children and This indicator looks at the extent to which the needs of 
Preparedness -- Does the state require all licensed children have been incorporated into state public health 
childcare facilities to have a multi-hazard written preparedness planning.
evacuation and relocation plan and verification that 
laws are implemented?
9.  Entity Emergency Liability Protection -- Does This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to work 
the state have laws that reduce or limit the liability for with the private sector in the event of a public health 
businesses and non-profit organizations that serve in a emergency.  The lack of liability protection is a serious 
public health emergency? deterrent to many businesses and non-profits that may
want to offer their services but are fearful of doing so
without clear liability laws.
10.  Funding Commitment -- Did the state maintain This indicator, adjusted for inflation, demonstrates states’ 
or increase funding for public health programs from commitment to funding public health programs, which 
FY 2007-08 to FY 2008-09? support the infrastructure needed to adequately respond
to emergencies.
Notes: States in red type have purchased more antivirals
since September 30, 2008.
*The percent reflects total state antiviral purchases and may
include unsubsidized state purchases, which is why some
states exceed 100% of their federally-subsidized allocation. 
**The population count for California and Illinois does not
include residents of Los Angeles County or Chicago.  
***New York State antiviral purchases include those made
by New York City.  
A complete breakdown of federal and state antiviral pur-
chases is available on line at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/
plan/states/antivirals.html. 
Source: http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/states/
antivirals.html (accessed November 24, 2009).
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37 states and D.C. have purchased 13 states have purchased LESS than 
50 percent or more of their federally- 50 percent of their share of federally-
subsidized antivirals drugs to stockpile for subsidized antiviral drugs to stockpile 
use during an influenza pandemic (1 point). for use during an influenza pandemic 
(0 points).
State  All Antivirals Percent of State All Antivirals Percent of 
Purchased by Allocation Purchased by Allocation 
Entity as of Purchased* Entity as of Purchased**
10/29/2009 10/29/2009
Alabama 533,553 112.8% Arizona 67,717 11.6%
Alaska 90,980 133.7% Colorado 1,215 0.3%
Arkansas 382,398 133.5% Connecticut 22,829 6.2%
California** 2,772,922 103.2% Florida 548,082 30.7%
Delaware 180,095 209.7% Idaho 8,567 6.0%
D.C. 90,926 155.3% Massachusetts 179,862 26.7%
Georgia 474,022 52.0% Montana 8,174 8.5%
Hawaii 172,487 131.6% Nebraska 71,952 39.4%
Illinois** 777,825 75.8% New Mexico 77,409 39.2%
Indiana 650,912 100.0% Oklahoma 93,765 25.5%
Iowa 312,631 101.2% Oregon 36,668 9.8%
Kansas 286,084 100.0% Rhode Island 38,987 34.5%
Kentucky 216,224 50.0% Utah 71,591 29.0%
Louisiana 478,734 101.5%
Maine 164,659 119.8%
Maryland 582,609 100.7%
Michigan 1,079,450 102.0%
Minnesota 373,828 70.3%
Mississippi 338,648 111.9%
Missouri 600,477 100.0%
Nevada 141,673 60.2%
New Hampshire 68,000 50.3%
New Jersey 880,293 97.0%
New York*** 2,444,836 121.2%
North Carolina 677,882 76.7%
North Dakota 57,000 85.7%
Ohio 1,388,858 115.7%
Pennsylvania 1,313,666 101.1%
South Carolina 459,960 105.6%
South Dakota 80,310 100.0%
Tennessee 613,706 100.0%
Texas 1,951,765 84.1%
Vermont 71,036 109.2%
Virginia 828,445 107.1%
Washington 528,257 82.1%
West Virginia 248,462 130.6%
Wisconsin 574,763 100.0%
Wyoming 74,826 141.9%
1. Indicator: MASS DISTRIBUTION— STATE ANTIVIRAL PURCHASES 
FINDING:  Thirty-seven states and D.C. have purchased 50 percent or more of their federally-
subsidized antivirals to stockpile for use during a pandemic influenza.
When the federal government set a goal of
stockpiling 81 million treatment courses of an-
tiviral drugs for use in the event of a pandemic
influenza, the main concern was the avian in-
fluenza, H5N1, circulating in Asia.  No one fore-
saw the emergence of a novel influenza virus,
H1N1, in the spring of 2009.  
As the H1N1 virus spread across the globe, the
World Health Organization (WHO) urged doc-
tors to treat suspected H1N1 cases as quickly as
possible with antiviral drugs, warning that the
virus could cause potentially life-threatening
viral pneumonia much more commonly than
the typical flu, sometimes in relatively young,
otherwise healthy people.   “It’s not like seasonal
influenza,” said Nikki Shindo, a medical officer
in the WHO’s Epidemic and Pandemic Alert
and Response Department. “It can cause very se-
vere disease in previously healthy young
adults.”12  
Dr. Anne Schuchat, CDC’s director of immu-
nization and respiratory disease emphasized the
need to promptly give antivirals to sick patients
with underlying conditions.  “The time it will
take to get the lab test back shouldn’t be waited
for,” she said.  “If you have a person who is se-
verely ill or a person with risk factors like preg-
nancy, asthma, diabetes, children under two,
and you suspect flu, we recommend any antiviral
medicines be given promptly.”13 She added that
in too many instances, health care providers
have delayed antiviral treatment, not realizing
that rapid flu tests are notoriously inaccurate.
As of October 2009, HHS has stockpiled 50 mil-
lion antivirals, 44 million of which have been al-
located to states based on their population.
HHS asked states to stockpile an additional 31
million treatment courses, collectively, for their
populations.  In order to encourage states to de-
velop their own antiviral stockpiles, HHS is sub-
sidizing 25 percent of the cost, while states pay
the other 75 percent.  Despite the subsidy pro-
gram, 13 states have purchased less than 50 per-
cent of their share of antivirals.  
According to HHS, as of October 29, 2009, state
and local jurisdictions have stockpiled slightly
more than 25 million treatment courses of an-
tivirals using the federal government subsidy.
Twenty-five states and D.C. have purchased 100
percent or more of their federally- subsidized
antivirals; 32 states and D.C. have purchased 75
percent or more; 37 states and D.C. have pur-
chased 50 percent or more; and 44 states and
D.C. have purchased 25 percent or more. Six
states have stockpiled less than 25 percent of
their share of antiviral treatment courses:  Ari-
zona (11.6 percent); Oregon (9.8 percent);
Montana (8.5 percent); Connecticut (6.2 per-
cent); Idaho (6.0 percent); and Colorado (0.3
percent).
TFAH awards a point on this indicator to those
states that have stockpiled 50 percent or more
of their federally subsidized share of antivirals.
In 2008, only 34 states and D.C. earned a point
on this indicator.  Over the past year, Maine,
Maryland, and Texas have increased their stock-
piles to exceed 50 percent of their federally-sub-
sidized antivirals.  
The antivirals Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) and Re-
lenza® (zanamivir) have been shown to reduce
symptoms and help prevent the spread of sea-
sonal influenza by suppressing the growth of the
influenza virus.  Antivirals differ from vaccines
in that they stop the virus from replicating, while
vaccines trigger an immune response in the
body.  Antivirals do not need to be formulated to
match a specific strain of the influenza virus to
be effective.  As such, they can be manufactured
and stockpiled in advance of a potential pan-
demic influenza outbreak.  High-risk patients,
including pregnant women and children, who
contract H1N1 or show flu-like symptoms are
being urged to start treatment with antivirals im-
mediately.
States that have not purchased their entire al-
lotment of federally-subsidized antivirals give
several reasons.  Some state health officials have
questions their effectiveness.14 Other states
worry about the drugs’ potential side effects and
financial constraints.  Given the current eco-
nomic recession, many states are reluctant to
spend resources on purchasing and stockpiling
antivirals that have a limited shelf-life.  Though
this shelf-life recently expanded from five years
to seven years, it is still too short for many state
health officials.  
Although TFAH recognizes these concerns, the
current crisis has demonstrated the importance
of having an antiviral stockpile (and the need to
replenish it as it is used).  Current national pol-
icy calls for the stockpiling of antivirals to be a
shared federal-state responsibility.  Preventing
serious illness and death among those infected
with H1N1 is threatened by differences in ca-
pacity among states.
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Source:  Office of Public Health Preparedness, Michigan Department of Community Health
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When the first tractor-trailer trucks rolled into Michigan this past spring carrying medical
countermeasures and supplies from the SNS to assist in the state’s response to the H1N1 outbreak,
years of planning and training by Michigan’s SNS team paid off.  The federal PHEP dollars had
helped the Michigan SNS staff establish a seamless, comprehensive, and efficient warehousing and
distribution process which has been functional throughout the 2009 H1N1 response.  CDC’s
delivery method was neither a push-pack nor managed inventory -- two scenarios the Michigan
team had trained for -- so state public health plans were quickly modified to accommodate the
unexpected volume and types of materials.  Within two business days of arrival the material had
been inventoried, local partners queried for gaps, and shipments were on their way statewide.
The Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH) had also used the federal funding to
establish partnerships with the Michigan Pharmacists Association, Michigan Volunteer Defense Force,
Civil Air Patrol (CAP), and other departments, which proved not only beneficial but timely in the
response to H1N1. Utilizing the CAP, the state was able to expedite the distribution to the most
remote locations in the Upper Peninsula within a very short period of time.  This activity was
managed through the established incident command system at MDCH Emergency Coordination
Center. Efforts continue throughout the current H1N1 response, demonstrating successful
communications and responsiveness to medical and public health needs statewide. 
As MDCH geared up for the largest mass vaccination campaign in U.S. history, public health officials
needed a way to track H1N1 vaccine administration and antiviral distribution and dispensing.
MDCH turned to the Michigan Care Improvement Registry (MCIR) in the MDCH Division of
Immunizations, which has been a key component for years in influenza vaccine tracking and
administration.  This system had been modified to include an All Hazards PHEP Module with the
capability to track SNS material prior to the spring of 2009 using the federal pandemic influenza
funding.  The MCIR was rapidly converted to track antiviral distribution and dispensing and H1N1
influenza vaccine administration.  Established policies and training programs allowed this internet-
based system to be effectively used in private pharmacies, hospitals, and other physician offices
where immunizations were not given routinely and where state-allocated antiviral medications
were never considered. The MCIR is the lifeblood of distribution and tracking in the H1N1 medical
countermeasure response.
The H1N1 response has reinforced the importance of the established dynamic surveillance systems
that are in place. As such, the Michigan Disease Surveillance system (MDSS) provides real-time
electronic reporting from the provider or laboratory through the local health department to the
State, Bureau of Epidemiology. Constitutional complaints collected from The Emergency
Department Syndromic Surveillance System collects chief complaints codes from over 88 hospital
systems, which provides another critical surveillance component. The Retail Over the Counter
Drug System (RODS) is another piece of the statewide surveillance puzzle that is evaluated and
analyzed in conjunction with sentinel physician reporting, hospital influenza-like illness reports and
school-based reporting. These federally-funded surveillance systems provide critical information to
assist with the response to H1N1. Local and state health officials can monitor disease activity in
their communities and target response based on those reports.  Development of these systems has
been costly over time, but has proven its value in response to H1N1 and other disease outbreaks.
Finally, it is impossible to capture the incredible value that the relationship building that has occurred
at all levels of government and the private sector directly related to the emergency preparedness
funding. Utilization of funds to meet benchmarks and deliverables often crosses the lines between
the sources. From the ability to expedite communications via the Michigan Health Alert Network to
the accessing of volunteers for vaccination clinics through the Michigan Volunteer Registry, the public
health response has and will continue to improve based on these critical federal preparedness funds. 
MICHIGAN -- BUILDING A STRONG INFLUENZA RESPONSE USING 
THE BACKBONE OF PREPAREDNESS
2. Indicator: HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS -- HOSPITAL BED AVAILABILITY REPORTING
FINDING:  Ten states and the District of Columbia do not submit weekly data for at least 50 percent of
the hospitals within their jurisdiction to the National Hospital Available Beds for Emergencies and
Disasters (HAvBED) System.
Source: ASPR15
Hospitals that receive funding from the National
Healthcare Preparedness Program at the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response must meet a series of expectations, in-
cluding the ability to track hospital bed availabil-
ity during a public health emergency.  Although
hospitals may create their own systems, they must
be compatible with HHS’s Hospital Available
Beds for Emergencies and Disasters (HAvBED)
System and use the same data standards and def-
initions.16 This system requires reports of avail-
able beds, including a count of available adult
and pediatric general beds and ICU beds, to state
and HHS emergency operations centers within
four hours of request. States can submit data at
the facility level (which is preferred for mapping
purposes) or they can submit state-wide aggre-
gate information.  Some states have developed
their own systems for situational awareness; oth-
ers use the HAvBED web portal for data entry.   
In 2009, HAvBED was activated three times: in
the National Capital Region (NCR) for the In-
auguration, for a nation-wide preparedness ex-
ercise in March, and for the 2009 H1N1 pre-
paredness and response.  Forty-nine states and
the District participated in the exercise.  With
the second wave of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic,
ASPR requested a nation-wide weekly data call
for HAvBED.  Since October 1, 2009 forty states
submitted data weekly for at least 50% of the fa-
cilities within their states.  Twenty four states --
were particularly noteworthy for providing
weekly data for 75% of the facilities in their
states.  Those states were: Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
York,  North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, and Wyoming.  
According to Dr. Nicole Lurie, the Assistant Sec-
retary for Preparedness and Response, HAvBED
has collected information from states about hos-
pital status, which has enhanced the H1N1 med-18
40 states submitted data on available beds
weekly for at least 50 percent of the
facilities within their state to the National
Hospital Available Beds for Emergencies
and Disasters (HAvBED) System as
required by ASPR during the 2009 H1N1
response (1 point)
Alaska Nebraska
Arizona Nevada
Arkansas New Jersey
California New York
Colorado North Carolina
Connecticut North Dakota
Delaware Ohio
Illinois Oklahoma
Indiana Oregon
Iowa Pennsylvania
Kansas Rhode Island
Kentucky South Carolina
Maine South Dakota
Maryland Tennessee
Massachusetts Texas
Michigan Utah 
Minnesota Vermont
Mississippi Virginia
Missouri Wisconsin
Montana Wyoming
10 states and the District did NOT submit
weekly data for at least 50 percent of their
facilities within their state to the National
Hospital Available Beds for Emergencies
and Disasters (HAvBED) System as
required by ASPR during the 2009 H1N1
response (0 points) 
Alabama Idaho
D.C. Louisiana
Florida New Hampshire
Georgia New Mexico
Hawaii Washington
West Virginia
ical surge response.17 In addition to the ‘available
bed’ data elements reported above, the H1N1
data collection included new data elements,
which were first implemented in September
2009.  States are incorporating these new data el-
ements into their existing HAvBED reporting sys-
tems to provide enhanced situational awareness.
Over the first eight weeks of participation (Octo-
ber-November), ASPR has worked with all 50
states and the District to implement collection of
the new data elements even though they are not
yet required under the HPP program.  Forty-one
states are reporting the new data elements.  This
has included modifications to electronic systems,
refinement of data elements and definitions, and
data input/collection strategies.  Many of the
states currently not reporting the new data ele-
ments are waiting for their state-based data col-
lection systems to be updated and active.  ASPR is
continuing to work with states on full implemen-
tation of HAvBED data reporting with a goal of
full participation in 2010.  
The ability for hospitals, health care providers,
and health departments to track bed availability
during an emergency is crucial in the event they
must care for a surge of patients.  ASPR, working
with the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), developed HAvBED to give
emergency planners a timely bed availability
tracking tool.  The utility of HAvBED is for all
hazards, and continues to be developed to pro-
mote integrated preparedness and response
across the tiers of response to include the
healthcare system, the community, states, re-
gions and the Federal government.
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A mass casualty event, such as a bioterrorist attack or a severe
influenza pandemic, could quickly overwhelm the health care
system if large numbers of patients all sought treatment at the
same time.  Resources -- including staff, supplies, and space --
would be strained in the case of such an event and health care
providers would face serious obstacles in attempting to provide
care to patients according to normal operating procedures.  
Providing care under this sort of challenging environment is
not something the U.S. health care system routinely deals
with, according to the Joint Massachusetts Department of
Public Health-Harvard Altered Standards of Care Working
Group.  While “[t]he military has traditionally upheld protocols
to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number during
mass casualty incidents, using well-established and accepted
practices for utilitarian triage to deploy resources…the
patient-centered model of civilian medicine in the United
States is much less familiar with such decision making.”19
In fact, a 2008 review of state planning revealed in some detail
the major challenges states and health care systems face when
developing crisis standards of care.  Researchers at the Center for
Public Health Preparedness at the Harvard School of Public
Health interviewed 33 hospital and state preparedness
coordinators and identified the following challenges:20 
 The allocation of scarce resources;
 Health care practitioner’s liability during a disaster;
 Health care worker absenteeism; and
 Lack of consensus on the current guidelines for triage pro-
tocols, consistent terminology, prioritization of patients, al-
location of ventilators, and others.
It is also unclear whether states should focus on developing
general guidance on how health care providers should approach
crisis care, or whether specific situation guidance, for example,
when to use a ventilator, is needed.
To help encourage more planning and development of crisis
standards of care, the IOM released Guidance for Establishing
Crisis Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations in
September 2009.  The report describes five key elements of
crisis standards of care protocols based on a review of existing
state plans, which include the following:
 A strong ethical grounding;
 Integrated and ongoing community and provider
engagement, education, and communication; 
 Assurances regarding legal authority and environment; 
 Clear indicators, triggers, and lines of responsibility; and
 Evidence-based clinical processes and operations.  
Among the states that have begun the process of planning and
developing crisis standards of care are: Arizona21, California22,
Colorado23, Massachusetts24, Minnesota25, Oregon26, Utah27,
and Virginia28.
“‘Crisis standards of care’ is defined as a substantial change in usual health care operations and the level of care it is possible to
deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive (e.g., pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., earthquake, hurricane) disaster. This
change in the level of care delivered is justified by specific circumstances and is formally declared by a state government, in
recognition that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period. The formal declaration that crisis standards of care are in
operation enables specific legal/regulatory powers and protections for health care providers in the necessary tasks of allocating and
using scarce medical resources and implementing alternate care facility operations.”
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THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE
3. Indicator: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- LAB PICK UP AND DELIVERY SERVICES 
FINDING:  Fourteen states do not have the capacity in place to assure the timely transportation (pick-up
and delivery) of samples 24/7, 365 days to the appropriate public health Laboratory Response Network
(LRN) reference laboratory.
Every state should have the capacity to deliver
and receive laboratory specimens on a 24-hour,
seven days a week basis as part of public health
preparedness.  Such a service, whether state-
owned and operated or contracted to a desig-
nated carrier, is essential to ensure the timeliness
of laboratory testing and subsequent treatment
or decontamination.    
According to APHL’s survey of state public
health laboratories, as of November 23, 2009
public health laboratories in 36 states and D.C.
report having this capacity.  Fourteen state pub-
lic health labs do not have this capacity.  Cuts in
federal and state budgets have significantly im-
pacted the ability of states to develop and main-
tain courier services; further budget cuts are
expected due to the current economic outlook.
These cuts threaten to undermine state labora-
tory preparedness as rapid recognition of an
event requires that samples coming from first re-
sponders, clinical or other laboratories be deliv-
ered to public health laboratories without delay.
Continuous sample referral and timely ground
transportation are the keys to state readiness.
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* Note:  Washington uses a system using the postal service, Fed/Ex/UPS, and local hospital couriers.
Source: APHL 2009 Survey of State Public Health Laboratories 
36 states and D.C. report that their public
health laboratories do have courier
systems (non-mail) in place to assure the
timely transportation (pick-up and
delivery) of samples 24/7, 365 days to the
appropriate public health LRN reference
laboratory (1 point).
Alabama Nebraska
Arizona New Hampshire
California New Mexico
Colorado New York
Connecticut North Carolina
D.C. Ohio
Florida Oklahoma
Hawaii Oregon
Iowa Pennsylvania
Kansas Rhode Island
Kentucky South Carolina
Louisiana South Dakota
Maryland Tennessee
Massachusetts Texas
Michigan Vermont
Minnesota Virginia
Mississippi Wisconsin
Missouri Wyoming
Montana
14 states report that their public health
laboratories do NOT have courier systems
(non-mail) in place to assure the timely
transportation (pick-up and delivery) of
samples 24/7, 365 days to the appropriate
public health LRN reference laboratory 
(0 points).
Alaska Maine
Arkansas Nevada
Delaware New Jersey
Georgia North Dakota
Idaho Utah
Illinois Washington*
Indiana West Virginia
4. Indicator: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- SURGE WORKFORCE
FINDING:  Eleven states and D.C. report not having enough staffing capacity to work five, 12-hour days
for six to eight weeks in response to an infectious disease outbreak, such as novel influenza A H1N1.   
An article published in the journal of the Asso-
ciation of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)
notes that during the first wave of H1N1 in the
spring of 2009, “The peak public health labora-
tory response was unsustainable; state and fed-
eral cutbacks have drained critical surge capacity
from a system already weakened by long-term
workforce shortages.”29
In the initial phases of an outbreak of a novel in-
fluenza virus, public health labs are on the front
lines conducting diagnostic testing because
other labs generally lack this capacity. Once the
novel virus is established in the population, di-
agnostic testing is no longer as important and
public health labs switch to surveillance testing.
The surveillance testing allows public health of-
ficials to gather enough information to track the
pandemic and monitor any genetic mutations
or changes in the virus.  
During a pandemic flu or other infectious dis-
ease outbreak, the demand on the public health
lab workforce is great -- and in some cases, ex-
ceeds supply.  According to APHL’s survey of
state public health laboratories, 11 states and
D.C. report not having enough staffing capacity
to work five, 12-hour days for six to eight weeks
in response to an infectious disease outbreak,
such as novel influenza A H1N1.   
If a major food-borne disease outbreak -- on the
scale of the 2008 salmonella contamination of
jalapeño and Serrano peppers --  were to occur
during H1N1 pandemic, there are concerns that
state public health labs would be unable to re-
spond effectively to both crises at the same time.  
Funding for public health laboratories is a major
concern.  Of the $600 million for pandemic pre-
paredness that was distributed to states in FY 2006
and FY 2007, public health laboratories received
little.  Even the emergency supplemental signed
June 24, 2009 provides very little for laboratory
preparedness.  Given that public health labs re-
ceived no funding via the federal stimulus pack-
age there are real concerns that labs will not be
able to maintain staffing capacity at a sufficient
level for the remainder of the H1N1 outbreak.
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Source: APHL 2009 Survey of State Public Health Laboratories
39 states report having enough staffing
capacity to work five, 12-hour days for six
to eight weeks in response to an infectious
disease outbreak, such as novel influenza 
A H1N1 (1 point). 
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11 states and D.C. report NOT having
enough staffing capacity to work five, 
12-hour days for six to eight weeks in
response to an infectious disease outbreak,
such as novel influenza A H1N1 (0 points).
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Public health workers are the backbone of the U.S. public
health system and carry out a range of duties including epi-
demiologic surveillance, laboratory testing and analysis, pre-
vention and treatment of infectious and chronic diseases, and
emergency preparedness.  
The public health workforce, however, is seriously strained by
chronic underfunding of public health and the current economic
recession, which has led to hiring freezes, travel restrictions, and
forced furloughs, at a time when the nation is grappling with a
major public health emergency.  According to a recent survey of
local health departments, 15,000 jobs have been eliminated since
2008.30 In addition, the public health workforce is aging and it
remains unclear how agencies plan to recruit the next generation
of workers.  According to a 2007 ASTHO survey, 24 states had
25 percent or more of their state public health workforce eligi-
ble to retire within in the next five years, while 10 states had 35
percent or more of their state public health workforce eligible.
Only seven states had less than 25 percent of their state public
health workforce eligible to retire within the next five years.  
One of the most severe public health workforce shortages is epi-
demiologists, second only to public health nurses.31 A 2005 sur-
vey of local health departments found that only 25 percent had an
epidemiologist on staff.32 Epidemiologists keep track of infectious
and chronic diseases, injury, and births and deaths in communi-
ties. They collect and analyze data about potential risks to health
in the community, and investigate disease outbreaks.  While many
epidemiologists have received advanced degrees from schools of
public health, others may be trained nurses or clinicians who per-
form investigations of disease outbreaks without the formal train-
ing.  Needless to say, without a trained epidemiology staff,
conducting effective public health interventions is very difficult.
A 2006 survey by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiol-
ogists (CSTE) reported a current total of 2,436 epidemiologists
working in state health departments (50 states and D.C.).33
The survey also found that the number of epidemiologists has
grown over time -- up 40 percent from the 2001 survey.  Much
of the growth in the epidemiology sector is attributed to the
federal emergency preparedness funding: more than one in five
epidemiologists in state health departments were funded by
preparedness grant monies, according to the 2006 survey.34
There is some concern that these new hires are extremely vul-
nerable to shifts in federal funding, especially at a time when
state public health dollars are stretched to the limits.  
Also concerning, is that despite the increase in epidemiologists
in the field, survey respondents also reported an estimated
need for 30 percent more epidemiologists in order to fully
staff all the programs.35 This translates into approximately one
epidemiologist per 100,000 population served to reach opti-
mal capacity in state health departments.36  
Measuring public health workforce capacity can be challeng-
ing.  Unlike health care professionals who must be accredited
and licensed -- thereby making it easier to count and track
them -- many public health workers are trained in fields that
do not provide any credentialing or licensing.  
As of the publication of this report, the health reform bills be-
fore Congress contain several provisions to strengthen the pub-
lic health workforce.  Among the provisions are the following: 
 Public Health Workforce Recruitment and Retention
Programs:  The pending Senate health reform legislation
would establish a public health workforce loan repayment
program to reduce critical public health workforce short-
ages in federal, state, local and tribal public health agencies.
In FY 2010, $195 million is authorized to be appropriated
for this program, and such sums as necessary for FY 2011-
2015.  A separate provision in the Senate bill, Grants for
State and Local Programs, authorizes $60 million in grants
for training of mid-career public health professionals.
 Public Health Workforce Corps:   The House-passed bill
would establish a Public Health Workforce Corps to ensure
an adequate supply of public health professionals to elimi-
nate critical public health workforce shortages.  The HHS
Secretary would be responsible for developing a methodol-
ogy for placing and assigning Corps participants, and the
methodology may allow for placing and assigning partici-
pants in state, local and tribal health departments and feder-
ally qualified health centers. The bill also establishes the
Public Health Workforce Scholarship Program & Public
Health Workforce Loan Repayment Program.  Sec. 2235
authorizes to be appropriated money from the Public
Health Investment Fund for the Corps.
 Fellowship Training in Public Health:   The pending Sen-
ate bill would authorize funding for fellowship training in ap-
plied public health epidemiology, public health laboratory
science, public health informatics, and expansion of the epi-
demic intelligence service in order to address documented
workforce shortages in state and local health departments.
The legislation authorizes $5 million to be available in each
fiscal year for epidemiology fellowship training programs, $5
million for laboratory fellowship training programs; $5 million
for the Public Health Informatics Fellowship Program; and
$24,500,000 for expanding the Epidemic Intelligence Service.
 Enhancing the Public Health Workforce:  The House-
passed bill would establish a public health workforce train-
ing and enhancement program consisting of awarding grants
and contracts for public health training programs and fel-
lowships and traineeships for students who participate in
these programs and who plan to specialize or work in the
field of public health.
PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
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 National Health Care Workforce Commission:  The
pending Senate legislation establishes a commission to dis-
seminate information on current and projected health care
workforce supply and demand, including the public health
workforce, health care workforce education and training
capacity, retention practices for health care professionals,
and recommendations on the development of a fiscally sus-
tainable integrated workforce.  The Commission shall make
recommendations regarding national health care workforce
priorities, goals, and policies, including recommendations
concerning related policies.  The finding shall be communi-
cated to various federal departments such as HHS, DHS,
Labor, Energy, and the VA.  There is similar language in the
House-passed bill to establish an Advisory Committee on
Health Workforce Evaluation and Assessment, which
would make recommendations on the classification of the
health workforce (which is defined as including public
health) and procedures to enumerate the health workforce,
the supply, diversity, and geographic distribution of the
workforce, the retention of the health workforce, and poli-
cies to carry out the recommendations made.
 State Health Care Workforce Development Grants:
The pending Senate legislation would establish a competi-
tive health workforce development grant program to en-
able state partnerships to complete comprehensive
planning and to carry out activities leading to coherent and
comprehensive health care workforce development strate-
gies at the state and local levels.  The legislation authorizes
$8 million for planning grants and $150 million for imple-
mentation grants for FY 2010 and such sums as may be nec-
essary for each subsequent year.
For the past seven years, Public Health Emergency Prepared-
ness (PHEP) funding has played a vital role in building the plan-
ning and response capacity of the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health (DPH). During the current H1N1 (swine) flu
response, PHEP funding has been critical in developing addi-
tional risk communications capacity, in terms of messaging
strategy, content development, development of tools for dis-
semination of materials, and increased coordination with pub-
lic health partners at the local level. 
On a capacity-building level, PHEP funding was used to create a
Risk Communications Manager position which is charged with
overseeing all aspects of risk communications strategy and mes-
saging, working in conjunction with the Director of Communica-
tions and Director of Media Relations.  The Risk Communications
Manager played a crucial role in coordination of messaging during
the initial H1N1 outbreak response in spring 2009, the develop-
ment of materials in preparation for the return of H1N1 in the fall,
and the rapid-response messaging as the current situation unfolds.
The Risk Communications Manager is also responsible for
managing the development of all H1N1-related public informa-
tion materials posted on the DPH “Flu Facts” website. The
website is designed to serve as a central portal for the full
range of public information materials related to H1N1 prepa-
ration and response, including guidance for health care, public
health, educational, and emergency response professionals; in-
formation on flu prevention, vaccine, and treatment for the
general public; and a wide variety of other materials.
DPH maintains a strong commitment to providing information
for residents in a variety of languages. All materials developed
for the general public are posted in at least the five non-Eng-
lish languages most widely spoken in Massachusetts. Basic in-
formation such as the H1N1 (swine) flu fact sheet are posted
in 14 different languages besides English. 
While the “Flu Facts” web pages are an important resource
for both professionals and residents, DPH also maintains a
blog which serves as a forum for rapid response to unfolding
events, the latest on vaccine availability, and other materials to
provide users with the most up-to-date information on the
current situation. The Risk Communications Manager is re-
sponsible for managing the development and posting of all
content to this blog and the use of ancillary social media tools
such as Facebook and Twitter, which drive visitors there.
PHEP funding has also been used to support the development of
risk communications capacity at the local level, in recognition of
the vital role that local boards of health play in communicating
with residents on flu prevention and response. On an immediate
note, the Risk Communication Manager plays an ongoing consul-
tative role with local public health communicators, continuing a
dialogue on the statewide perspective on flu activity and vaccine
distribution in Massachusetts and what local partners are seeing
in their communities. Ideas and requests generated during these
conversations help to inform the regular updates to the blog, and
the development of new clinical guidance and public information
materials for the “Flu Facts” website.
On a wider level, the Risk Communications Manager has de-
veloped a series of basic and advanced risk communications
modules which have been provided in a variety of training ven-
ues for local public health and other emergency responders.
The Risk Communications Manager has also developed a spe-
cial training module on Message Mapping, which is a tool that
helps public health professionals to craft simple, effective risk
communications messages in response to specific public health
threats. This training has been offered in a number of venues
across the state and continues to be offered to local public
health partners as requested.
Source: Massachusetts Department of Public Health
MASSACHUSETTS -- PHEP FUNDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK 
COMMUNICATIONS CAPACITY
5. Indicator:  BIOSURVEILLANCE -- NEDSS COMPATIBILITY
FINDING:  Six states do not use a disease surveillance system that is compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
The National Electronic Disease Surveillance Sys-
tem (NEDSS) was developed to integrate and stan-
dardize the tracking of infectious diseases.  It
promotes standards-based, electronic reporting for
more rapid, accurate, and integrated information.
In fact, a study published in January 2008 found
that automated electronic laboratory results
(ELR) identified nearly five times as many cases as
traditional, paper-based reporting and identified
these cases nearly eight days earlier.37 As the au-
thors noted, “Public health monitoring of disease
outbreaks, including reports of notifiable condi-
tions from laboratories and health care providers
to public health authorities, is fundamental to the
prevention and control of population-based dis-
ease.”38 NEDSS facilitates the development of
“…integrated surveillance systems, where the dis-
ease issues of reportable conditions in public
health are tracked in an environment that allows
you to see that patients who have HIV also have
hepatitis C and tuberculosis, and you can take in-
tegrated public health action.”39
According to CDC, to be considered NEDSS-
compatible, states must have systems that meet
the following requirements:
1. Disease data entry directly through an Inter-
net browser-based system, thereby creating a
database accessible by health investigators
and public health professionals.
2. Electronic Laboratory Results (ELR) report-
ing, which allows labs to report cases to health
departments.
3. Integration of multiple health information
databases creating a single repository.
A fourth component, electronic messaging ca-
pabilities, allowing states to share information
efficiently with CDC and other health agencies,
is being upgraded system-wide, and is, therefore,
not included among the criteria.
Disease surveillance systems have a long track
record of use during outbreaks.  State health de-
partments are working to enhance disease sur-
veillance systems and build better electronic
linkages.  NEDSS provides a platform to do so. 
Beginning in 2004, TFAH has tracked states’
compatibility with NEDSS.  Six years ago, only
18 states were NEDSS-compatible; by 2009, 44
states and D.C. were NEDSS compatible.  The
six non-compatible states meet two of the three
criteria.  These states are making steady progress
towards meeting the third requirement.    
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44 states and D.C. report that they use a
disease surveillance system that is compati-
ble with CDC’s National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System (NEDSS) (1 point).
Alabama Kentucky Ohio
Alaska Louisiana Oklahoma
Arizona Maine Oregon
Arkansas Maryland Pennsylvania
California Massachusetts Rhode Island
Colorado Michigan South Carolina
Delaware Missouri South Dakota
D.C. Montana Tennessee
Florida Nebraska Texas
Georgia New Hampshire Vermont
Hawaii New Jersey Virginia
Idaho New Mexico Washington
Illinois New York West Virginia
Indiana North Carolina Wisconsin
Iowa North Dakota Wyoming
6 states report that they do NOT use a dis-
ease surveillance system that is compatible
with CDC’s National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System (NEDSS) (0 points).
Connecticut*
Kansas*
Minnesota
Mississippi*
Nevada
Utah*
Note: State expects to be NEDSS-compatible by late 2009/early 2010.  
Source: CDC National Center for Public Health Informatics, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services
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Since the terror attacks of September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings in October, state and
local public health departments have implemented syndromic surveillance systems to rapidly detect
public health threats.  According to CDC, “the term ‘syndromic surveillance’ applies to surveillance
using health-related data that precede diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an out-
break to warrant further public health response. Though historically syndromic surveillance has been
utilized to target investigation of potential cases, its utility for detecting outbreaks associated with
bioterrorism is increasingly being explored by public health officials.”40
Delivering effective public health services depends on timely and reliable information.  Health depart-
ments cannot protect people from existing or emerging health threats, such as a pandemic flu, or a
bioterrorist attack, without correct and pertinent information.  The lack of timely and comprehensive
data can delay the identification of and response to serious and mass emergency health problems.  In
addition, federal, state and local health departments and private health care providers must all work
together to effectively track information about and respond to health threats.  
Fortunately, in the United States, we rarely experience the type of bioterrorism or mass casualty
events that syndromic surveillance was initially designed to help detect.  However, states report that
syndromic surveillance has been extremely useful for monitoring seasonal and H1N1 flu activity.  In
fact, according to the International Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS) a growing body of evidence
suggests that syndromic surveillance can “herald the onset of influenza seasons in advance of virus iso-
lation by public health laboratories, provide more timely and geographically detailed information com-
pared to information from networks of sentinel health care practices, and provide detailed,
age-specific information that can characterize annual variations in the pattern of influenza morbid-
ity.”41 (For more information on syndromic surveillance, please see Section 2: Federal Preparedness.)
In May 2007, ISDS convened representatives from CDC, the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officers (ASTHO), the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO),
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and other agencies and organizations to
help ISDS develop of survey of state, local, and territorial health departments regarding syndromic
surveillance practices.42
ISDS distributed the survey in August 2007 to 59 public health jurisdictions including all 50 states and
the District of Columbia.  For the survey, ISDS defined “syndromic surveillance” as systems with all of
the following characteristics:
1) Surveillance for human health-related events or outcomes, including pre-diagnostic events or diagnoses;
2) Surveillance for the purpose of early event detection or situational awareness, which implies an
emphasis on timeliness approaching to the extent possible “real-time” surveillance;
3) Ongoing surveillance as opposed to time-limited, “drop-in” surveillance around specific high-profile
events; and
4) Surveillance systems not established primarily to support notifiable disease reporting.43
The survey also asked respondents about the staffing needs, cost, and utility of syndromic surveil-
lance, in addition to plans to initiate, expand, or reduce syndromic surveillance efforts.  
ISDS received responses from 52 of the 59 jurisdictions; including 46 of the 50 states, two of five terri-
tories, Chicago, the District of Columbia, Los Angeles County, and New York City.  Forty-three of the
52 respondents reported conducting syndromic surveillance for a median of 3.3 years.  Unfortunately,
ISDS only reported the results in aggregate and did not isolate state health department responses.  
In 2009, the American College of Emergency Physicians published its National Report Card on the State
of Emergency Medicine.44 Among the findings, 37 states and D.C. have a statewide real-time or near
real-time syndromic surveillance system.  However, it’s not clear whether or not ACEP used the
same definition as ISDS.
BIOSURVEILLANCE -- REAL-TIME SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
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In January 2009, US Airways flight 1549 carrying 169 people went down in the Hudson River between
New York and New Jersey. New Jersey’s response was driven in part by data collected and dissemi-
nated through the state’s knowledge management/information brokerage health information technol-
ogy system, HIPPOCRATES.  Developed for $3 million by the New Jersey State Health Department
with state dollars as well as federal PHEP grant money, HIPPOCRATES provides New Jersey with
real-time health information fusion and display through static and dynamic data collection, integration,
and dissemination.  As a result, critical information is provided to over 3,000 users to include health,
critical infrastructure, local, state, and federal partners in public and private sectors.
During the “Miracle on the Hudson” emergency, New Jersey’s Health Command Center used the sys-
tem to notify local, state, and federal partners including health care providers, first responders, emer-
gency managers, and public safety officials.  As information was received and verified, the duty officer
entered event updates in HIPPOCRATES and new email notifications were sent with each update, 
with new recipients added to the notification list as needed. Update topics included: flight details, EMS
staging areas, deployment of ambulances and other assets, patient health status, numbers and locations
of transported patients, contact numbers, etc.  New Jersey health officials were also able to use 
HIPPOCRATES to track hospital bed status and identify and locate ambulances transporting patients.  
New Jersey has also used HIPPOCRATES to support the state’s H1N1 efforts.  The Healthcare Sys-
tem Resource Module is being used to collect and report on hospital bed availability, and the data is
then reported to ASPR’s HavBED system.  In addition, officials can use HIPPOCRATES to monitor
hospital emergency department diversion status.  The Interactive Mapping Module is being used to
track and display medical stockpile sites and inventories, while the Communication Channel Module is
being used to compile emergency department influenza-like illness patient volume.
Additional categorical scenarios/events in which Hippocrates has been used:
 Utility incidents;
 Forest/wildland fires;
White powder incidents (potential bioterrorism threats);
 Hazardous materials events (potential chemical exposure to population);
 Tropical storms, floods and hurricanes; and
 Hospital or nursing home evacuations.
HIPPOCRATES is used daily at the Health Command Center and nine Medical Coordination Centers
to monitor and manage health-related incidents; by all of the state’s acute-care facilities and Advanced
Life Support (ALS) communication centers  to enter real-time status updates; by local, county and re-
gional EMS providers to monitor the availability of hospital services and equipment; and is monitored
by external stakeholders including other public health agencies and federal entities such as the FBI.
During a recent power outage, HIPPOCRATES automatically notified all public health and healthcare
stakeholders via email. One stakeholder, a home health agency, upon learning of the power outage
through HIPPOCRATES conducted checks on their patient population and found that a home-based
ventilator patient was on battery power without generator back-up. Due to the notification from HIP-
POCRATES and the prompt response by the stakeholder, this patient was able to continue oxygen
therapy without incident. 
The system has drawn praise and attention from federal officials, as well as interest on the part of pri-
vate software developers and other state health departments.  
Source: Division of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response, New Jersey Department of Health
NEW JERSEY -- HEALTH IT FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
6. Indicator: FOOD SAFETY -- DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS
FINDING:  Thirty-six states and D.C. were able to identify the pathogen responsible for reported food-
borne disease outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national three-year average (2005-2007).
Source:  U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Annual Listing of Food-borne Disease Outbreaks, United States, 2005-
2007.  Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data.htm.
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36 states and D.C. were able to identify the 14 states were NOT able to identify the 
pathogen responsible for reported foodborne pathogen responsible for reported 
disease outbreaks at a rate that met or foodborne disease outbreaks at a rate that 
exceeded the national average of 46 percent met or exceeded the national average of 
(combined data 2005-2007) (1 point). 46 percent (combined data 2005-2007) 
(0 points).
State Total Total Percent of State Total Total Percent of 
Confirmed Reported Confirmed Confirmed Reported Confirmed 
Outbreaks Outbreaks Outbreaks Outbreaks Outbreaks Outbreaks 
(2005-2007) (2005-2007) (2005-2007) (2005-2007) (2005-2007) (2005-2007)
Alaska 13 14 93% Alabama 5 28 18%
Arkansas 7 9 78% Arizona 15 50 30%
Colorado 56 99 57% California 154 480 32%
Connecticut 31 41 76% Florida 66 331 20%
Delaware 2 3 67% Illinois 63 199 32%
D.C. 2 3 67% Kansas 19 94 20%
Georgia 36 71 51% Maine 30 100 30%
Hawaii 47 51 92% Maryland 27 70 39%
Idaho 15 22 68% Michigan 37 124 30%
Indiana 9 10 90% Missouri 5 14 36%
Iowa 13 28 46% Montana 2 8 25%
Kentucky 2 4 50% Nevada 0 0 N/A
Louisiana 8 9 89% Ohio 104 272 38%
Massachusetts 23 34 68% Washington 41 133 31%
Minnesota 119 155 77%
Mississippi 4 7 57%
Nebraska 2 2 100%
New Hampshire 10 20 50%
New Jersey 18 30 60%    
New Mexico 4 4 100%
New York 86 181 48%
North Carolina 40 54 74%
North Dakota 11 16 69%
Oklahoma 9 14 64%
Oregon 62 98 63%
Pennsylvania 72 94 77%
Rhode Island 6 7 86%
South Carolina 30 34 88%
South Dakota 3 4 75%
Tennessee 45 64 70%
Texas 21 38 55%
Utah 10 15 67%
Vermont 8 10 80%
Virginia 30 33 91%
West Virginia 2 3 67%
Wisconsin 65 72 90%
Wyoming 10 15 67%
Monitoring the public’s food supply is a real-
world example of public health preparedness as
it requires the same skills and technologies
needed to detect and mitigate bioterrorism and
infectious disease outbreaks: a strong surveil-
lance system and adequate lab capacity.  Ac-
cording to Michael Taylor, Senior Advisor to the
FDA Commissioner, “ensuring the safety of the
food supply is centrally important to the public’s
health and underpins the success of the nation’s
trillion dollar food and agriculture industries.”45
Approximately 76 million Americans - - one in
four - - are sickened by food-borne disease each
year.  Many of these cases go unreported al-
though there are an estimated 325,000 individ-
uals who are hospitalized annually due to
food-borne illness and 5,000 who die each year.46
CDC defines a food-borne disease outbreak as
the occurrence of two or more cases of a similar
illness resulting from the ingestion of a common
food.  State, local, and territorial health depart-
ments report food-borne disease outbreaks to
CDC each year via the electronic Food-borne
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS).  CDC’s
goal is for 75 percent of outbreaks to have a pre-
liminary report in eFORS within 60 days of the
date the first individual became ill.47    
Between 2005 and 2007, the last year for which
CDC data was available at the time of publication,
state public health departments reported a total of
3,326 food-borne disease outbreaks that sickened
67,021 individuals, down from the 3,548 outbreaks
reported in the previous three-year period (2004-
06) which sickened 74,077 individuals.  Of the
3,326 reported outbreaks between 2005 and 2007,
state public health departments were only able to
confirm the etiology, or causative pathogen, in
1,542 cases, or 46 percent of outbreaks.
However, there is no mandate that dictates the
type of data states submit to CDC.  As seen in the
table above, the quality of data reported by states
varies greatly.  In some states, such as California,
state epidemiologists report a large number of
food-borne disease outbreaks (480 between 2005-
2007) and an equally large number of confirmed
outbreaks (154 between 2005-2007), but still fall
below the national average. Other states, like New
Mexico, only reported four outbreaks over the
three-year period and all four were confirmed,
putting them well above the national average.  
The 36 states and D.C. that earned a point on this
indicator were successful at identifying the bac-
teria, virus, parasite, or chemical that caused the
outbreak at a rate that met or exceeded the na-
tional average of confirmed food-borne disease
outbreaks of 46 percent (combined data 2005-
2007).  In last year’s report, only 30 states earned
a point on this indicator -- and the national three-
year average was lower (44 percent) than this
year’s national three-year average (46 percent). 
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State and local health and agriculture departments are the
frontline defense in our nation’s food safety system, with
primary responsibility for disease surveillance, response to
food-borne disease outbreaks, and regulation of food safety in
over one million restaurants and grocery stores.  In fact, a
2009 report Stronger Partnerships for Safer Food: An Agenda for
Strengthening State and Local Roles in the Nation’s Food Safety
System, notes that, “State and local agencies collectively
conduct many more inspections, test many more food
samples for harmful contamination, and bring many more food
safety enforcement actions than the federal food safety
agencies.”48 The report was produced by the Department of
Health Policy at the George Washington University School of
Public Health and Health Services in partnership with the
organizations that represent food safety officials and
practitioners at the state and local levels: the Association of
Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), ASTHO, and NACCHO.  
In addition to outlining the current roles of federal, state, and
local agencies in protecting Americans against food-borne illness,
the report makes 27 findings on the strengths and weaknesses in
the current food safety system. For example, the authors note
progress in how federal, state, and local agencies collaborate to
detect food-borne outbreaks but also find that state and local
agencies are hampered in their response to and prevention of
outbreaks by lack of focused federal leadership to build an
integrated system, chronic underfunding, wide disparities in
capacity and diversity of practices in all areas of food safety, and
barriers to information sharing and collaboration. 
The report makes 19 specific recommendations for
strengthening state and local roles and building an integrated
national food safety system that works effectively to prevent
foodborne illness. Among the recommendations is a call for
increased federal funding of state and local food safety programs
coupled with a recommendation that state and local
governments maintain stable funding streams for their own
programs.  Other recommendations address disease surveillance
and outbreak response and food safety regulation and
inspection.  The report also calls for enhanced collaboration via
the establishment of a network of regional, federally-funded
food-borne outbreak response centers to ensure an integrated
“systems” approach to investigations to prevent far-reaching
foodborne illness outbreaks. 
STRENGTHENING STATE AND LOCAL FOOD SAFETY
7. Indicator:  MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS READINESS
FINDING:  Nine states do not meet the Medical Reserve Corps readiness criteria.
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps
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One of the public health programs that affects all Americans is
the food safety system, a network of federal, state, and local
regulatory systems that oversee production and sales of nearly
all types of food. Yet, the nation is dependent on a patchwork
of archaic laws, obsolete technologies, and highly variable sur-
veillance systems to protect the food supply.  Too often, food-
borne illness goes unidentified and more consumers get sick
while the system attempts to trace the source instead of pre-
venting the contamination at the point of production.  This
weakened system can have devastating consequences.  Food-
borne diseases cause an estimated 76 million illnesses,
325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths, and lead to an an-
nual $44 billion in lost productivity and medical costs.  In addi-
tion, inaccurate identification of food-borne diseases can
devastate an entire industry, as was seen by tomato growers
in 2008 when a Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak was erro-
neously attributed to tomatoes. 
2009 represented the first major steps in modernizing the fed-
eral food safety system in several decades.  In July, the House
of Representatives passed the Food Safety Enhancement Act,
a bill which would set a minimum for risk-based inspections of
food plants, give FDA the authority to recall tainted foods, and
require facilities to develop comprehensive food safety plans
to prevent contamination at the source.  The bill passed the
House with a bipartisan vote of 283-142.  In November, the
Senate Health Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Com-
mittee unanimously passed its own version of food safety leg-
islation, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, but the bill
has not yet reached the Senate floor.  Instead of our current
food safety structure, which reacts to outbreaks, these meas-
ures aim to move the nation toward a system that can prevent
illness and detect contamination at early stages.  
The Obama Administration has expressed strong support for
revamping the federal food safety system, including endorsing
the House and Senate bills.  The White House has also em-
panelled a Food Safety Working Group to increase coordina-
tion between federal agencies, modernize food safety laws,
and ensure their enforcement.
MODERNIZING FOOD SAFETY
41 states and D.C. have: 1) Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC) State Coordinators,
2) a majority of MRC units in compliance
with the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) guidelines, and 3) a
majority of MRC units integrated with the
state Emergency System for Advance
Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) (1 point).
Alabama Kansas North Carolina
Arizona Kentucky North Dakota
Arkansas Louisiana Ohio
California Maine Oklahoma
Colorado Maryland Oregon
Connecticut Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Delaware Michigan Rhode Island
D.C. Minnesota South Carolina
Florida Mississippi Tennessee
Georgia Missouri Utah
Hawaii New Hampshire Virginia
Idaho New Jersey Washington
Illinois New Mexico West Virginia
Indiana New York Wisconsin
9 states do NOT have: 1) Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) State Coordinators, 2) a
majority of MRC units in compliance with
the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) guidelines, and 3) a majority of
MRC units integrated with the state
Emergency System for Advance
Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) (0 points).
Alaska South Dakota
Iowa Texas
Montana Vermont
Nebraska Wyoming
Nevada
The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a national
network of community-based groups which en-
gage civilian volunteers to strengthen public
health, emergency response, and community re-
silience. MRC volunteers include professionals
from fields such as public health, medicine, and
nursing, as well as non-health professionals who
work on administration, logistics, communica-
tions, and other support tasks.
The MRC network is supported by the Office of
the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps
(OCVMRC), which is run out of the Office of
the U.S. Surgeon General in coordination with
ASPR.  As of November 1, 2009 there were
191,189 volunteers enrolled in 866 MRC units
in all 50 states, D.C., Guam, Palau, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
It is recognized that local governmental services
may be quickly overtaxed in a major public health
emergency, and that MRC volunteers could help
deliver essential medical care and other services.
For example, Homeland Security Presidential Di-
rective 21 (HSPD-21), emphasizes the need for
state and local jurisdictions to have a cadre of
trained volunteers who can come to the aid of
their fellow community members.  This presi-
dential directive envisions a country “where local
civil leaders, citizens, and families are educated
regarding threats and are empowered to mitigate
their own risk, where they are practiced in re-
sponding to events, where they have social net-
works to fall back upon, and where they have
familiarity with local public health and medical
systems.”49 Groups such as MRC fulfill this vision
and “will significantly attenuate the requirement
for additional assistance.”50 
For the 2009 report, TFAH assessed MRC units
within each state on three factors:
 The presence of a state-level MRC Coordinator.
 All states have been encouraged to appoint
an MRC State Coordinator to provide rec-
ommendations to OCVMRC about new (and
continued) MRC unit registrations, and to
provide technical assistance and support to
their local MRC units. The appointment of
an MRC State Coordinator shows a level of
commitment from the state to the MRC. In
some states, the same individual serves a dual
role as the MRC State Coordinator as well as
coordinator for the Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP).
 The majority of MRC units in a state are in
compliance with the National Incident Man-
agement System (NIMS) guidelines, or work-
ing towards compliance.  
 NIMS provides a consistent nationwide
mechanism for federal, state, tribal, and
local governments, and private sector and
nongovernmental organizations to effec-
tively work together to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from emergency incidents.
OCVMRC has provided the following guid-
ance to MRC units regarding NIMS (available
at http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/
NIMSGuidance): “all MRC units should
adopt NIMS and an ICS response structure,
and have a NIMS/ICS training plan that uti-
lizes a tiered approach to meeting NIMS com-
pliance requirements. All MRC leaders and
members must be trained in ICS-100: An In-
troduction to ICS, or equivalent and IS-700:
NIMS, An Introduction or equivalent, and
have received certificates of completion for
these courses.”
 The majority of MRC units in a state are inte-
grated with the state Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) or working to-
wards integration
 The MRC and ESAR-VHP are national ini-
tiatives of HHS to improve the nation’s abil-
ity to prepare for and respond to public
health and medical emergencies. While
MRC units are made up of individuals from
local communities who support public
health activities year-round, and are trained
to respond in times of emergency, the
ESAR-VHP system is primarily a means of
registering and verifying the credentials of
volunteer health professionals in advance
of an emergency. HHS encourages integra-
tion so as to strengthen the local-state-
Federal coordination of volunteers in the
event of a public health emergency.
State governments can assist their MRC units,
and affect community resiliency and other MRC-
related outcomes, through policy, funding, and
coordination.  As of November 1, 2009, 41 states
and D.C. met these three benchmarks, thus
earning a point on this indicator. 
The local MRC units are a crucial part of our na-
tion’s public health emergency response work-
force. These men and women serve their
communities throughout the year and are ready
when needed if an emergency, such as H1N1 or
a natural disaster, strikes in their communi-
ties. Ensuring a robust MRC capability provides
communities with a local safety net that can be
activated in times of need which increases pub-
lic health resiliency and helps to further states,
and our nation’s national health security.
30
8. Indicator: COMMUNITY RESILIENCY -- CHILDREN AND PREPAREDNESS 
FINDING:  Twenty states and D.C. require all licensed childcare facilities to have a multi-hazard written
evacuation and relocation plan and verification that laws are implemented.
Source: Save the Children52
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Tribal preparedness is a significant component of overall preparedness for the State of Arizona, where
nearly five percent of the population is Native American.51 Over the past seven years, the Arizona
Department of Health Services has used federal PHEP dollars to reach out to the state’s tribal popula-
tion, which includes coordinating with tribal leadership, local health departments, and the Indian
Health Service.  Arizona has also directed some of its PHEP grant money to tribal governments so
they can carry out their own preparedness activities, and the state health department has a tribal liai-
son on staff who works through the state’s inter-tribal council.
The lines of communication between state, tribal, and local health officials have been strengthened
over the years, which was enormously helpful when the H1N1 flu virus hit and the state was forced to
develop and implement a mass vaccination campaign in a matter of months.  In addition to identifying
providers and registering them to administer the vaccine, Arizona’s Department of Health Services
wanted to make sure the state’s at-risk populations were covered.  State health officials were espe-
cially concerned about tribal populations because of their higher rates of underlying conditions, includ-
ing diabetes and asthma.  According to Don Herrington, Acting Assistant Director for Arizona’s Public
Health Preparedness Services, “Given the significant tribal population in our state, we wanted to make
sure they had access to the H1N1 vaccine and that locations were chosen that would be accessible to
this population.”  To ensure tribal populations’ access to the H1N1 vaccine, the state health depart-
ment allocated vaccine to Indian Health Service clinics and other tribal facilities, but also coordinated
with counties with large numbers of Native Americans. 
Source: Arizona Department of Health Services
ARIZONA -- REACHING OUT TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS TO BUILD 
RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 
20 states and D.C. do require all licensed
childcare facilities to have a multi-hazard
written evacuation and relocation plan and
verification that laws are implemented 
(1 point).
Alabama North Dakota
Arkansas Ohio
California Oklahoma
Delaware Pennsylvania
D.C. South Carolina
Hawaii Texas
Maryland Utah
Massachusetts Vermont
Mississippi
Nevada
New Hampshire
New York 
North Carolina
30 states do NOT require all licensed
childcare facilities to have a multi-hazard
written evacuation and relocation plan,
and/or lack verification that laws are
implemented (0 points).
Alaska Minnesota
Arizona Missouri
Colorado Montana
Connecticut Nebraska
Florida New Jersey
Georgia New Mexico
Idaho Oregon
Illinois Rhode Island
Indiana South Dakota
Iowa Tennessee
Kansas Virginia
Kentucky Washington
Louisiana West Virginia
Maine Wisconsin
Michigan Wyoming
Planning to care for 67 million children in
American schools and child care settings during
a public health emergency presents complex
considerations and challenges.  Children are not
“small adults” and special consideration needs
to be given to complicated issues ranging from
child-appropriate doses of medications and vac-
cines, to caring for children if schools and child-
care facilities are closed for extended periods.
Parents and other caregivers may also become
sick or injured during a disaster, complicating
their ability to care for children.
In 2009, Save the Children reviewed state laws and
regulations to determine to what extent the needs
of children were incorporated into preparedness
planning.  Save the Children examined four basic
emergency preparedness standards for licensed
child care facilities and K-12 schools:
 Evacuation Plan:  A law or regulation requir-
ing all licensed child care facilities to have a
multi-hazard written evacuation and reloca-
tion plan;
 Reunification Efforts:  A law or regulation re-
quiring all licensed child care facilities to have a
written plan to notify parents of an emergency;
 Children with Special Needs:  A law or regula-
tion that requires a written plan for accommo-
dating all children with special needs enrolled
in a particular licensed child care facility; and
 K-12 Disaster Planning: A law or regulation re-
quiring a multi-hazard disaster plan.
States were contacted when state laws or regula-
tions were not found online or required clarifi-
cation.  Separate calls were made to child care
licensing staff and to school personnel identify-
ing the Save the Children project and criteria
and seeking verification that the data found on-
line was accurate.
Only seven states (14 percent) meet all four
basic emergency preparedness standards: Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.  Nearly
three-quarters of all states (37 states) require K-
12 schools to have a multi-hazard disaster plan.
However, far fewer states have standards for
child care settings.  Only 20 states and D.C. (41
percent) require all licensed child chare facili-
ties to have a written evacuation and relocation
plan, while 15 states (29 percent) require all li-
censed child care facilities to have a written
plan to notify parents during an emergency.
Less than a quarter of states (11 states) require
a written plan for accommodating all children
with special needs during an emergency evacu-
ation and relocation.  
Failing to plan for these worst-case scenarios
puts children and adolescents at increased risk
of injury and abuse.  
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In December 2007, Congress created the National Commis-
sion on Children and Disasters to improve emergency pre-
paredness and to specifically address the unique needs of
children.  The Commission met for the first time on October
14, 2008 to start work to make sure children become a prior-
ity in emergency planning.
The 10-member commission, which includes doctors, emer-
gency management specialists, children’s organization leaders,
and legislators, delivered its first report to the President and
Congress in October 2009.  The Interim Report of the National
Commission on Children and Disasters highlights the Commis-
sion’s work over the past year and includes recommendations
for federal, state, and local governments to improve our na-
tion’s readiness to protect children during a disaster.53  
The commission broke down their recommendations into the
following 11 categories.
 Disaster management and recovery;
Mental health;
 Physical health and trauma;
 Emergency medical services and pediatric transport;
 Disaster case management;
 Child care standards;
 Elementary and secondary education disaster preparedness;
 Child welfare and juvenile justice;
 Sheltering standards, services, and supplies;
 Housing; and
 Evacuation.
The interim report stresses that children should not be grouped
in with adults or with other “at-risk” or “special needs” groups,
but rather are a unique group with needs that must be priori-
tized before, during, and following disasters.  The report notes
that children have continually been forced to contend with “be-
nign neglect” and that cycle must end with planning and re-
sponse specifically tailored to the needs of children.
The Commission will continue to meet for another year and
then release their Final Report in October 2010.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN AND DISASTERS
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Effective public communication is essential in any public health
disaster.  A general lack of understanding or lack of knowledge
about a public health event can not only fail to solve the problem,
but has the potential to make a mild or moderate crisis much
worse. This is especially true of an infectious disease outbreak,
where, without accurate information, uninformed members of
the public can pass disease on to others unwittingly or make ex-
cessive demands on health authorities and facilities when they are
unwarranted. In order to make information as easy to access as
possible, public health authorities are becoming increasingly web-
friendly in the way they communicate with the public. In many
cases, this means increasing their use of social media. 
America has experienced drastic changes in the media land-
scape in recent years. According to the Pew Research Center
for People and the Press, daily newspaper readership has de-
clined, from 58 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 2008.55 Mean-
while, the practice of visiting the web for news has become
more popular. In 1995, only two percent of Americans surfed
news websites, but by 2008, that number rose to 37 percent.56  
Public health authorities’ methods of educating at-risk popula-
tions have followed suit.  The decline of conventional media
use, such as newspapers, and the rise of online communica-
tion mean that government agencies have to adapt in order to
reach all at-risk populations. America saw this evolution play
out in real time as the H1N1 outbreak of 2009 unfolded.
Social media has a special role in the government’s response
to H1N1 because of its disproportionate effect on the
younger generation.57 While the seasonal flu is usually a prime
health threat to older Americans, H1N1 has proved to be a
greater threat to the young. The disease is especially virulent
in the population born after 1957 because that group lacks the
immunity found in older people who lived through earlier, sim-
ilar influenza outbreaks.58
Public health departments recognized the importance of com-
municating over the Internet immediately when H1N1 ap-
peared in the U.S. in the spring of 2009. A study published in
Health Affairs showed that the majority of health departments
responded in a timely manner on their websites within 24
hours of the outbreak.59  
However, there were some concerns that the government’s
media outreach was not fully engaging the web-savvy, younger
audience that was most at risk. In August 2009, in anticipation
of the second wave of the H1N1 pandemic, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) wrote
in its Report to the President on U.S. Preparations for 2009-H1N1
Influenza, “CDC’s plans for public communications appear to
be inadequately developed at present and somewhat behind
schedule. In addition, the Group was concerned that CDC had
not adequately planned to engage the full range of communica-
tions channels. Because 2009-H1N1 will particularly affect
young people, there is an opportunity and need to engage new
media and social networking channels.”60 
PCAST was referring to the fact that young Americans often
use the internet to access information, instead of more con-
ventional forms of media, like television or radio. According to
the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 93 percent of teens
(12-17 years old) go online and 65 percent use some kind of
social networking site. Members of Generation Y (18-32 years
old) are not far behind, with 87 percent using the Internet and
67 percent engaging in social networking.61
To get information to those most at risk, government agencies
took a number of steps to reach out to Americans between the
ages of 18-34, a group not usually targeted for flu-prevention
campaigns. CDC turned to social media outlets to get their mes-
sage out.62 The agency now uses Twitter® and Facebook® to
communicate about H1N1 and other public health information
programs. Their Facebook® page has more than 20,000 fans.63 
H1N1 is not the first public health crisis to push public health
agencies into the world of Facebook®, Twitter®, and MySpace®,
and CDC is not the only agency diversifying their media strategy in
the face of H1N1. The Washington Post reported that health
emergencies have acted as catalysts to get a number of govern-
ment health agencies involved in social media campaigns.   For in-
stance, when H1N1 crossed the border, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) started using Twitter® posts to monitor the spread
of the illness.64 When the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is-
sued a recall after the 2009 Salmonella outbreak in peanut butter
and peanut butter products, it set up the Twitter® account, FDAre-
calls. After the agency issued subsequent recalls for pistachios and
Brussels sprouts, it gained more than 10,000 followers.65
But relying too much on social media can exclude some popu-
lations that must also be reached. Although more Americans
are using social media than ever before, a gap in usage still ex-
ists between age groups, geographic areas. and income levels.
While Americans under 63 years old boast high rates of Inter-
net use, older generations still prefer more conventional
media sources. The Silent Generation (64-72) has only 56 per-
cent of its members online and the G.I. Generation, (73+) is
only 31 percent connected.66  
A 2009 study by the Pew Foundation’s Internet and American
Life Project shows that low-income individuals are also less
likely to glean information and news from the web. Pew found
that 85 percent of households with an income exceeding
$75,000 have broadband service, while only 42 percent
households earning less than $30,000 are connected to high
speed access.67 Rural residents are also experiencing a gap in
service. An estimated 10 percent fewer rural residents use the
Internet than their urban counterparts. In the rural South,
home Internet use drops below 50 percent.68
Increased outreach on social and Internet -based media cam-
paigns may be necessary to reach a younger audience. How-
ever, an over reliance on this type of media outreach may risk
missing large swaths of the population that do not engage in
comparable rates of Internet communication.
“One of the lessons of prior influenza epidemics is the importance of timely, clear, and effective communication among 
government officials, medical professionals, and the public.”
- PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (PCAST) 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA54
PLUGGED IN: COMMUNICATING WITH A NEW AUDIENCE ABOUT FLU
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Planning, communication, and teamwork -- these three components of public health emergency pre-
paredness have been crucial as Oregon State’s Public Health Division grapples with the ongoing H1N1
pandemic.  The federal Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) grant dollars have been instru-
mental in building relationships between the state public health department, other state agencies,
tribes, local health departments and the health care system.  This investment paid off during the H1N1
outbreak when Oregon activated its public health agency operations center and officials disseminated
information on the outbreak in the early days last spring.  Likewise, the state was trained and able to
rapidly mobilize to receive the state’s share of federally stockpiled antivirals and successfully coordi-
nated with the State National Guard, Oregon’s Department of Transportation, and other public safety
agencies.  According to Mike Harryman, Oregon’s Preparedness Manager in the Public Health Division,
“We wouldn’t have developed these relationships without the PHEP funding.”
For example, the coordination between the Oregon Public Health Division and the 33 local health de-
partments in the state has been crucial in this H1N1 response as it’s the local health departments who
are setting up mass vaccination clinics and handling a lot of the on-the-ground response.  To enhance
state and local collaboration on emergency preparedness, Oregon had established a master contract
for all public health functions.  Having this contract in place eliminated a lot of red tape and helped
push the emergency federal H1N1 preparedness dollars out to the local health departments in a
timely fashion, according to Harryman.  “The Governor sent a letter to county officials telling them to
move ahead with their H1N1 plans,” he says.
The state has also worked hard to build relationships with the health care system in the state.  It helps
that both the PHEP cooperative agreement grants and the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) coop-
erative agreement grants are managed by the same office in the Public Health Division, which has helped
in terms of coordinating the programs so that they complement each other.  The state has focused on
developing a communications system to link all 62 hospitals with the state health department, which in-
cludes not only building personal relationships between preparedness coordinators, but also investing in
communications technology.  Using both PHEP and HPP dollars, Oregon has purchased 168 satellite
phones and deployed them to each local health department, hospital, and Native American tribe.  “We
worked with our state emergency management department,” Mr. Harryman says.  “We let them set the
tone and then buy the equipment they recommend.” 
Source: State Public Health Division, Oregon Department of Human Services
OREGON -- LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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9. Indicator: LEGAL PREPAREDNESS -- ENTITY EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION
FINDING: 32 states and D.C. have statutes that extend some level of immunity to businesses and non-
profit organizations providing charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services, although these laws varied
greatly among states.
Source: Public/Private Legal Preparedness Initiative, North Carolina Institute for Public Health, Gillings School of Global
Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill69
32 states and D.C. have either enacted
entity liability laws or have made a formal
and official determination that existing law
provides such protections (1 point).
Alabama1 New Hampshire1
Arkansas2 New Jersey1
California5 North Carolina2
Colorado6 North Dakota
Delaware1 Ohio1
D.C.1 Oklahoma2
Florida3,9 Oregon2,9
Georgia2 Pennsylvania1
Idaho1 Rhode Island1
Indiana7 South Carolina3,9
Iowa2 Texas8
Kansas9 Utah2
Louisiana2 Vermont1
Michigan1 Virginia2
Minnesota2,4 Washington2
Mississippi1,9 Wisconsin1
Nevada1
18 states have not adopted entity
emergency liability protections or have
made no formal determination under
existing law (0 points).
Alaska Missouri
Arizona Montana
Connecticut Nebraska
Hawaii New Mexico
Illinois New York
Kentucky South Dakota
Maine Tennessee
Maryland West Virginia
Massachusetts Wyoming
NOTES:
1 Protection under existing law.
2 Enacted since 2007.
3 Administrative Arrangement in place.
4 Limits protection to a “Closed point of dispensing (POD).”
5 Statute limits the kind of legal entity that may provide emergency services. In the case of California, entity
liability protection applies only to architects and engineers.
6 Statute limits the kind of legal entity that may provide emergency services. In the case of Colorado, protection
applies for non-profit or hospital that is formed for the purpose of facilitating volunteer provision of health
care.
7 Statute limits the role an entity may play in the emergency.  In the case of Indiana, scope limited to providing
health care services.
8 Based on a facial read of the plain text of the Texas statutes, there appears to be some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services.  However, interviews
with the state health department’s legal counsel indicate that these combined provisions do not create reliable
entity liability protection under Texas state law.
9 Phone interviews with these states’ legal counsel indicate that state law provides entity liability protection.  How-
ever, a facial read of the plain text of the statute suggests remaining ambiguities regarding the extent to which the
statute confers unequivocal entity liability.
Just as volunteer health professionals will be
called upon to provide treatment in a cata-
strophic public health emergency, so too will pri-
vate sector and non-profit organizations.  In fact,
many state preparedness plans envision the role
private companies will play in dispensing med-
ical countermeasures in the event of a pandemic
or bioterrorist attack.  
A 2008 IOM workshop examined the issues sur-
rounding the dispensing of medical countermea-
sures for public health emergencies, including the
need for liability protection for private-sector vol-
unteers and entities.70 As the workshop summary
report noted, “few states furnish immunity from li-
ability to corporations and other entities when they
act as Good Samaritans.”71 This is disconcerting as
businesses may not be able to maintain typical
quality control standards in their efforts to meet
demand for resources.  During declared states of
emergency, legitimate concerns about liability thus
could deter or delay health care professionals and
entities from fully participating in relief efforts.
In assessing state law relevant to entity protec-
tions, researchers from the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services drew from model language and find-
ings developed by the North Carolina Institute
for Public Health as part of its Public/Private
Legal Preparedness Initiative within their Good
Samaritan Entity Liability Protection Initiative.72
Key elements of this model law are as follows:  
 The extension of Good Samaritan protection
to business and non-profit entities acting in
good faith during emergencies; 
 Coverage triggered by a Governor’s emer-
gency declaration; 
 Retroactive coverage that reaches pre-plan-
ning and training activities; and 
 An approach to protection that extends lia-
bility to those entities working in coordination
with a state agency.  
For this analysis, state statutes that extend to en-
tities what might be thought of as “property” im-
munity – that is, immunity with respect to
injuries involving real or other property owned
or controlled by an entity -- are not included.
This analysis focuses on protecting conduct un-
dertaken by both business and non-profit enti-
ties during an emergency.  
As of October 2009, 32 states and D.C. had ex-
tended some level of immunity to groups
and/or organizations providing charitable,
emergency or disaster relief services.  At the
same time, these statutes exhibit a certain de-
gree of variation.  For example, four states limit
the role that can be played by covered entities
acting under their liability protections (e.g., al-
lowing only the provision of goods in response
to a disaster). Twelve state laws require that the
service provided be without compensation. 
In addition, while eleven states appear to have
enacted specific legislation establishing entity
liability protections, the North Carolina Insti-
tute for Public Health reports that in an addi-
tional 17 states the protection is the result of a
legal interpretation under existing law.73 For
example, in South Carolina, volunteer entities
working with the state agency may be granted
state liability insurance coverage by using two
sections of the South Carolina statutes, to-
gether with the definitions contained in the
existing state tort insurance contract.74
As with volunteer practitioner laws, the number
of states addressing volunteer entity liability ap-
pears to be growing.  In 2009 alone, six state leg-
islatures enacted entity liability laws (Arkansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Virginia).  But despite the growth of such
statutes, entity liability laws remain less uniform
across the states. The Uniform Emergency Vol-
unteer Health Practitioners Act (UEVHPA) has
brought a degree of uniformity to volunteer lia-
bility statutes that is lacking in the area of entity
liability.  Whether similar uniform legislation is
merited in the case of entity liability is a matter
that deserves consideration. The federal gov-
ernment could consider the adoption of a na-
tional standard as part of its national emergency
response and preparedness plan, particularly
since the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)75 au-
thorizes the President to pay the “allowable
costs” related to certain state emergency activi-
ties.  This statutory platform could be used as a
uniform mechanism for federal reimbursement
of claims paid under a state’s tort claims act for
damages against entities acting in good faith
when assisting state or local governments in
public health emergencies.  
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In the event of a catastrophic public health emergency, such as a bioterrorist attack, pandemic in-
fluenza, or natural disaster, government officials will depend on volunteer health professionals to treat
the surge of patients coming forward to seek care.  However, relying on volunteer health profession-
als presents several issues including: licensing; permissible scope of practice; the relationship between
volunteers, the relief organizations, local health care, emergency management, and licensing agencies;
the eligibility of volunteers for immunities from liability; and volunteers protection laws and workers’
compensation benefits.  
Surveys of public health and medical professionals have found that almost 60 percent of clinicians re-
ported that having medical malpractice insurance coverage would be important (24.3%) or essential
(35.4%) in their decision to travel out of state to provide assistance during an emergency. At the
same time, almost 70 percent of respondents answered that immunity from civil lawsuits would be an
important (35.6%) or essential (33.8%) factor in deciding whether to volunteer in an emergency.76  
While federal laws such as the 1996 Federal Volunteer Protection Act (FVPA), the 2002 Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), and the 2006 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act all provide
some federal liability coverage, there is no uniform federal law that acts as a shield to liability for health
care volunteers during declared public health emergencies.77 Nor is there any uniform federal law pro-
tecting paid health care workers during an emergency, which is a concern for planners developing crisis
standards of care. (Please see p. 21 of the report for more information on crisis standards of care.) 
Good Samaritan laws, which exist in all 50 states and D.C., are narrow in scope and generally provide
protection only for emergency aid at the scene of an emergency.  Health care volunteers who provide
non-emergency care at a facility following the acute phase of an emergency, for example, would likely
not be protected by a state’s Good Samaritan law.78 Furthermore, a Good Samaritan statute offers
only an affirmative defense in a liability action; it is not a legal grant of immunity from suit.  
In response to this gap in nature and scope of legal liability protection extended to volunteers, in 2007
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), along with a number
of health care professional organizations, developed the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practi-
tioners Act (UEVHPA).  The Act offers model legislation to facilitate the deployment of health care
volunteers during emergencies.  The UEVHPA addresses a number of important issues, such as regis-
tration, licensing and accreditation of qualified health care volunteers for the purpose of swift and ef-
fective deployment.79 The UEVHPA also extends civil liability protections to registered health care
volunteers similar to the immunity provided to state employees under the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC), as well as provision for workers compensation.  
Beginning in 2007, TFAH has tracked state legislation that extends liability to health care volunteers
during a public health emergency.  In 2007, 29 states and D.C. earned a point on this indicator.  The
following year, 42 states and D.C. earned a point.  
Although TFAH did not use this measure as an indicator this year, states continue to enact new legislation
extending liability protection to health care volunteers.  As of November 2009, 11 states had adopted the
UEVHPA, which offers the most complete immunity protections for volunteer health practitioners.  
HEALTH CARE VOLUNTEER EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION
10. Indicator: PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING COMMITMENT -- STATE PUBLIC 
HEALTH BUDGETS
FINDING: Twenty-seven states cut funding for public health from FY 2007-08 to FY 2008-09.
Source: Research by TFAH of publicly available state budget documents and interviews with health and budget officials in the states.
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23 states and D.C.  increased or maintained
level funding for public health services from
FY 2007-08 to FY 2008-09 (1 point)
State and percent increase 
(adjusted for inflation)
Alabama (11.9%)
Arkansas (4.6%)
Colorado (2.9%)6
Connecticut (16.2%)2
Delaware (2.6%)2
D.C. (18.5%)
Georgia (10.2%)5,6
Idaho (5.3%)
Illinois (3.8%)6
Iowa (1.7%)
Kentucky (10.9%)
Michigan (2.5%)3
Missouri (7.2%)5
Nebraska (4.7%)6
Nevada (7.7%)6
New Mexico (1.0%)6
New York (10.1%)
North Dakota (25.5%)4
Oklahoma (14.0%)1,5
Oregon (12.8%)
South Dakota (3.3%)6
Texas (3.1%)5 
Vermont (1.6%)
West Virginia (16.0%)
27 states DECREASED funding for public
health services from FY 2007-08 to FY
2008-09 (0 points)
State and percent decrease 
(adjusted for inflation)
Alaska (-1.1%)2
Arizona (-24.5%)
California (-13.9%)5
Florida (-13.2) 2
Hawaii (-0.7 %)2,6
Indiana (-17.1%)
Kansas (-10.6%)
Louisiana (-5.4%)
Maine (-4.0%)2
Maryland (-2.7%)2
Massachusetts (-1.5%)
Minnesota (-7.8%)2
Mississippi (-16.0%)2,5 
Montana (-5.1%)
New Hampshire (-4.0%)
New Jersey (-6.1%)
North Carolina (-10.5%)2
Ohio (-5.3%)
Pennsylvania (-1.2%)2
Rhode Island (-4.0%)6
South Carolina (-22.0%)
Tennessee (-8.4%)
Utah (-5.4%)5
Virginia (-5.0%)3
Washington (-9.7%)3 
Wisconsin (-1.9%)
Wyoming (-2.3%)
NOTES:
Biennium budgets are bolded.
1 May contain some social service programs, but not Medicaid or CHIP.  
2 General funds only.
3 Budget data taken from appropriations legislation.
4 North Dakota’s budget data for the 2007-2009 biennium taken from appropriations legislation.
5 Excludes one-time funding for antivirals.
6 State did not respond to the data check TFAH coordinated with ASTHO that was sent out 10/23/09.  States
were given until 11/25/09 to confirm or correct the information.  The states that did not reply by that date
were assumed to be in accordance with the findings.
This indicator, adjusted for inflation, illustrates
a state’s commitment to funding public health
programs that support the infrastructure -- in-
cluding workforce -- needed to adequately re-
spond to emergencies.
Every state allocates and reports its budget in dif-
ferent ways.  States also vary widely in the budget
details they provide.  This makes comparisons
across states difficult.  For this analysis, TFAH ex-
amined state budgets and appropriations bills for
the agency, department, or division in charge of
public health services for FY 2008-2009, using a
definition as consistent as possible across the two
years, based on how each state reports data.
TFAH defined “public health services” broadly,
including most state-level health funding.
Based on this analysis, 27 states made cuts in
their public health budgets.  With the current
recession, states are in severe economic distress
and many states have tried to close shortfalls by
increasing taxes and/or cutting spending.  Cur-
rently, 41 states plus D.C. are making major cuts
to budgets including at least 27 states that have
made cuts to public health programs.80 At the
current rate of economic deterioration, and
based on the course of past recessions, the Cen-
ter on Budget and Policy Priorities reports the
total shortfall for fiscal year 2010 now totals $166
billion across 48 states and predicts that total
gaps through 2011 will exceed $350 billion.81
TFAH is deeply concerned about state budget
cuts and the effect they will have on state and
local governments’ ability to be prepared for
health emergencies over the next few years.  Sev-
eral states that received points for this indicator
may not have actually increased their spending
on public health programs.  The ways some
states report their budgets, for instance, by in-
cluding federal funding in the totals or includ-
ing public health dollars within health care
spending totals, make it very difficult to deter-
mine “public health” as a separate item.
Few states allocate funds directly for bioterror-
ism and public health preparedness as part of
their public health budgets.  Instead, most rely
on federal funds to support these activities.  The
infrastructure of other public health programs,
however, also supports their underlying pre-
paredness capabilities.
While this indicator examines whether states’
public health budgets increased or decreased, it
does not assess if the funding is adequate to
cover public health needs in the states.  This also
does not take into account ongoing hospital
needs and funding.
(For additional information on the methodology
of the budget analysis, please see Appendix C:
Data and Methodology for State Indicators.)  
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Since spring 2009, there have been over 3,500 cases of flu re-
ported in Wyoming.  According to Wyoming State Health Offi-
cials, federal PHEP and HPP dollars have been instrumental in
developing capacity and capabilities to respond to health
emergencies, like the current H1N1 pandemic.  Federal dol-
lars have been used to hire staff involved in the response,
from the laboratory testing to surveillance to communications
to supply distribution to planning.  In addition, many of the
personnel funded through the PHEP funding provide surge ca-
pacity in the laboratory and epidemiology areas, without
which these areas would be more limited in their capabilities.
State health officials attribute Wyoming’s success with receiving
and distributing medical countermeasures to the PHEP funding,
which was used to develop this capability.  This would not have
been possible without the funding to build the program, de-
velop plans and coordinate with the many partners responsible
for SNS activities in Wyoming.   Because of this investment,
Wyoming state health officials were able to ensure delivery of
antiviral medications and other influenza countermeasures
from CDC to local public health departments to ensure that
supplies are available at the county level when needed.
Wyoming has also relied on various disease surveillance sys-
tems to keep health officials apprised of the latest develop-
ments.  For example, EpiCenter collects data on emergency
department (ED) admissions from nine Wyoming hospitals,
while the Hospital Bed Tracking System is used to report in-
fluenza hospitalization information.  With 125 reported hospi-
talizations from H1N1 as of November 16, 2009, the health
care system has not been overwhelmed, but clear communica-
tion among health care partners remains essential.  Wyoming
has used the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System
(NEDSS) for disease reporting, while the Wyoming Immuniza-
tion Registry has been utilized to collect information on school
absentee rates.  The multiple systems in place provide the best
information on disease activity in Wyoming and provide the
best guidance to health care providers.
Source: Wyoming Department of Health
WYOMING --  INVESTMENT IN PREPAREDNESS PAYS DIVIDENDS WHEN H1N1 STRIKES
For several years, the Kentucky Department for Public Health
(KDPH) has been actively preparing for natural and man-made
disasters by taking an “all hazards” approach to preparedness.
Enabled by federal PHEP and HPP funds, public health person-
nel have planned for a wide variety of public health threats, in
coordination with local, state, regional and federal agencies.  Re-
sources from the federal government have provided the KDPH
with the ability to enhance its all-hazards preparedness capabili-
ties by building partnerships, hiring personnel at the state and
local level, developing and testing emergency response plans,
creating a statewide communications network, and purchasing
or leveraging a wide variety of medical and non-medical re-
sources. All of this planning was recently put to the test during
the worst natural disaster in Kentucky’s modern history.
With less than 12 hours’ warning, on January 27, 2009, a severe
winter ice storm struck the state, leaving a large footprint: 103 of
the state’s 120 counties were declared disaster areas in its wake.
The ice storm dealt a heavy blow to transportation, communica-
tions and public utility infrastructures in the commonwealth.
Many of the roadways in parts of the state were initially impassa-
ble.  Both cell and land-line telephone services were unavailable
for days in the hardest hit areas. Immediately following the
storm, approximately 800,000 residential and commercial units
lost power, including numerous hospitals and long-term care fa-
cilities.  Slowing recovery, temperatures continued to hover at
or below freezing for days after the event.  At the height of the
response, over 200 shelters in 72 counties provided assistance to
over 7,800 people.  In the largest statewide call-up ever, over
4,100 National Guard members helped respond.
Anticipating the need for health and medical assistance, the
KDPH took a proactive stance in the early stages of the storm
and maintained a fully activated departmental Operations Center
from January 28 through February 11, 2009.  During this period
of activation, the KDPH coordinated ESF-8 response efforts
throughout the affected areas of the state and provided public
health support and guidance to activated emergency operations
centers, deployed Public Health Strike Teams, local health agen-
cies, shelters, long-term care facilities, hospitals, schools, and pri-
vate residences.  According to Dr. William Hacker,
Commissioner for Public Health, “Without our continued steady
progress in the state’s preparedness program, afforded through
federal support, the Kentucky Department for Public Health
could not have mounted such a comprehensive and successful
response to the health needs of those touched by the storm.”
Throughout the event, state and local health departments inter-
acted closely with multiple levels and types of agencies to coordi-
nate an integrated health and medical response.  Pre-positioned
equipment and supplies were deployed to the affected areas of
the state, in order to support local health departments, hospitals,
and shelters. Safety information was disseminated to the public
using innovative communication methods, due the lack of televi-
sion or telephone access.  Satellite radios, purchased by Public
Health and located in facilities across the commonwealth, al-
lowed agencies to communicate with each other even when
other systems failed.  In addition, relationships developed with
other southeastern states through participation in Region IV’s
Unified Planning Coalition allowed Kentucky to supplement its
own public health team with seasoned teams of professionals
from other states.  Although 36 storm-related fatalities were re-
ported, enhanced public health response capabilities -- made pos-
sible through planning, partnerships and the use of federal funds
-- minimized the storm’s ultimate health impact and helped pre-
serve the health of many Kentuckians.
Source:  Kentucky Department for Public Health
KENTUCKY -- ALL HAZARDS PLANNING LEADS TO SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
IN 2009 WINTER ICE STORM
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50 states and D.C. scored 69 or higher on CDC’s SNS TAR evaluation tool, indicating they
have adequate plans in place to receive and distribute medical countermeasures from the
SNS (2008-2009).
State SNS TAR score SNS TAR score State SNS TAR score SNS TAR score 
(8/10/08-8/9/09) (8/10/07-8/9/08 (8/10/08-8/9/09) (8/10/07-8/9/08
Alabama 86 92 Missouri 76 96
Alaska 70 80 Montana 96 91
Arizona 85 83 Nebraska 85 81
Arkansas 97 93 Nevada 89 84
California 100 100 New Hampshire 81 86
Colorado 96 94 New Jersey 100 98
Connecticut 94 84 New Mexico 78 71
Delaware 98 96 New York 100 97
D.C. pending 94 North Carolina 98 93
Florida 98 95 North Dakota 83 77
Georgia 90 73 Ohio 89 90
Hawaii 84 74 Oklahoma 98 97
Idaho 70 90 Oregon 86 85
Illinois 99 96 Pennsylvania 82 82
Indiana 100 96 Rhode Island 99 93
Iowa 95 93 South Carolina 93 87
Kansas 94 93 South Dakota 91 87
Kentucky 83 86 Tennessee 89 89
Louisiana 100 94 Texas 100 97
Maine 90 90 Utah 88 85
Maryland 96 93 Vermont 98 93
Massachusetts 93 91 Virginia 100 100
Michigan 100 95 Washington 97 94
Minnesota 88 84 West  Virginia 83 83
Mississippi 99 95 Wisconsin 92 86
Wyoming 80 80
Source: CDC Division of Strategic National Stockpile.  Scores for the four federally funded localities (Chicago, District of Columbia, Los
Angeles County, and New York City) were not available for release when this report went to print. States with pending scores were evaluated
on SNS TAR scores from the previous Budget Period 08 (August 10, 2007 to August 9, 2008).
B. STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)
Since the first edition of the Ready or Not?  report
in 2003, TFAH has tracked states’ plans to re-
ceive and distribute emergency vaccines, anti-
dotes, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies
from the SNS.  In 2003, only two states had ade-
quate plans based on a CDC evaluation.  Now,
based on CDC’s technical assistance review
(TAR), all 50 states and D.C. have adequate
plans to receive and distribute supplies from the
SNS.  It should be emphasized that the scoring
system assesses planning and management of the
stockpile.  It does not reflect the actual capacity
of the state to deploy countermeasures and
other supplies from the SNS.  
State and local health departments plan and
train in order to: 1) receive SNS assets from the
federal government; 2) distribute, or move,
those assets from the storage facility to the point
of dispensing (POD); and 3) dispense, or pro-
vide or administer, the medical countermeasure
to the affected person(s). 
It is worth noting that the CDC has changed its
evaluation system, and that scores still vary greatly
based on this system, ranging from a high of 100
in eight states (California, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Vir-
ginia) to a low of 70 in Alaska and Idaho.  Over
the past year, the majority of states were able to
increase or maintain their SNS TAR scores, al-
though there were some exceptions.  In seven
states, SNS TAR scores fell between budget years.
The CDC set a goal for states to obtain a score of
69 or higher on the SNS TAR by December 31,
2008.  As of November 23, 2009, all 50 states and
D.C. met this goal.  For the next PHEP grants
budget year (August 10, 2009 to August 9,
2010), states must score 79 or higher in order to
meet grant requirements.
The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics,
chemical antidotes, antiviral drugs, antitoxins,
life-support medications, intravenous (IV) ad-
ministration equipment, airway maintenance
supplies, and medical and surgical items. The
SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply
state and local public health agencies in the
event of a national emergency anywhere and at
anytime within the United States or its territo-
ries.  As a condition of federal public health pre-
paredness grants, states are required to develop
a plan for the receipt and distribution of SNS
contents and then exercise the plan.82  
According to CDC, “Preparedness to receive,
stage, store, and distribute SNS materiel is es-
sential to saving lives at risk during a public
health emergency.”83 For example, in a 2007
study, researchers used a computer model to il-
lustrate the importance of rapidly receiving, dis-
tributing, and dispensing medical countermea-
sures in the event of a bioterrorist anthrax attack.
According to the study’s authors, “The number
of people infected who become seriously ill can
be reduced by 81 percent if mass prophylaxis is
initiated two days after the release (of the an-
thrax) and finished two days later.  If mass pro-
phylaxis is initiated five days after the release and
finished 10 days later, the number of casualties
is reduced by only 39 percent.”84
CDC evaluates states’ SNS distribution pre-
paredness plans based on a zero-to-100 point
scale.  The agency’s TAR relies primarily on a
checklist tool for evaluating SNS plans and sup-
porting documents.  The evaluation takes place
over the course of one day during an on-site
CDC staff visit.85 There are 13 functions on
which states are evaluated.86
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California’s ability to effectively respond to recent emergency
events such as H1N1 influenza has been significantly strength-
ened by effective Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) planning.  In
2003, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) began
to aggressively build a complete and robust SNS program, aided
by the support and encouragement of CDPH executive manage-
ment, the Secretary of the California Health and Human Services
Agency, and the Governor.  California’s efforts culminated in Cal-
ifornia’s SNS program becoming the first Project Area in the na-
tion to achieve a perfect score of 100 from CDC on the annual
State Technical Assistance Review. The same score was awarded
in 2009. The effective use of Public Health Emergency Prepared-
ness funds made this achievement possible.
The success of California’s approach is based on an “all haz-
ards” emergency management model that is NIMS compliant.
CDPH formed the Emergency Pharmaceutical Services Unit
(EPSU) to focus on building the State’s capacity to receive,
store, stage and distribute emergency medical and pharma-
ceutical supplies to local entities during a public health emer-
gency.  Using CDC grant funding, CDPH hired several subject
matter experts as consultants to assist in this endeavor.  
CDPH began by building relationships with public and private
entities.  CDPH developed written agreements with partner
State agencies, including the California Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection for Incident Command System position
mentoring and access to their emergency resource directories
and the California Highway Patrol for security at CDPH’s Re-
ceiving, Storing and Staging (RSS) warehouse site and to provide
highway escort during shipment to local health departments. In
addition, CDPH entered into emergency use agreements with
numerous trucking firms and multiple statewide warehouse lo-
cations for potential RSS warehouse sites. 
CDPH developed a comprehensive SNS plan and a training
and exercise program based on the plan.  Annually, CDPH
conducts a full scale warehouse exercise to test the State’s
ability to receive, store, stage and rapidly distribute pharma-
ceutical and medical supplies.  Emergency response plans, in-
cluding the State SNS Plan, are continually updated based on
lessons learned during exercises. 
In addition to bolstering the State’s capabilities, CDPH works
directly with local health departments to assist them in further
developing their emergency plans and response capabilities.
CDPH has assigned staff to provide technical assistance and
mentoring on a regional basis to guide local planners.
When CDPH was called into action for the H1N1 outbreak in
April 2009, the State was ready to respond.  In addition to ac-
tivation of its department operations center, CDPH activated
the State RSS warehouse to simultaneously establish emer-
gency operations.  Operating on a 24/7 schedule, the RSS
warehouse deployed approximately two million courses of an-
tivirals statewide to local health departments in May 2009.
With few exceptions, shipments were received by local health
departments within 24 hours of request.  Like CDPH, Califor-
nia’s local health departments reported that previous SNS
planning made it possible for them to efficiently receive, dis-
tribute and dispense antivirals. 
Source: California Department of Public Health
CALIFORNIA -- BUILDING A ROBUST CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE AND DISTRIBUTE 
PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES 
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The SNS maintains a variety of critical pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies including antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin and
doxycycline, chemical nerve agent antidotes like atropine and
pralidoxime, antiviral drugs such as Tamiflu® and Relenza®,
pain management drugs such as morphine, vaccines for agents
like smallpox, as well as radiological countermeasures such as
Prussian blue and DTPA. In addition to pharmaceuticals, the
SNS contains supportive care supplies like endotracheal tubes
and IV supplies, burn and blast supplies such as sutures and
bandages, ventilators, personnel protective equipment such as
N-95 respirators and surgical gloves and other life-saving med-
ical materiel. While this list is not comprehensive, it is repre-
sentative of the items contained in the SNS. 
The SNS is positioned in undisclosed locations throughout the
United States and is configured to provide a flexible response
strategy.  Included in the stockpile are a dozen 12-hour Push
Packages, which contain over 50 tons of pharmaceuticals and
medical materiel.  These assets are pre-configured in deploy-
able containers and strategically located to enable rapid deliv-
ery to the site of a national emergency within 12 hours of the
federal decision to deploy.  
The majority of the SNS formulary is maintained in managed
inventory.  Like the 12-hour Push Packages, these assets are
also strategically located around the nation.  They provide the
ability to configure and deliver significant quantities of pharma-
ceuticals and medical materiel as an initial response if the na-
ture of the public health emergency is well defined, or as
follow-on to a “push package” delivery.  Delivery of assets
from managed inventory are planned to begin arriving within
24 to 36 hours after the federal decision to deploy them.
Quantities in the SNS change based on national planning guid-
ance and prioritization, modeling scenarios, and standard in-
ventory management procedures.  
According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Pre-
paredness and Response (ASPR), some of the contents of the
national stockpile include:
 Enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or
every man, woman, and child in America87;
Over 41 million regimens of countermeasures against an-
thrax88; 
 Therapeutic anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic pa-
tients89;
 10 million anthrax vaccine (AVA) doses90;
 Countermeasures to address radiation exposure including
475,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethylenetri-
amine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA91; and
 4.8 million bottles of pediatric formulation of potassium io-
dide (KI) for use in the event of a release of radioiodines.92
The SNS also has a supply of countermeasures that could be
used during an influenza pandemic.  In fact, beginning with the
spring emergence of H1N1, the U.S. government has been
distributing both antivirals and supplies from the SNS to state
and local health departments.  As of November 12, 2009, the
SNS contained the following countermeasures:93 
 36.6 million regimens of oseltamivir capsules; 
 10.3 million regimens of zanamivir;
 20.4 million N95 respirators;    
 37.7 million surgical masks; and
 5.4 million pediatric formulations of oseltamivir.
THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)
As of November 12, 2009, there were 5.4 million regimens of
pediatric antiviral formulations in the federal stockpile to treat
a potential pandemic flu for the nation’s 73.6 million children.
Additional pediatric purchases have been made with deliveries
expected in 2010.94 For planning purposes, the federal gov-
ernment has assumed that antivirals would be needed for at
least 25 percent of the population.  This principle was applied
towards pediatric population as additional pediatric formula-
tions were purchased for the SNS.    
In fact, the H1N1 influenza pandemic has affected young children
at much higher rates than seniors, who are normally considered a
high-risk group for seasonal influenza.  Data from the first six
weeks or so of the fall wave of H1N1 (CDC considers September
1, 2009 to be the start of the 2009-2010 flu season) reveal that
more than half the hospitalizations -- 53 percent -- were of people
under age 25. Only seven percent were of people over the age of
65. As Dr. Anne Schuchat, CDC’s director of immunization and
respiratory disease noted: “This is really, really different from what
we see with seasonal flu.”  This is a “young person’s disease.”95
Given the high attack rate among young children, private phar-
macies have reported shortages of liquid antiviral formula-
tions.  CDC has released some 540,000 courses of liquid
Tamiflu from the SNS, and some pharmacy chains, including
Walgreens and Wal-Mart, have begun breaking open adult
Tamiflu capsules and mixing them with sweet syrup into pedi-
atric formulations as indicated in the Tamilfu package insert as
an alternative if commercial suspension product is not avail-
able.96 To facilitate the pharmacists compounding of adult
drugs into pediatric doses, CDC and FDA have posted guid-
ance online.  The guidelines posted also ask pharmacist and
clinicians to consider alternatives to suspension formulations
that includes compounding and using Tamiflu pediatric cap-
sules (30mg and 45mg ) that are not limited in supply for pa-
tients over 33 pounds and over one year of age.  These
capsules may be opened and mixed with a sweetened liquid
by a caregiver, if the child cannot swallow capsules. 
SNS and Children
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CDC released updated guidance on pandemic H1N1 infection
control in health care settings in October 2009 recommending
that workers caring for H1N1 patients wear fit-tested N95 res-
pirators -- not surgical masks -- as protection against the virus.101
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has seconded this recommen-
dation, while calling for more research on flu transmission and
the efficacy of different respiratory protection methods.102  
In its updated guidance document, CDC notes that its N95 rec-
ommendation may lead to increased demand and possible short-
ages.  “Although the exact total supply in the public and private
sectors is not known, a large gap between supply and demand is
predicted.  In the face of shortages, appropriate selection and
use of respiratory protection is critical,” says CDC.103  
Many workers find respirators uncomfortable to wear and re-
port that they make communication with patients and other
staff very difficult.  An article in the Journal of the American
Medical Association found that influenza rates among nurses
wearing surgical masks were not significantly higher than those
wearing N95 respirators, leading some to question the need
to wear the N95s.104 Meanwhile, some major labor unions, in-
cluding Service Employees International Union (SEIU) the na-
tion’s largest organization of health care workers, strongly
support the use of N95s when caring for a patient with sus-
pected or confirmed H1N1.105
Although health care workers and their professional associa-
tions are divided over the use of N95s, industry representa-
tives report the use of N95s in hospitals has risen dramatically
as the second wave of H1N1 has picked up speed.  CDC cur-
rently estimates the projected need for N95 respirators dur-
ing the H1N1 pandemic to be 525 million, which is far more
than the 20.4 million N95 respirators CDC had left in the fed-
eral stockpile as of November 12, 2009.  Of that 525 million,
the nation’s 13 million health care workers would need 243
million based on current knowledge of the H1N1 pandemic.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
meanwhile, had previously estimated the projected need for
N95 respirators during an influenza pandemic to be 4.8 billion
(2.4 billion in the health care).  However, this estimate was
based on assumptions of a massive pandemic with an ex-
tremely virulent strain of flu virus.  
According to one of the leading manufacturers of personal
protective equipment (PPE), as of October 2009 state public
health agencies and hospitals had stockpiled an estimated 92
million N95 respirators for use in a pandemic, with one state,
California amassing some 57 million respirators.106 This figure
does not include N95s that are purchased through the regular
supply chain for everyday use in hospitals and other health
care settings.  Between this private estimate and the federal
SNS stockpile it appears that the nation has stockpiled far
fewer respirators than what CDC estimates will be needed
over the course of the H1N1 pandemic, or what OSHA esti-
mated would be needed in a severe pandemic.  
As some hospitals and health care systems begin to have prob-
lems meeting their own N95 needs, CDC announced on Octo-
ber 19, 2009 that it would distribute 75 percent of the
remaining N95 respirators in the SNS to support state and local
health departments with their H1N1 influenza response.107    
A major part of the problem is that manufacturers do not have
the capacity to meet the increased demand for N95s
prompted by the H1N1 pandemic.  Although some are adding
additional manufacturing capacity, that won’t be up and run-
ning for several months.  According to one sales representa-
tive, “What was a six- to 12-month backlog has become a
two- to three-year backlog.”108 Manufacturers are in talks
with the federal government about building capacity, but even
if the government decided to fund the construction of new
plants, they would not be up and running for at least a year
which would not help meet the demand from the second or
third wave of H1N1.
If health care systems do not have enough N95 respirators for
all staff, CDC recommends the careful prioritization of their
use and says that personnel who do not receive respirators
should be given facemasks.  “Facemasks that have been
cleared for marketing by the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion have been tested for their ability to resist blood and body
fluids, and generally provide a physical barrier to droplets that
are expelled directly at the user. Although they do not filter
small particles from the air and they allow leakage around the
mask, they are a barrier to splashes, droplet sprays, and au-
toinoculation of influenza virus from the hands to the nose and
mouth. Thus, they should be chosen over no protection.”109  
Given that CDC guidance recommends N95s, it may be nec-
essary for the CDC, together with FDA and OSHA, to imple-
ment a robust education campaign for health care workers
and the general public about the safety of using other PPEs for
pandemic influenza infection control.  More importantly, the
shortage underscores the need for all health care workers to
receive the seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine every
year.  Only 42 percent of health care personnel receive an an-
nual flu shot.110 Assuring higher vaccination rates among
health care workers is also about protecting patients from
contracting influenza from their care providers.
STOCKPILING AND USE OF N95 RESPIRATORS IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS
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The Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) is administered by the FDA and DOD.  The DOD, the Vet-
erans Administration (VA) and CDC/SNS participate in the program.97 DOD and SNS both maintain
large stockpiles of medications and vaccines in order to ensure that both military and civilian popula-
tions have access to needed antidotes, and treatments in the event of a medical emergency. In order
to save federal dollars, FDA and DOD developed a system of extending the shelf-life of these drugs
beyond the manufacturer’s expiration date.  
The program has resulted in substantial savings.  According to CDC’s analysis, the return on invest-
ment for SNS participation in the SLEP is that for each dollar ($1.00) spent on SLEP costs, which in-
cludes testing, shipping, and re-labeling, SNS saved $13.00.98  
Despite the substantial savings at the federal level, states’ stockpiles of antivirals -- purchased through an
HHS-subsidized program as part of states pandemic preparedness -- are not eligible.  As of September
10, 2009 state and local jurisdictions have stockpiled nearly 25 million treatment courses of antivirals
In 2006, ASTHO surveyed its members regarding the stockpiling of antivirals.  At the time, states indi-
cated that inventory management, including the storage, rotation, and shelf-life extension strategies,
were of critical concern.99 State public health budgets are stretched thin already.  Without a federal
compromise on the SLEP, many states will be unwilling to commit scarce dollars to buy antivirals that will
expire in only seven years.  Although the May 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implemen-
tation Plan asked HHS/FDA to explore the possibility of extending SLEP to state and privately-held
stockpiles, according to a 2008 IOM report, “nothing has been released about the feasibility, cost, and
other barriers of extending the program to properly maintained non-federal stockpiles.”100  
SHELF-LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
C. SENIORS’ SEASONAL FLU AND PNEUMOCOCCAL
VACCINATION RATES
Routine vaccinations have helped prevent
countless illnesses and deaths, and are ex-
tremely cost-effective, sparing the healthcare sys-
tem the expense of caring for those who might
otherwise become ill.  
CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) recommends that adults aged
65 and older receive both an annual seasonal flu
shot and a pneumococcal vaccine every ten years.  
According to CDC, five to 20 percent of Americans
contract the seasonal flu, more than 200,000 peo-
ple are hospitalized from flu complications, and
approximately 36,000 people die from the flu each
year.111 Certain people, such as the elderly, the very
young, and those with compromised immune sys-
tems are more vulnerable to complications from
seasonal flu.112 Complications of flu can include
bacterial pneumonia, dehydration, and worsening
of chronic medical conditions, such as congestive
heart failure, asthma, or diabetes.  
In recent years, states have made vaccinating one
key high risk group, adults aged 65 and older, a
public health priority.  Using data from CDC’s
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS), TFAH has looked at vaccination rates
for this group based on three-year averages.   
In 2006 and 2007, TFAH included an indicator
on state public health preparedness that graded
states on their ability to increase or maintain
their seasonal flu vaccination rates among this
target group.  By 2008, all 50 states and D.C. were
able to either significantly increase (18 states) or
maintain (32 states and D.C.) their vaccination
rates for this group.  This year, when TFAH ana-
lyzed the data, we found similar results, although
an even larger number of states (31 states and
D.C.) were able to show a statistically significant
increase in seniors’ seasonal flu vaccination rates.
In the other 19 states, rates held steady.
Given the importance of successful mass vacci-
nation campaigns during a pandemic, such as
the ongoing H1N1 flu, or an infectious disease
outbreak or bioterror attack, it is encouraging
to see the success states have had with vaccinat-
ing this high risk group.  It illustrates how effec-
tive public health departments can be at
reaching out to vulnerable populations and get-
ting important health messages across.  
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Seasonal Flu Vaccination Rates for Adults Aged 65 and older -- 
Comparing 2004-2006, 2005-2007, and 2006-2008
State 2004-2006 2005-2007  2006-2008  2005-07 2006-08 
(three-year average) (three-year average) (three-year average) +/- 2004-06 +/- 2005-07
Alabama 63.0% 64.0% 66.6% 1.0% 2.7%
Alaska 62.5% 62.7% 65.2% 0.2% 2.5%
Arizona 64.7% 65.7% 68.7% 1.0% 3.0%
Arkansas 67.5% 68.1% 69.9% 0.6% 1.8%
California 67.9% 67.4% 68.7% -0.5% 1.4%
Colorado 76.3% 75.5% 76.7% -0.8% 1.2%
Connecticut 71.8% 72.3% 73.5% 0.5% 1.2%
Delaware 68.5% 70.0% 71.2% 1.6% 1.2%
D.C. 56.9% 58.7% 60.9% 1.8% 2.2%
Florida 60.7% 60.7% 63.3% 0.0% 2.6%
Georgia 63.4% 64.5% 65.9% 1.1% 1.4%
Hawaii 73.9% 75.5% 77.1% 1.6% 1.6%
Idaho 65.1% 66.1% 67.6% 1.1% 1.5%
Illinois 62.6% 63.5% 65.9% 0.9% 2.4%
Indiana 64.5% 67.1% 68.6% 2.6% 1.5%
Iowa 73.1% 73.3% 74.9% 0.2% 1.6%
Kansas 68.9% 70.7% 72.7% 1.8% 2.0%
Kentucky 64.2% 67.3% 71.1% 3.1% 3.8%
Louisiana 65.2% 65.2% 66.9% 0.0% 1.7%
Maine 70.6% 72.3% 74.6% 1.7% 2.3%
Maryland 63.3% 65.6% 69.1% 2.4% 3.5%
Massachusetts 71.1% 73.6% 74.4% 2.4% 0.8%
Michigan 68.4% 69.8% 70.7% 1.3% 1.0%
Minnesota 76.7% 77.2% 76.6% 0.5% -0.6%
Mississippi 64.6% 65.6% 67.5% 1.0% 2.0%
Missouri 67.7% 67.8% 71.0% 0.1% 3.2%
Montana 71.4% 71.7% 71.6% 0.2% -0.1%
Nebraska 73.9% 74.3% 75.3% 0.3% 1.0%
Nevada 56.5% 57.7% 59.0% 1.1% 1.3%
New Hampshire 71.0% 73.3% 75.9% 2.4% 2.6%
New Jersey 65.8% 66.8% 67.6% 1.0% 0.9%
New Mexico 69.3% 68.5% 69.1% -0.8% 0.6%
New York 64.2% 65.7% 68.7% 1.6% 3.0%
North Carolina 67.3% 68.8% 71.3% 1.4% 2.5%
North Dakota 71.9% 71.3% 72.3% -0.6% 1.0%
Ohio 66.8% 68.5% 70.3% 1.7% 1.9%
Oklahoma 72.9% 73.3% 73.3% 0.4% 0.0%
Oregon 70.4% 71.1% 71.5% 0.7% 0.4%
Pennsylvania 63.8% 66.7% 70.9% 2.9% 4.1%
Rhode Island 71.6% 73.9% 76.2% 2.3% 2.3%
South Carolina 63.2% 64.8% 67.1% 1.5% 2.3%
South Dakota 75.8% 75.9% 75.9% 0.2% 0.0%
Tennessee 66.1% 67.4% 70.4% 1.3% 3.0%
Texas 65.0% 64.9% 68.1% -0.1% 3.2%
Utah 72.4% 72.7% 73.9% 0.4% 1.2%
Vermont 68.6% 71.3% 73.6% 2.7% 2.3%
Virginia 68.2% 70.5% 72.5% 2.3% 2.1%
Washington 68.8% 70.2% 71.3% 1.4% 1.2%
West Virginia 65.9% 66.9% 69.4% 1.0% 2.5%
Wisconsin 72.7% 72.6% 73.0% 0.0% 0.4%
Wyoming 72.5% 73.4% 72.6% 0.9% -0.7%
Note: Percentages are rounded to the tenth decimal place.  States in red type had statistically significant (p<0.05) increases between
three-year comparisons.  No state had a statistically significant decrease over the past five years (2004-2008).  
Source:  BRFSS.  Data include three year comparisons.  Please note that each state has a different sample size so the rates of increase and decrease
are not comparable across states -- each state has a different range to reach statistically significant changes.  See Appendix C for the methodology.
Another priority for public health departments has
been to meet the national goal of vaccinating 90
percent of adults aged 65 and older against pneu-
mococcal disease by 2010.113 Although states still
fall far short of that goal, the majority of states (47
and D.C.) were able to increase or maintain pneu-
mococcal vaccination rates for adults aged 65 and
older in 2006-2008 compared to 2005-2007.  
The ability of states to conduct successful pneu-
mococcal vaccination campaigns took on added
urgency in 2009 when the H1N1 virus first ap-
peared.  CDC reports that many people who
have experienced serious and sometimes fatal
complications from H1N1 flu have also been in-
fected with streptococcus pneumoniae, a major
cause of pneumonia.  As such, CDC urged high-
risk groups, including adults aged 65 and older
and all persons aged two to 64 years with high-
risk conditions to receive the 23-valent pneu-
mococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPSV23).  
47
Finding:  Forty-seven states and D.C. increased or maintained pneumococcal
vaccination rates for adults 65 and older (comparing 2005-07 to 2006-08).
47 states and D.C. increased or maintained 3 states did NOT increase or maintain 
pneumococcal vaccination rates for adults 65 and pneumococcal vaccination rates for adults 65 and 
older (comparing 2005-07 to 2006-08) (1 point) older (comparing 2005-07 to 2006-08) (0 points)
STATE 2005-2007 2006-2008 06-08 STATE 2005-2007 2006-2008 06-08 
rates rates +/- 05-07 rates rates +/- 05-07
Alabama 62.3% 64.0% 1.7% Louisiana 67.9% 66.3% -1.7%
Alaska 62.4% 64.0% 1.6% Nevada 68.5% 66.1% -2.4%
Arizona 66.3% 68.2% 1.9% New Jersey 64.6% 63.5% -1.1%
Arkansas 61.9% 64.2% 2.2%
California 60.6% 61.0% 0.5%
Colorado 71.8% 72.6% 0.7%
Connecticut 67.4% 66.6% -0.8%
Delaware 68.0% 70.0% 2.0%
D.C. 53.2% 54.4% 1.2%
Florida 62.8% 62.4% -0.3%
Georgia 63.1% 64.0% 0.9%
Hawaii 68.0% 67.9% -0.2%
Idaho 63.6% 64.7% 1.1%
Illinois 59.5% 59.6% 0.1%
Indiana 65.8% 66.9% 1.1%
Iowa 69.8% 70.1% 0.3%
Kansas 68.3% 68.5% 0.2%
Kentucky 64.5% 65.2% 0.7%
Maine 67.8% 70.5% 2.6%
Maryland 64.6% 66.1% 1.6%
Massachusetts 69.0% 69.6% 0.7%
Michigan 65.8% 65.8% 0.0%
Minnesota 71.0% 70.8% -0.2%
Mississippi 66.6% 66.8% 0.2%
Missouri 66.3% 67.3% 1.0%
Montana 71.4% 71.2% -0.2%
Nebraska 69.4% 70.2% 0.9%
New Hampshire 70.1% 71.2% 1.1%
New Mexico 64.1% 64.6% 0.5%
New York 62.2% 63.3% 1.1%
North Carolina 68.0% 68.8% 0.8%
North Dakota 70.5% 69.4% -1.1%
Ohio 66.7% 68.4% 1.8%
Oklahoma 71.0% 71.1% 0.1%
Oregon 73.4% 73.2% -0.2%
Pennsylvania 68.6% 69.7% 1.2%
Rhode Island 72.1% 71.8% -0.3%
South Carolina 63.8% 64.0% 0.3%
South Dakota 65.0% 64.7% -0.3%
Tennessee 65.2% 65.4% 0.2%
Texas 63.1% 63.7% 0.6%
Utah 67.1% 68.0% 0.9%
Vermont 67.8% 69.0% 1.1%
Virginia 67.7% 68.1% 0.4%
Washington 69.1% 70.0% 0.9%
West Virginia 67.0% 66.9% 0.0%
Wisconsin 69.0% 70.5% 1.5%
Wyoming 71.0% 70.3% -0.8%
Note: States in red type
had statistically significant
(p<0.05) increases and/or
decreases (p<0.05). 
Source:  BRFSS.  Data in-
clude three year compar-
isons.  Please note that
each state has a different
sample size so the rates of
increase and decrease are
not comparable across
states -- each state has a
different range to reach
statistically significant
changes.  See Appendix C
for the methodology.

Federal Preparedness
This past year, public health preparedness in the
United States and around the world has been
tested by the emergence of the novel A/H1N1
strain of the flu.  The outbreak has posed serious
challenges, but the strain of the virus has been
relatively mild.  What H1N1 has shown is that if
the virus had become more severe, our nation’s
public health safety system could have been
stretched beyond the breaking point.
In order to have a strong, public health system
that can respond to threats, whether they are
man-made or naturally occurring diseases and
disasters, the federal government needs to ramp
up policies and investment to strengthen our
core public health system.
While federal preparedness policy has evolved
over the past seven years with the passage of
major legislation and a renewed focus on ac-
countability and transparency, a review of federal
policies by TFAH finds that the federal govern-
ment continues to lag in several key areas:
 Funding:  The U.S. Congress has failed to de-
liver a sustained financial commitment to-
wards preparedness -- especially at the state
and local level where many of the essential
preparedness and response activities occur.
While the President and Congress should be
applauded for providing more than $7.7 bil-
lion in emergency supplemental funding to
respond to the H1N1 outbreak this fall, with a
bulk of that funding going toward the devel-
opment and purchase of vaccines, we cannot
be prepared for the range of threats we as a
nation face when we rely on a band aid ap-
proach to funding emergency preparedness;
 National Stockpiles:  The President and Con-
gress need to plan for the replenishment of the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  In addi-
tion to the antivirals distributed to fight H1N1,
other medical countermeasures in the SNS are
beginning to pass their shelf-life expiration
date.  Current legislation, however, does not
allow for replenishing the stockpile, nor does it
factor in the storage, security, and maintenance
costs associated with the SNS; and
 Biosurveillance:  Real-time disease detection
and surveillance is crucial for a well-pre-
pared public health and medical response
system.  While there has been an increased
focus on biosurveillance and the need to co-
ordinate across government agencies, the na-
tion’s human health surveillance systems
remain a patchwork.
Issues addressed in this section include:
A. H1N1 preparedness and response; 
B. Funding for pandemic and all-hazards pre-
paredness and funding for core public health
capacity
C. National stockpiles and development of med-
ical countermeasures;
D. Real-time disease surveillance systems and
health information technology;
E. Implementation of the 2006 Pandemic and All
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA); and
F. Emergency care issues.
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2S E C T I O NIn this section of the report, TFAH examines federal preparedness activities,which have been developed to help the country prepare for a range of poten-
tial health emergencies that we might face, ranging from bioterrorism to natural
disasters to major disease outbreaks.
A. H1N1 PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
This report comes out at a time the nation is grap-
pling with a major public health event: the second
wave of H1N1.  The novel virus emerged in April
2009 and rapidly spread around the globe, hospi-
talizing tens of thousands and killing thousands
more.  Although outbreaks of H1N1 continued
across the United States this past summer, it wasn’t
until late August/early September that a signifi-
cant increase in cases occurred.  The widespread
flu activity this fall has been unprecedented, and
federal, state, and local public health departments
continue to work around the clock to develop and
implement mass vaccination plans, medical surge
plans, and communication campaigns.  
Fortunately, the country is much better prepared
to face a pandemic than it was just a few short years
ago.  The investments that have been made over
the past several years to improve pandemic pre-
paredness have resulted in significantly enhancing
the country’s ability to respond to an influenza
pandemic.  These investments have increased the
country’s vaccine manufacturing capacity, pro-
vided helpful awareness and education campaigns,
contributed to a more robust federal stockpile of
antiviral medications, improved many core public
health functions, and assisted in the development
of federal, state, local, community, business, and
school pandemic plans.  Since 2005, a strong Na-
tional Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has been
developed, and every state has a pandemic plan,
which is constantly being revised and refined.
However, there also have been many concerns
which were not adequately addressed or funded
before 2009.  These included the need to mod-
ernize and strengthen, in a sustained way, much
of the public health infrastructure, how best to
manage surge capacity during a mass event, and
developing a reimbursement system for uncom-
pensated care during an emergency. In addition,
proir to this year, policies called for many pre-
paredness functions to be state and local respon-
sibilities without provision  of federal support for
these needs, including the expectation that states
would purchase a significant portion of antiviral
medications to protect their own citizens.
The federal government has been able to ad-
dress some of these underlying issues in the
short-term as they grapple with the H1N1 pan-
demic, but longer-term solutions are needed.
Some key areas of concern that were under-
scored by the H1N1 outbreak include:
 Vaccine distribution and the intersection of
public health and clinical care;
 Payment for the administration of vaccines; and  
 Surge capacity, including offsite diagnosis.
Vaccine distribution and the intersection of public health and clinical care
After the initial H1N1 outbreak, the United States
immediately started preparing for H1N1 vaccina-
tions.  In mid-September, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) cleared vaccines from
Sanofi-Aventis SA, CSL Ltd, Medimunne, and No-
vartis AG to help prevent H1N1.  A fifth, from
GlaxoSmithKline, was approved in November.
The near-term availability of sufficient pandemic
vaccine, albeit slower than hoped for initially, is
due to an investment that began in FY 2006, when
Congress approved $3.2 billion for advanced de-
velopment, infrastructure building, and purchase
of vaccines.114 The federal government invested
in retrofitting and expanding capacity in vaccine
manufacturers that had domestic production fa-
cilities -- MedImmune and sanofi pasteur —and
ensuring a year-round supply of eggs.115 In fact,
the Untied States moved as fast as or faster than
any other country in the world.  The United King-
dom, for example, just began its vaccination cam-
paign the last week of October -- even though
there is more vaccine production capacity in the
United Kingdom than in the United States.  Be-
tween May 22, 2009 and September 21, 2009,
HHS purchased some $2.25 billion worth of
H1N1 vaccine and adjuvant.116 The vaccine is well
matched to the circulating virus and it is proven to
be safe and effective in clinical trials.  
When vaccines were first distributed in early Oc-
tober, there were reports that medical care
providers were unfamiliar with the government’s
plan to distribute the vaccine.  At the same time,
many private practices were inundated with calls
from patients seeking the vaccine.117
As of November 20, 2009, the U.S. government
had shipped 46.2 million H1N1 vaccine doses
to the 62 Public Health Emergency Response
(PHER) project areas, including all 50 states
and four major metropolitan areas; Chicago,
the District of Columbia, Los Angeles County,
and New York City.118
Unlike a bioterrorist attack, where the public
health system would likely be the sole distributor
of the medical countermeasure, the H1N1 flu
pandemic required the public health and clini-
cal care systems to work together in order to
reach as many Americans as possible.  State pub-
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lic health departments created vaccination plans,
which included identifying locations where the
public was directed to receive vaccinations.
These locations varied by state and included
health care providers, community health centers,
pharmacies, and/or state and local health de-
partments.  In some cases, health departments set
up special vaccination centers in shopping malls
or even drive-thru stations.  States provided CDC
with vaccine orders, and CDC contracted with the
McKesson Corporation to distribute vaccine di-
rectly to the approximately 150,000 locations the
states identified.  Vaccines were distributed with
medical supplies (syringes and sterilization
swabs), in accordance with state plans.
The policy decision designating the federal gov-
ernment as the central purchaser and distributer
of vaccine was wise from both public health and
ethical standpoints.  Centralization has permitted
the federal government to control the flow of the
limited supply. Every state is receiving vaccine on
a per capita basis, rather than based on private or-
dering, state budgets, population demographics,
or political decision-making.  An influenza out-
break does not acknowledge or respect state bor-
ders, and no American should be less protected
based on where he/she lives. Although all states
are temporarily experiencing shortages, all states
are suffering shortfalls equally.  The situation is
not always as clear on the local level, where distri-
bution within states appears uneven in some cases.
This is not to say that there have not been glitches
in this centralized system.  But as best TFAH can
determine, federal health officials have moved as
rapidly as possible to address the problems.  
While the federal government has assumed cen-
tralized responsibility for vaccine distribution to
state and local health departments, each local-
ity is then responsible for developing its own
policies and systems for administration of vac-
cine as it becomes available.  This has posed a
number of important challenges, particularly in
a context of changing messaging resulting from
shortages of both seasonal and H1N1 vaccines:
 First, state and local health officials received
constantly shifting information about how
much vaccine would be available and when.
This makes setting parameters for vaccine ad-
ministration very difficult.  It is nearly impossible
to know why the communications breakdown
between federal officials and industry occurred
with regard to the pace of production.  But this
is clearly an issue that has not only created con-
fusion among the American people; it has also
made the job of local health officials far more
difficult in an already challenging situation.
 Second, the largest mass vaccination campaign
in U.S. history is taking place during an eco-
nomic recession and when state and local health
departments are experiencing devastating
budget and staff cuts.  According to a survey by
National Association of County and City Health
Officials (NACCHO), 15,000 positions have
been lost in local health departments since the
beginning of 2008.119 Meanwhile, a survey by the
Association of State and Territorial Health Offi-
cials (ASTHO) found that 40 percent of states
expected to lose staff through layoffs or attrition
in FY 2009.120 While the federal government has
rapidly pumped almost $1.5 billion to state and
local health departments for pandemic re-
sponse, this does not address the underlying de-
cline in the core capacity of health departments.
We are seeing the result of decades of under-in-
vestment in public health capacity.  It cannot be
rebuilt on an emergency basis.
 Third, public confusion may well have been ex-
acerbated by the fact that each state and locality
has determined how to distribute its supply once
it was received from the federal government.
While all jurisdictions have kept to the general
prioritization of certain populations, they have
often acted differently in terms of which indi-
viduals within the prioritized grouping would
get vaccine first.  This may well have been due to
how supply was ordered by the states and/or dis-
tributed within the states. For example, some lo-
calities have prioritized health care workers,
some have prioritized the vaccination of chil-
dren, and still others have made pregnant
women a top priority.  Population demograph-
ics differ from state-to-state, so it is sensible to
allow some flexibility between locales (for ex-
ample, if the pandemic had targeted seniors,
Arizona and Florida may have very different dis-
tribution plans than other states).  However, the
variation in distribution methodologies has cre-
ated a fair amount of confusion among the pub-
lic.  Although each health department based
their plans on a larger supply of vaccines, HHS
may want to revisit this issue and consider some
standardization in future emergencies since it is
not unreasonable for the American people to
expect some level of consistency in approach.
Otherwise, they may think that the target pop-
ulation hierarchies articulated by the federal
government are not science-based.
A number of experts believe there will likely be
a third wave of H1N1 that may occur in the
United States in the winter or spring, so even
after this winter’s flu season subsides, many pub-
lic health professionals recommend that the vac-
cination campaign continue to protect people
for the future.
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As the second wave of the H1N1 outbreak picked up steam in August 2009, Virginia state health officials
had three main priorities: the distribution of medical countermeasures, including H1N1 vaccines; handling
increased patient volume at hospitals, community health clinics, and private practitioners’ offices, and pro-
viding accurate, useful, prudent and timely information to the general public as well as focused messages
to key communities.  
According to Bob Mauskapf, Director, Emergency Operations, Planning and Logistics for the Virginia
Department of Health (VDH), planning and preparing for the distribution of medical countermeasures
-- including the handling of mass vaccinations and antivirals -- was a key focus of the federal Public
Health Emergency Preparedness grant to the state.  “This was a preparedness benchmark that we
spent a lot of time and energy on and we’ve seen the pay off this fall,” he said.
Over the past several years Virginia had built up its stockpile of antiviral drugs, which if taken within
48 hours of the onset of flu symptoms, can lessen the severity of the illness.  Although the state hasn’t
had any reports of antiviral shortages from private pharmacies, VDH wanted to make sure that unin-
sured and underinsured Virginians had access to antivirals.  VDH mobilized their SNS team and dis-
tributed 50,000 treatment courses of Tamiflu to local health departments and free clinics.  In addition,
VDH released all 15,000 treatment courses of pediatric oral suspension antiviral formulations they
had received from the SNS to children’s hospitals and pharmacies.  According to Mauskapf, the suc-
cess of this deployment of countermeasures from the SNS was the result of partnerships built over
the past seven to eight years with various business entities, including a major pharmacy warehousing
and distributing center and the United Parcel Service (UPS.)  “Where would we be without the train-
ing in logistics paid for by the PHEP grants?  [Logistics] isn’t a core competency of public health but it’s
something that we’ve trained on over the past several years and it has proven to be essential to this
H1N1 response,” he said.
State health officials and medical providers were also able to draw upon the capabilities developed via the
federal investments in hospital preparedness.  The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) funding has en-
abled Virginia to develop and maintain a network of mutually supporting health care regions, hospitals,
federally-qualified health centers (FQHCs), long-term care facilities (LTCFs), free clinics, and other health
care entities.  Of particular note has been the establishment of a state Healthcare Emergency Manage-
ment Committee and six Hospital Regions, each with a primary and a secondary Regional Healthcare Co-
ordinating Center and a dedicated Regional Hospital Coordinator. This has enhanced communications,
interoperability, mutual support, patient diversion, and coordinated surge operations.  Fortunately, there
have only been a few spot reports around Virginia of hospitals that implemented surge plans.  
However, private practitioners and local public health departments have been overwhelmed by people
seeking information about the H1N1 vaccine.  In order to help ease this burden, VDH instituted a Pub-
lic Health Information Center (PHIC)/Call Center staffed by employees hired with the federal emer-
gency supplemental H1N1 funding.  The call center is staffed with a mixture of clinicians, nurses and
subject matter experts who can answer email or take a phone call that can’t be fielded by a lay person.
The call center greatly reduced local health department call volumes so that they could more appropri-
ately direct local resources toward other pressing operations, such as disease surveillance and investi-
gation of suspected H1N1 cases.  According to VDH, the call center was fielding 750 calls per week
through the end of October, although in early November that dropped to 400 calls per week.  
As the supply of H1N1 vaccine steadily increases and priority populations are immunized, VDH offi-
cials are planning for a mass vaccination campaign that will target the general public.  As Mauskapf
notes, “It’s not our imagination that’s holding us back but the logistics of getting enough vaccine.”  
Source:  Virginia Department of Health
VIRGINIA -- PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO H1N1
The President’s declaration of a public health
emergency -- as in the case with the current H1N1
pandemic -- makes possible the federal purchase
and nationwide distribution of free vaccine.  But
even when vaccine is distributed free of charge,
its administration poses costs to physicians, health
departments, and schools.
The hybrid public-private vaccine delivery system
in the United States further complicates the dis-
tribution and administration of vaccines.  The
health insurance system is comprised of thou-
sands of separate coverage arrangements gov-
erned by multiple laws that lack common content
or coverage and payment requirements.  Three
major insurance issues surround H1N1 immu-
nizations.  These issues may create barriers that
deter low-income families and individuals from
seeking immunizations.  The concerns include:  
 Determining whether an insurance provider
will require a co-pay or deductable for receiv-
ing an H1N1 immunization;
Making it easy for providers to bulk bill insur-
ance companies or government insurance
providers for payment though a method called
roster billing, instead of filling out individual
paperwork claims for every single patient; and 
 Allowing for out-of-network coverage, so that
patients can go to available locations adminis-
tering vaccines without concern for whether
they are part of their official insurance network.
The federal government has direct oversight re-
sponsibilities for certain health insurance
arrangements and can set policies for these pro-
grams, including Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In
addition, the federal government plays a key over-
sight role in the case of health benefit plans cov-
ering the federal civilian and military workforce
(Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)).  HHS and
the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) also over-
see the state regulated insurance market for both
small group and individual coverage as a result of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (HIPAA).   DOL oversees the adminis-
tration of health benefit plans offered by private
employers.  As of 2009, around 60 percent of pri-
vate employers sponsored health benefit plans
for their employees.121 Virtually all of these plans
operate under the authority of the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  Finally,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) oversees the
awarding to tax-free status to the 2,900 non-gov-
ernmental, nonprofit hospitals in the United
States, which includes requiring these hospitals
meet defined “community benefit” standards.
An analysis TFAH commissioned from researchers
at the George Washington University School of
Public Health and Health Services determined the
federal agencies could take the following actions to
help improve vaccine administration issues:
Medicaid should update their policies around
roster billing and out-of-network issues.  They
should clarify that their policies should provide
coverage for administration of the vaccine and
out-of-network medical care related to H1N1
and allow for roster billing.  The program cov-
ers 60 million individuals including the nation’s
most vulnerable low-income and medically
high-risk individuals.  H1N1 vaccine adminis-
tration is covered for children enrolled in Med-
icaid through the early and periodic screening,
diagnostic and treatment benefit (EPSDT).
 DOL has the ability to communicate with
ERISA-governed health benefit plans offered
by private employers to encourage them to
provide information to all of their beneficiaries
about the importance of getting vaccinated;
waive co-pay requirements for vaccinations;
and waive out-of-network restrictions for vacci-
nations; and provide state and local public
health departments with information about
vaccination rates and progress to the extent
covered by law (ERISA does not pre-empt pub-
lic health reporting requirements). 
OPM and DOD can also communicate with the
contractors that manage their health plans to
encourage that they provide information to all
of their beneficiaries about the importance of
getting vaccinated; waive co-pay requirements
for vaccinations; and waive out-of-network re-
strictions for vaccinations; and provide state
and local public health departments with in-
formation about vaccination rates and progress
to the extent covered by law.
 The U.S. Treasury Department, of which the IRS
is one of the divisions, could remind nonprofit
hospitals that immunization is a key community
benefit and encourage that they actively work to
provide vaccines to the community and extend
hours and their workforce to help state and local
health departments with community vaccination
efforts.  The IRS found has found that in the
past, nearly one in two nonprofit hospitals spent
nothing on immunizations, and for those who
did, many may have charged for the care.122
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Vaccines and payment issues
Federal role
In the long-term, the federal government should
mandate that all health insurers -- including the
federally-run plans -- cover seasonal and pan-
demic flu shots, regardless of the where they are
administered.  Another option would be for the
government to pass legislation similar to that
which was introduced by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-
Iowa) -- The Seasonal Influenza and Pandemic
Preparation Act of 2009 -- which would establish
a nationwide, voluntary influenza vaccination
program under which any individual may receive
an annual influenza vaccine, free of charge.  
State role
Even when the vaccine is distributed free of
charge (as in the case of the H1N1 influenza vac-
cine) the vaccine administration fee could rep-
resent a major financial barrier for families who
cannot gain access to free or reduced priced vac-
cination sites such as public health agencies,
community health centers, and volunteer loca-
tions.  In fact, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
has identified vaccine administration as a po-
tential financial barrier to care.123  
However, a review of state health insurance
statutes and regulations focusing on those man-
dating coverage of immunization administration
during a declared public health emergency,
found that no state addresses coverage of vaccines
or administration during periods of public health
emergencies.  An analysis of state laws by legal re-
searchers at the George Washington University
School of Public Health and Health Services,
found that 32 states and D.C. maintain some level
of pediatric immunization mandate.  However,
the mandates are weak, effectively leaving all states
without mandatory coverage of routine immu-
nizations for children under 18.  (See TFAH’s on-
line supplement State Laws Mandating Insurance
Coverage of Vaccines for Children and Adults available
at www.healthyamericans.org).
This raises questions of how accessible private
sector immunization services would be, particu-
larly for larger families.  
States might pursue two avenues for assuring in-
dividuals and families help with the cost of vac-
cine administration. One approach might be
enactment of an insurance coverage mandate
that requires insurers operating in both the in-
dividual and group health insurance markets to
cover and pay for vaccine administration fees
during periods of declared public health emer-
gencies, when the vaccines themselves have
been distributed on a nationwide basis.  
An alternative approach would be to assess a
modest “public health safety” fee assessed
against both employers and insurers selling
products in the individual and group health
markets, which in turn could be used to create
a specific fund to underwrite vaccine adminis-
tration costs whether furnished in public set-
tings or by private health care providers.    
Either approach would provide critical financ-
ing to help defray the cost of vaccine adminis-
tration during public health emergencies.  The
benefit of an insurance mandate is that it would
utilize standard insurance claims payment meth-
ods for assuring payment to participating
providers.  Insurers could trigger their claims
payment system once a public health emergency
is declared, allowing providers whether in- or
out-of-network to submit vaccine administration
claims on members’ behalf, using specially de-
signed claims forms. 
The benefit of the latter approach is that it
would eliminate insurance administration com-
plexities while assuring that, because of its struc-
ture as a public health preparedness statute
rather than as an insurance product mandate,
the financing mechanism would reach not only
insurance products sold to employers in the
group market but also employers who self insure
and purchase only administered products,
thereby exempting their plans from the reach
of state insurance laws.124 Such a fee could be
paid directly to a state public health agency,
which in turn could allot funds back to physi-
cians, health care professionals, mass immu-
nization entities and private health care
providers who agree to payment conditions such
as the elimination of point-of-service charges
and acceptance of payment under such a pro-
gram as payment in full.   
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As the first wave of the H1N1 pandemic spread across the United States last spring, officials with the
Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) quickly realized that an effective response to the pan-
demic would require the entire community to be engaged and take appropriate action.  To effectively
handle the H1N1 flu state health officials would rely on the four critical pillars of a mitigation effort:
nonmedical interventions that limit the spread of the virus; antiviral drugs; medical care; and vaccines. 
Over the past several years, ISDH staff has used federal PHEP dollars and supplemental pandemic
preparedness funding to develop relationships with various community partners, such as healthcare
providers, emergency management, hospitals, primary and secondary schools, the media, and faith-
based organizations. These essential relationships were developed using a systems-based approach as
a foundation of ISDH’s preparedness planning and response.  Community partnerships were forged at
the local level using pandemic influenza preparedness funding
Having developed these essential relationships, state health officials have been able to communicate to
the general public and at-risk groups the importance of nonmedical interventions such as hand washing,
covering coughs, and staying home when ill. In 2006, Indiana public health officials conducted a compre-
hensive state-wide gap analysis of pandemic influenza planning in all 92 counties, as an evidence-based
approach to creating a stronger preparedness infrastructure across the state. Technical assistance has
also been provided to rural Indiana hospitals to develop strategic plans for sustaining essential healthcare
services, while meeting the demands placed on them by large numbers of patients with influenza.  
Indiana public health officials have also worked with the private sector to ensure that businesses operating
in Indiana have appropriate policies in place to ensure that employees who are sick are not pressured to
come into work or penalized for staying home when they are ill.  For example, both Purdue University
and Indiana University changed graduation handshaking policies directly related to our communications,
while Purdue and other universities changed policies for class attendance.  In addition, Community Hospi-
tal changed their policy regarding illness.  Originally, they were instructed to stay home for at least seven
days if they developed the flu and were also told they must use vacation days.  That policy changed -- staff
no longer have to take vacation or paid-time-off if they are home sick -- because hospital administration
officials decided that they did not want clinicians coming to work sick in order to save their vacation. 
To ensure that residents infected with H1N1 or any other pandemic influenza have access to antivi-
rals, the state stockpiled more than 650,000 treatment courses to be used in the event that private
supplies were depleted.  During the spring outbreak, the federal government released 25 percent of
the SNS antiviral cache to states.  Although there have been no reports of shortages at local pharma-
cies, ISDH decided to allow local health officers to use antivirals from the SNS to treat low-income
patients who couldn’t afford the cost of their antiviral prescriptions. 
The ISDH also drew upon lessons learned from PHEP exercises and drills to develop a mass vaccina-
tion plan.  The state actively engaged local health departments to ensure that community partnerships
were mobilized to successfully achieve an efficient and equitable mass vaccination campaign.  For many
local health departments, Indiana’s decision to allow them to hire a Preparedness Coordinator using
federal PHEP dollars to develop preparedness plans and operations really paid off.  The Tippecanoe
County Health Department (TCHD) is a good example of return on investment.  Through emergency
preparedness dollars, the TCHD was able to hire a full-time person to work on planning, including
planning for a pandemic.  Even after federal funds were cut which supported this position, Tippecanoe
County decided that this position was valuable and continued to fund it with county funds.  
To assist those counties in Indiana without the resources to operate a mass vaccination clinic, ISDH has
used the supplemental H1N1 funding to put together Immunization Strike Teams.  The Strike Teams
were developed for the small rural counties with limited assets to operate a mass vaccination clinic by
themselves.  The teams are composed of both personnel and supplies.  The personnel package includes
31 personnel, including 22 Vaccinators; three RNs, one Clinical Nurse Supervisor and five Administrative
Assistants/Runners.  The local health department will also receive an Immunization Strike Team Supply
kit that will provide them with items which may be needed during the Mass Vaccination Clinic.  These
teams are requested by the local health department and can be tailored to meet their needs.  
Source: Indiana State Department of Health
INDIANA -- MOBILIZING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS TO FIGHT H1N1
Surge capacity, including offsite diagnosis
CDC estimates that about 22 million people
were infected with 2009 H1N1 between April
and October 17, 2009, and while not everyone
sought treatment, the agency estimates there
were about 98,000 H1N1-related hospitaliza-
tions, and nearly 4,000 deaths.125 Hospitals, am-
bulatory care centers, and doctors’ offices all
have seen an increase in the number of patients
seeking treatment for influenza.  If the H1N1
virus were to mutate and become more severe,
our health care system could easily be over-
whelmed by an influx of severely ill patients,
those with mild illness, and by people anxious
to determine if they have the flu.  One of the
short-term solutions the U.S. government and
health care sector have put forth is the use of
telephone or Internet screening tools.  In the-
ory, these tools can ease the burden on health
care facilities by encouraging patients with mild
cases of flu to stay home and enabling more peo-
ple to make a self-determination as to whether
they should seek professional care
In early September, the IOM held a meeting on
“Assessing the Severity of Influenza-Like Illness:
Clinical Algorithms to Inform and Empower
Health Care Professionals and the Public.”  At
the meeting, the creators of Emory University’s
“Strategy for Off-Site Rapid Triage” (SORT) pre-
sented their tool, an online application that pro-
vides users with guidance on how to handle their
influenza-like illness (ILI).  The SORT applica-
tion factors in the severity of the patient’s condi-
tion and potential risk factors in determining
whether to recommend the patient seek medical
care.  Emory University designed the tool so that
it is easily understood by individuals with limited
health literacy.  To date, the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs has announced that it will develop
its own website based on the Emory model.      
Hospitals are also experimenting with alternate
care sites -- in some cases tents set up in parking
lots -- where patients coming to the emergency de-
partment can be screened.  Moving the screening
out of the emergency departments (EDs) this also
frees up scarce space and staff that is needed to
treat the seriously ill.
A major concern for hospitals and health care
providers is how to deal with a possible public
health emergency and the resulting crush of pa-
tients while complying with the Emergency Med-
ical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).
EMTALA is a federal law that requires all
Medicare-participating hospitals with EDs to pro-
vide an appropriate medical screening exam to
all individuals who come to the department, re-
gardless of their ability to pay.  If it is determined
the patient presents an emergency medical con-
dition, the hospital must treat and stabilize the
patient within its capability or transfer the pa-
tient to a hospital that has capacity to do so.
State and local health departments and hospi-
tals have expressed concerns about EMTALA
compliance during a public health emergency,
such as a pandemic flu outbreak.  Will hospitals
be able to provide adequate care when EDs are
overwhelmed by the influx in surge of the sick
and worried-well?  In light of these concerns,
President Obama declared a national emer-
gency on October 23, 2009, paving the way for
the health care system to offer a more stream-
lined response to the crisis.  
This declaration set up the necessary conditions
for Secretary of Health and Human Services
Kathleen Sebelius to issue a Section 1135 waiver
on October 27, 2009, which allows hospitals to di-
rect patients seeking treatment at the ED to an
alternative off-campus site.126 In order for this
type of EMTALA waiver to be granted, the fol-
lowing requirements must be met: 
 The president has declared an emergency or
disaster under the Stafford Act or the Na-
tional Emergencies Act;
 The Secretary of HHS has declared a Public
Health Emergency;
 The Secretary invokes her waiver authority
(which may be retroactive), including notify-
ing Congress at least 48 hours in advance; and
 The waiver includes waiver of EMTALA re-
quirements and the hospital is covered by the
waiver.
Prior to the President’s declaration and the Sec-
retary’s Section 1135 waiver, in August 2009 the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) issued guidance clarifying that there is
flexibility in the EMTALA law.  
Among the options for managing surge without
a Section 1135 waiver, hospitals may:
 Set up alternative screening sites on campus
outside of the ED;
 Establish a screening at off-campus, hospital-
controlled sites; or
 Communities may set up screening clinics at
sites not under the control of a hospital.
(For a more detailed discussion on surge capac-
ity, please see Section 3: Hospital Preparedness.)
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B. FUNDING FOR PANDEMIC AND ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS
AND FUNDING FOR CORE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE
Public health infrastructure has been under-
funded for decades, as documented in repeated
assessments by CDC, IOM, and other experts.  The
gaps in infrastructure have hampered the nation’s
ability to respond to the H1N1 outbreak as effec-
tively and quickly as possible.  A key lesson learned
from the outbreak is that until the infrastructure is
strengthened, shortcomings in the core public
health system will always leave the country unnec-
essarily vulnerable to emerging threats.
Current federal, state, and local public health
spending is approximately $35 billion per year -
- or $120 per person.127 The federal government
provides nearly 60 percent of these funds; state
and local governments provide the remaining
40 percent.  This spending represents less than
two percent of the total National Health Expen-
diture Accounts.  In 2008, TFAH, together with
the New York Academy of Medicine (NYAM) es-
timated the current shortfall in spending on
public health to be $20 billion per year.128 This
shortfall means that federal, state, tribal, and
local public health departments are unable to
adequately carry out core functions. 
Federal public health funding has not even kept
pace with inflation.  To simply restore public
health agencies to funding levels in 2005, the
government would need to add $2.58 billion.
Congress has attempted to address the chronic
underfunding of public health by including pro-
visions in the House and Senate health reform
bills that would dedicate a funding stream to core
public health functions and prevention.  For in-
stance, the House bill contains a provision that
would progressively increase up to $1.3 billion a
year on state, local, and tribal public health in-
frastructure -- to improve capacity for such basic
things as laboratories, disease surveillance and
vaccine delivery – as well as public health re-
sponsibilities not related to preparedness.  It re-
mains unclear if these provisions will become law.
To attempt to compensate for the chronic un-
derfunding of public health, over the past seven
years, the federal government has made a sub-
stantial investment in all hazards public health
and pandemic preparedness appropriating
more than $11 billion to state and local health
departments and hospitals, including $2.043 bil-
lion for pandemic preparedness and re-
sponse.129 The funding, however, has not been
sufficient enough to address the existing gaps,
nor has it been sustained over time.
Federal funding for public health preparedness
is fragmented.  Several different agencies and
departments are responsible for various grant
programs, including CDC, ASPR, and DHS.
Each agency has its own funding requirements
and objectives, presenting challenges for state
and local health departments to develop com-
prehensive preparedness plans.
Instead of providing funding for preparedness
in a sustained and stable manner, the federal
government has cut core funding for public
health preparedness since FY 2005 by 27 percent
(adjusted for inflation), thus choosing to fund
the crisis of the day by throwing large amounts
of money at state and local health departments.
This approach is extremely shortsighted and
destined to fall short.  As one state health official
remarked, “I’d rather have received an addi-
tional $2 million per year over the past 10 years
than $20 million this year.  Our state would have
been better prepared for H1N1 with longer-
term, sustained funding.”133  
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1. Upgrading State and Local Capacity
The federal dollars that CDC uses to fund the state
and local Public Health Emergency Preparedness
(PHEP) cooperative agreements, the Centers for
Public Health Preparedness, the Advanced Practice
Centers, and all other state and local capacity have
declined nearly 28 percent since FY 2005 when ad-
justed for inflation.  The President’s FY 2010 budget
proposal included $761.1 million for upgrading
state and local capacity, a modest increase of two
percent from FY 2009’s $746.6 million.134
2. Hospital Preparedness
In FY 2009, ASPR’s Hospital Preparedness Pro-
gram received $387.6 million, down seven per-
cent from FY 2008.  The slight decline in
funding is part of ASPR’s decision to align the
HPP cooperative agreement budget with the
states’ budget year (July/June).  As such, the FY
2009 funding period is 11 months.  According
to the President’s budget request, in FY 2010,
when the two budget years are aligned, funding
will be restored to $426 million, which repre-
sents a one percent increase from the previous
12-month funding cycle in FY 2008.
By aligning the cooperative agreement budget
year with the states’ budget year and moving from
a one-year planning cycle to a three-year planning
cycle, ASPR hopes to address some of the concerns
raised by HPP grantees in the program’s five-year
evaluation and allow for state health departments
and hospitals to develop more realistic work plans. 
3. Biomedical Advanced Research And Development Authority (BARDA)
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
of 2006 (PAHPA) directed HHS to establish the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Develop-
ment Authority (BARDA) to advance the devel-
opment of medical countermeasures, such as
vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tools for public
health emergencies.  Established in 2007, BARDA
is part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR).  
Among BARDA’s responsibilities is the develop-
ment and acquisition of medical countermea-
sures, including those for pandemic influenza,
emerging infectious diseases, and chemical, bi-
ological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
threats.  BARDA collaborates with other gov-
ernment agencies, such as CDC, FDA, and NIH,
as well as research institutions, academics, pri-
vate sector pharmaceutical companies and man-
ufacturers and helps to foster research and
development while balancing the inherent risks
involved with developing new medical counter-
measures and treatments.  
Although the PAHPA legislation included author-
ization for approximately $1 billion for BARDA for
FY 2007 through FY 2008, the U.S. Congress has
failed to appropriate the full amount.  
FY 2009 saw a significant increase in funding for
BARDA with $275 million devoted for the ad-
vanced research and development, including
$25 million for the development of next gener-
ation ventilators for pandemic preparedness.
The president’s FY 2010 budget proposal in-
cludes $305 million for BARDA, an increase of
$30 million over FY 2009.  While these increases
are encouraging, the basic budget for BARDA
falls far short of what is needed for the agency to
meet its own mission and goals.  According to an
analysis by the Center for Biosecurity, while
The cuts in core funding for public health pre-
paredness have left states vulnerable at a time
when the economic recession means they have
fewer resources of their own to draw upon.  With
the sudden influx of supplemental pandemic pre-
paredness funding this fall, many state health de-
partments had trouble ramping up to spend this
money after laying off thousands of public health
workers.  We don’t fund fire departments at the
moment a fire breaks out and we must move away
from funding mechanisms that respond to public
health emergencies.  
$0  
$50,000,000  
$100,000,000  
$150,000,000  
$200,000,000  
$250,000,000  
$300,000,000  
FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 
BARDA Funding History, FY 2005-FY 2009
Source:  HHS’s Public Health and Social Services Emergency
Fund Budget Justification document.135  
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BARDA’s current level of funding has allowed
ASPR to set up the infrastructure necessary to
support advanced research and development of
medical countermeasures, it has been insufficient
to support the successful development of a whole
range of medical countermeasures.  The Center
for Biosecurity estimates that BARDA needs $1.7
billion to fully fund its research mission.136 Fund-
ing would have to be sustained at this high level
for many years, given the risks and costs associ-
ated with medical countermeasure development.  
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4. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness  -- H1N1 Supplemental
*Note: This table details HHS’s share of the $7.7 billion Congress appropriated for H1N1 response.  A total of $5.8 billion in
contingency funds are available at the Administration’s discretion.  These numbers represent the latest release of funds as of
press time.  
1 $3.975 billion of the total Contingent Emergency Appropriation remains available as of 8/31/09
2 $1.259 billion of the total Contingent Emergency Appropriation remains available as of 9/2/09
Source:  Office of Management and Budget
Since the emergence of H1N1 this spring, offi-
cials have been racing against the clock to ad-
dress many of the remaining issues.  Congress
appropriated $1.9 billion in emergency supple-
mental funding and an additional $5.8 billion in
contingency funding, some of which has already
been tapped by the Obama administration to
enhance vaccine production, help bolster state
and local health department capacity, upgrade
surveillance capabilities, and meet other needs.
In the last few months, $1.4 billion has been
drawn from the available funds to assist states in
their pandemic response and vaccination im-
plementation programs.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: 
FY 2009 Supplemental HHS Funds for H1N1 
(dollars in millions)
Direct Contingent Contingent Total
Appropriation Emergency Approp. Emergency 
Updated 8/31/091 Approp. 9/2/092
Vaccine Production includes bulk vaccine antigen 
manufacturing, bulk adjuvant manufacturing, 1,117 1,426 1,006 3,548
syringes/needles/fill finish, and vaccine production
Vaccination Campaign includes planning, state and 
local vaccine implementation/administration, vaccine 30 335 1,084 1,449
distribution, and CDC vaccination campaign activities
Medical Surge Reserve Fund 0 53 0 53
Antivirals 0 0 232 232
Ongoing Pan Flu Activities with H1N1 Impacts 179 0 0 179
Deployment/Operations Support – ASPR 3 0 0 3
Upgrading State and Local Capacity including 
vaccination campaign planning, cooperative 350 0 0 350
agreements for state and local through CDC, and 
cooperative agreements for hospitals through ASPR
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
including international response, domestic response, 170 0 154 324
operations, community mitigation and port 
preparedness, communications, and virus detection
Food and Drug Administration 0 10 0 10
Compensation 1 1 0 2
HHS TOTAL 1,850 1,825 2,475 6,097
Department of Defense 0 0 140 140
Department of Veterans Affairs 0 0 68 68
US Department of Agriculture 0 0 28 28
State Department 0 0 5 5
Subtotal, Other Government Agencies 0 0 241 241
Federal Government TOTAL 1,850 1,825 2,716 6,338
C. REAL-TIME DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS AND HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
After the anthrax attacks in October 2001, the
federal government began to focus on the need
for a real-time biosurveillance system that would
both help detect bioterrorism events and natu-
rally occurring health threats such as a pan-
demic influenza or emerging infectious disease.
Over the years legislation (PAHPA) and presi-
dential directives (HSPD 21) have highlighted
the importance of developing real-time disease
detection capability.  While there has been clear
progress in evaluating existing biosurveillance
systems and mapping out existing capacities, we
are still far away from achieving real-time disease
detection and surveillance.  
According to a high-level government review of
U.S. biosurveillance activities, “There is no over-
arching strategy that establishes the objectives of a
National Biosurveillance Enterprise or that lays
out the implementation plan for such a system.”138  
A major barrier is the very nature of biosurveil-
lance.  While the federal government, namely
HHS and DHS, has taken the lead in develop-
ing a national biosurveillance system, multiple
other federal agencies have their own surveil-
lance systems, not to mention the 50 states.  By
one estimate, there are more than 300 separate
biosurveillance efforts underway across all lev-
els of government.  For the most part these ef-
forts are neither integrated nor interoperable,
and their effectiveness is unclear in some cases.  
Funding is also an issue.  While state and local
health departments and hospitals have been able
to tap into preparedness funding to build and
strengthen biosurveillance systems, the level of
funding for biosurveillance is well below what is
needed to establish a 21st century real-time bio-
surveillance system.  Cuts in federal prepared-
ness dollars in recent years, coupled with state
budget cuts due to the economic recession,
threaten to erode the gains we have made in en-
hancing our nation’s biosurveillance capacity.  As
the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcom-
mittee notes, “In effect, we are asking states to
fund systems that are essential to U.S. national
security, without establishing a coherent plan-
ning or funding strategy to sustain the keystones
of the National Biosurveillance Enterprise.”139
And while the federal government provides
funding for numerous surveillance programs,
formal legal authority for collecting public
health and clinical surveillance data lies with the
state and local health departments.  Therefore,
the federal government cannot mandate that
state health departments report data through a
national system.  Since there is no federal man-
date, reporting varies greatly among state health
departments, and even among programs in the
same state health department.  
One way for the federal government to eliminate
such discrepancies in reporting would be to make
reporting in a standardized format a condition of
federal grant dollars.  While this may work to
solve some of the variability in reporting, in those
instances where the government doesn’t fund
surveillance activity it will not be an option.
For those instances, federal, state, and local public
health officials could work to develop systems
where information is shared both ways.  Too often
state and local health departments and health care
providers complain that for all the data they send
to the system they get little to nothing in return.  
The $20 billion the federal government is di-
recting towards the development of new health
information technology (HIT) as part of the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) offers a prime example of where new
technology can be developed taking state and
local public health officials’ considerations and
needs into account.  The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technol-
ogy (ONC), part of HHS, is leading the Admin-
istration’s HIT efforts, including the promotion
of nationwide health information exchange to
improve health care. 
As part of the ARRA, Congress authorized the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) to provide reimbursement incentives for
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TODAY, THE U.S. DOES NOT HAVE AN INTEGRATED, NATIONAL APPROACH TO
BIOSURVEILLANCE THAT IS CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC HEALTH THREATS OR
TO MORE FAMILIAR PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE CONTAMINATION OF FOOD SUPPLIES.
-- NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE ADVISORY SUBCOMMITTEE, APRIL 2009137
“
”
eligible professionals and hospitals who are suc-
cessful in becoming “meaningful users” of certi-
fied electronic health record (EHR) technology.
These incentive payments begin in 2011 and
gradually decrease. Starting in 2015, providers
are expected to have adopted and be actively uti-
lizing a certified EHR in compliance with the
“meaningful use” definition or they will be sub-
ject to financial penalties under Medicare.
The ONC is currently working on the “mean-
ingful use” definition, which TFAH believes
should incorporate public health surveillance
considerations.  ONC expects to release the
“meaningful use” definition in late 2009.
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In April 2009, initial reports from Mexico suggested a highly
lethal novel influenza virus was circulating in the population.
CDC’s epidemiology and surveillance divisions called upon ex-
isting surveillance and disease detection systems to track the
novel influenza virus.  Over the course of the H1N1 pan-
demic, CDC has used these systems to analyze information
about influenza disease activity in the United States and pub-
lishes findings of five “Key Flu Indicators” in a report called
FluView (available online at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/).
The Key Flu Indicators include the following:
ILINet:  Reports from 3,200 providers in the United States are
compiled weekly on visits for influenza-like illness (ILI).  There
are participating providers in all 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia and the U.S. Virgin Islands reporting over 25 million patient
visits each year. Each week, approximately 1,400 outpatient care
sites around the country report data to CDC on the total num-
ber of patients seen in doctors’ offices and emergency depart-
ments and the number of those patients with influenza-like
illness (ILI) by age group. For this system, ILI is defined as fever
(temperature of 100°F [37.8°C] or greater) and a cough and/or a
sore throat in the absence of a KNOWN cause other than in-
fluenza. Sites with electronic records use an equivalent definition
as determined by the state public health authorities.  
Emerging Infections Program:  CDC has greatly increased
the capacity to collect detailed information on patients hospi-
talized with influenza. Using the 198 hospitals in the Emerging
Infections Program (EIP) network, and six additional sites with
76 hospitals, CDC monitors a population of 25.6 million to es-
timate hospitalization rates by age group and monitor the clini-
cal course among persons with severe disease requiring
hospitalization.  The EIP sites also track vaccine effectiveness.
122 Cities Mortality Reporting System: Each week, the vital
statistics offices of 122 cities report the total number of death
certificates received and the number of those for which pneu-
monia or influenza was listed as the underlying or contributing
cause of death by age group. The percentage of all deaths due
to pneumonia and influenza (P&I) are compared with a seasonal
baseline and epidemic threshold value calculated for each week. 
Surveillance for Influenza-associated Pediatric Mortality:
Influenza-associated deaths in children (0-17 years) was added as
a nationally notifiable condition in 2004. Laboratory-confirmed
influenza-associated deaths in children are reported through the
Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality Surveillance System.
Geographic Spread:  State health departments report the
estimated level of spread of influenza activity in their states
each week through the State and Territorial Epidemiologists
Reports. States report influenza activity as no activity, spo-
radic, local, regional, or widespread. 
Expanding Testing Capability:  Within two-and-a-half weeks
of first detecting the novel 2009 H1N1 virus, CDC had fully
characterized the new virus, disseminated the information to
researchers and public health officials, and developed and begun
shipping to states a new test to detect cases of 2009 H1N1 in-
fection.  CDC continues to support all states and territories
with test reagents, equipment, and funds to maintain laboratory
staff and ship specimens for testing.  In addition, CDC serves as
the primary support for public health laboratories around the
globe and has provided test reagents to 295 laboratories in 147
countries.  It is vital that accurate testing continue in the United
States and abroad to monitor any changes in the virus that may
indicate increases in severe infection, resistance to antiviral
drugs, or a decrease in the match to circulating vaccine strains.
Monitoring severe illness and mortality of women who are
pregnant:  Pregnant women are a group known to be at a
higher risk for seasonal influenza.  Similarly, data indicate that
pregnant women also are at higher risk of severe disease and
death from the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus.  CDC is in the
process of implementing a new system to collect data on severe
illness (intensive care hospitalization) and mortality among preg-
nant women, which will improve its ability to monitor this group.
Aggregate Hospitalizations and Deaths Reporting Activity
(AHDRA):  To supplement several well-established influenza sur-
veillance systems, CDC introduced an interim data collection ac-
tivity to augment information on hospitalizations and deaths in
2009.  This supplemental activity collects information from all 50
states to identify hospitalizations and deaths due to influenza or in-
fluenza-like-illness (ILI) nationally and within each state.  Jurisdic-
tions now can report to CDC either laboratory-confirmed or
clinical pneumonia counts of hospitalizations and deaths.  Initiated
on September 1, 2009, this new collection activity will contribute
to a more complete picture of the burden of serious influenza and
pneumonia illness and deaths during the pandemic and let each
state examine trends in the course of the pandemic in their areas.  
Health Care System Readiness: HHS is also using multiple
systems to track the impact of the H1N1 outbreak on our
healthcare system.  HHS and CDC are in constant communica-
tion with state health officers and hospital administrators to
monitor stress on the healthcare system and to be prepared in
case federal medical assets will be necessary to augment state
and local surge capabilities.  To date, state and local officials have
been able to accommodate the increased patient loads, but this
is something health officials need to monitor very closely, and
need to be prepared to respond quickly if the situation warrants. 
TRACKING H1N1 -- EXISTING SYSTEMS RAMPED UP
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The Distribute Project, or the Distributed Surveillance Task-
force for Real-time Influenza Burden Tracking and Evaluation
Project, is a real-time display of summarized daily data for in-
fluenza surveillance.140 Distribute is an influenza surveillance
project that CDC is supporting to complement its existing mix
of influenza surveillance approaches and to enhance national
and regional influenza situational awareness. The project col-
lects data from state or local health departments that conduct
emergency department (ED)-based syndromic surveillance
and involves collection of data on ED visits for influenza-like
illness. The project represents an extension of a pilot project
that was conducted by the International Society for Disease
Surveillance (ISDS) and was initiated with CDC funding.  
The Distribute project represents a novel approach to devel-
oping a national surveillance system, as responsibility for im-
plementing this system is more “distributed” than traditional
CDC approaches.  Together, CDC and ISDS have conducted
outreach to all states, territories, and selected localities that
independently conduct syndromic surveillance. To date, 43
state or local jurisdictions have agreed to participate, although
the number that are fully engaged and have data represented
on the Distribute website is smaller.  As of October 6, 2009,
19 states and five local health departments were reporting
data to Distribute via ISDS or CDC.  State health departments
reporting data included those from:  Alabama, Arizona, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin.  The local health departments from Boston, MA,
Denver, CO, New York City, NY, Seattle, WA, and Tarrant
County, TX were also reporting data.141  
CDC is focusing on closing this gap and bringing more state and
local health departments into the program. While the process of
connecting to the Distribute system is relatively simple, health
departments that are already extraordinarily busy may need ad-
ditional resources to participate in Distribute.  CDC allowed
state and local health departments to use some of their H1N1
supplemental funding to support participation in Distribute.  
THE DISTRIBUTE PROJECT:  A NOVEL APPROACH TO DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
CDC developed BioSense in 2002 to serve as an early-event
detection system that collects clinical information from hospi-
tals, such as patients’ symptoms, quantities and types of drug
prescriptions, and the number of emergency room visits,
among other data.  This type of surveillance, known as syn-
dromic surveillance, relies on information available well before
an official diagnosis or confirmed lab result.  Some public
health officials believe this type of surveillance can be crucial
to alerting them to possible disease outbreaks or bioterror-
ism, while others are skeptical about the merits of syndromic
surveillance in providing outbreak recognition.
Most experts agree, however, that syndromic surveillance can
provide information that can be used to help the progress of an
outbreak as has been seen during the 2009 influenza pandemic
with CDC’s ILInet.  Nevertheless, even the most developed syn-
dromic surveillance systems do not provide adequate situational
awareness.  For example, although ILI-based surveillance sys-
tems represent some of the most highly-developed syndromic
surveillance systems that are in existence at national and state
levels, public health response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was
still limited by critical data gaps.  Answers to key response ques-
tions, such as how many people are infected and how severe are
the illnesses will require more robust data linkages between
public health and the healthcare sector than currently exist.
Numerous government reports have faulted the program for
its failure to deliver on its promises of real-time syndromic
surveillance.  According to a November 2008 report from the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Federal,
state, and local public health officials expressed mixed views
on the usefulness of BioSense data as compared with the use-
fulness of data from similar systems.”142 In fact, about half of
the officials surveyed said that they rely on other systems as
their primary tool for syndromic surveillance. For example,
public health officials with the Department of Defense
(DOD) prefer DOD’s Electronic Surveillance System for the
Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics
(ESSENCE). Meanwhile, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
public health personnel use the civilian version of ESSENCE
more often than BioSense. Both DOD and VA officials stated
that ESSENCE allows more flexibility in evaluating and view-
ing data than BioSense.  
In response to the critiques, CDC launched a redesign of the
program in late 2007 hoping to improve collaboration with state
and local public health departments and health care facilities.
However, GAO has faulted this redesign for lacking “reliable
cost and timeline estimates and outcome-based performance
measures,” without which there’s an increased risk “that the
agency will perpetuate weaknesses identified in its initial imple-
mentation of the program and related system.”143
The President’s FY 2010 budget proposal seeks $34.4 million for
BioSense, which is essentially unchanged from FY 2009 levels.  
BIOSENSE
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BioWatch is DHS’s environmental monitoring system, which is
designed to serve as an early warning system in the event of
the release of biological agents by monitoring and testing air
samples.  BioWatch sensors were first deployed in 2003 and
there are currently some 500 sensors located in some 30
major U.S. metropolitan areas.144 
The goals of BioWatch are to:
 Deliver early warning of a biological attack by identifying the
presence of a biological agent to minimize casualties;
 Assist in providing evidence on the source, nature, and ex-
tent of an attack to aid law enforcement and public health
officials; and 
 Determine where the biological attack occurred and what
populations were exposed.
The president’s FY 2010 budget request includes $94.5 million
for BioWatch, which is $17 million lower than the FY 2009
budget.145 No explanation was given for the 15 percent decrease
in funding between fiscal years.  
Critics of BioWatch point to its high cost and have suggested
that the money would be better spent on enhancing hospital-
based rapid diagnostic capabilities.  BioWatch has also suffered
from sensors picking up bioagents occurring naturally in the
environment that were not related to any sort of terrorist at-
tack.  In fact, most of BioWatch detections have been environ-
mental detection events of indigenous organisms, while a few
were related to lab cross-contamination.
There have also been some problems with state public health
laboratories, 29 of which host the BioWatch program and pro-
vide dedicated office and lab space for the BioWatch program
free of charge.146 APHL and DHS continue to work together
to address some of state public health lab’s lingering concerns. 
BIOWATCH
Under U.S. law, state public health departments are responsi-
ble for disease surveillance.  Therefore, any transmission of
nationally notifiable disease data from state and local health
departments to CDC is strictly voluntary.  Limited resources
at the state and local level inhibit a further expansion of dis-
ease surveillance in some jurisdictions.  
Several states and jurisdictions have used federal preparedness
dollars to purchase innovative health information technology
that supports public health emergency preparedness while also
improving medical care at state hospitals and health clinics.  
Some state and local public health departments have con-
tracted with Logical Images, manufacturer of the software, Vi-
sual Dx, which is an integrated information system that
provides users with a comprehensive collection of some
17,000 digital medical images and illustrations of over 900 vi-
sually identifiable diseases.  The information in Visual Dx is
regularly updated and reviewed by physicians.  Clinicians who
are presented with an unfamiliar visually diagnosable condition
can access the system and are able to view multiple images,
including images of diseases in patients with darker skin tones,
which can improve diagnoses in minority patients.  
While the software can have an immediate impact on patient
care, it also enhances public health preparedness.  The software
can help clinicians quickly identify potential bioterrorism attacks,
outbreaks, and emerging infectious diseases.  The user is able to
customize the software to receive 24/7 relevant online alerts
and, in the case a suspected notifiable disease, the software sys-
tem directly links users to public health departments, which en-
hances public health surveillance and disease reporting. 
As of October 2009, eight state health departments had
launched Visual Dx using federal preparedness dollars, includ-
ing: Delaware, D.C., Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.  Another eight local health de-
partments and/or regional consortia also had launched Visual
Dx, including: Texas DSHS Region 8/San Antonio Metro Health
District, Los Angeles County Department of Health, Oregon
Healthcare Preparedness Region 9, Polk County, Iowa, Brad-
ford County, Florida, Union County, Florida, Madison County,
Florida, and the New York Regional Resource Centers.
GE Healthcare is another company that is working to inte-
grate point of care information into electronic medical records
(EMR).  In April 2009, GE Healthcare announced a collabora-
tion with CDC’s National Center for Public Health Informat-
ics. The project will demonstrate the capability of a public
health agency to utilize EMR systems to provide clinicians with
timely, patient-specific information at the point of care. 
CDC routinely disseminates important health alerts, advisories
and notifications-via email and on the agency’s website-to public
health practitioners and clinicians. The pilot program will explore
the feasibility of creating and integrating actionable alerts with
GE’s Centricity® EMR system based on patient record content,
using a standard messaging format. The project will determine
the EMR’s ability to identify specific patients with risk factors re-
lated to the health condition identified in the alert, enabling clini-
cians to immediately act on the alerts by addressing the
impacted patients. Additionally, the development of a feedback
mechanism to capture the provider’s response will be explored. 
Studies have shown that EMR systems with decision support can
improve clinician compliance by, among other ways, presenting
vaccine reminders to clinicians for immunizing high-risk persons
for influenza, identifying high-risk persons for tuberculosis
screening and alerting physicians of potential prescribing errors.
ROLE FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (HIT) IN PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
D. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2006 PANDEMIC AND 
ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT (PAHPA)
In 2006, Congress reauthorized the public health
emergency preparedness legislation passed in the
wake of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax at-
tacks.  The 2006 PAHPA legislation has helped to
strengthen the nation’s preparedness and re-
sponse planning, including acknowledging the
threat of pandemic flu and the need for increased
transparency and accountability for preparedness
activities.  The legislation included a series of
benchmarks for federal agencies to meet over the
five-year span of the Act.  Seven of these deliver-
ables were due no later than 180 days after the en-
actment of PAHPA, or by the end of June 2007.
Another set of four deliverables were due no later
than December 2007, or 12 months after enact-
ment.  Three more deliverables were due between
October 1, 2008 and January 2009.  Funding, how-
ever, was not provided for the implementation of
the PAHPA benchmarks.  In spite of this, as of No-
vember 2009, 12 of the 14 benchmarks have been
met, which is commendable, given staffing and
funding constraints at the federal level.  
However, some of the unmet or partially com-
pleted deliverables are crucial to the nation’s
preparedness, including:
 Development of new, outcome-oriented per-
formance measures;
 Enhanced real-time disease detection and sur-
veillance; and
 Advanced research and development of coun-
termeasures.
Congress should hold regular oversight hearings
to monitor the progress and implementation of
PAHPA.
E. EMERGENCY CARE ISSUES
Federal policies for sick leave do not support the
recommendations for the best ways to provide
care and reduce the spread of disease during a
public health emergency.  
1. Sick Leave
One proven non-pharmaceutical intervention
to slow or curb the spread of a pandemic is to
stay home if you are sick, or keep your child
home if they are sick.  At a news conference in
late April President Obama emphasized this: “If
you are sick, stay home.  If your child is sick,
keep them out of school.”147  
This advice presents special challenges for the
nearly half of American workers in the private
sector who do not have any paid sick leave
available.  This amounts to more than 59 mil-
lion people.148 This statistic also dispropor-
tionately includes women, low-wage, and
part-time workers.  
In an already unstable economic situation, indi-
viduals who are sick and should stay home may
still go to work for fear of lost wages or losing
their job.  According to Debra L. Ness, the pres-
ident of the National Partnership for Women
and Families, “This could be the beginning of a
spiral into economic disaster.  People can’t just
cavalierly put their jobs or paychecks at risk.”149 
This could mean that restaurants, child care
centers, nursing homes, hotels, public transit sys-
tems, schools, and offices across the country
could be operated and run by individuals in-
fected with the flu who should be at home, not
at work.150 In addition to lacking personal sick
leave, another 94 million workers do not have
sick leave that enables them to take time off to
care for an ill child, spouse, or parent.
In new guidance issued on August 19, 2009,
CDC recommends actions businesses should
take to decrease the spread of influenza in the
workplace during the 2009 flu season.151 One
recommendation is to keep sick workers home
and not let them return to work until 24 hours
after their fever is gone.  The guidance stresses
the importance of allowing sick workers to stay
home without fear of losing their job.  
Although existing law, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, allows employees to take unpaid sick
time due to a serious illness, the law exempts 40
percent of the workforce who work at small and
mid-size businesses, does not cover less severe
communicable diseases, and does not mitigate
the fear of lost income or lost employment
among many workers.  
These deficiencies in the law indicate that a fed-
eral paid sick days law is necessary.  Proposed
legislation that seeks to address this need in-
cludes the Healthy Families Act, sponsored by
Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and Sen. Christo-
pher Dodd (D-CT).  This legislation would re-
quire employers with 15 or more employees to
offer up to seven days of job-guaranteed paid
sick leave each year, to be used to deal with in-
dividual medical needs or to care for sick family
members.  Although the bill has garnered over
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100 House cosponsors and over 20 Senate
cosponsors in the 111th Congress, the Healthy
Families Act has not been taken up in either
Chamber.  While some argue that this legislation
is good for public health in general, because sick
individuals should not attend work and risk in-
fecting coworkers and the public, others point
out that seven days of paid sick leave may not be
enough to minimize the spread of disease dur-
ing a public health emergency such as a pan-
demic flu outbreak.  However, given the political
realities surrounding the legislation, such as op-
position to any paid sick day requirements by
some employer groups, the existing language is
a positive step toward addressing shortcomings
in existing law. 
In the absence of a federal paid sick days law, the
U.S.  Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is-
sued draft guidance asserting that the government
may extend new leave policies to federal employ-
ees providing care to family members with the
H1N1 flu.152 Federal employees would be able to
use accrued or accumulated sick leave to stay
home to care for a family member if a doctor or
other health official determines that their pres-
ence in the workplace might jeopardize the health
of co-workers and to use advanced sick leave if they
have exhausted their annual allotment.  The pro-
posal is not likely to go into effect until well into
the H1N1 outbreak, however, and the proposed
rules would not affect government contractors,
who often do not have any sick leave available.
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Health Care System
Preparedness
In public health emergencies, such as the ongoing novel influenza A/H1N1 outbreak,a bioterror attack, or catastrophic natural disaster, U.S. hospitals and health care fa-
cilities will be on the front lines providing triage and medical treatment to individuals.  In
the best of times, however, most emergency rooms and intensive care units (ICUs) must
confront bed shortages and staffing issues; in a mass casualty event -- particularly a pan-
demic influenza or mass bioterror attack -- the situation could quickly spiral out of control.  
The importance of surge capacity, or the ability of
a health care system to expand quickly beyond nor-
mal services to meet an increased demand for med-
ical care in the event of bioterrorism or other
large-scale public health emergencies, cannot be
understated.153 The challenge of how to equip hos-
pitals and train health care staff to handle the large
influx of critically injured or ill patients who show
up for treatment after or during a public health
emergency remains the single, most challenging
issue for public health and medical preparedness.  
Over the past decade, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has led na-
tional efforts to develop surge capacity for cata-
strophic events.  The Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
manages the Healthcare Preparedness Program
(HPP), which awards one-year grants to hospitals
to improve surge capacity and enhance commu-
nity and health care system preparedness for all-
hazards, including bioterrorism and pandemic
influenza.  Meanwhile, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) funds research on
medical and public health preparedness and has
developed guidance and tools for hospitals and
health care facilities.  The U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) oversees the pub-
lic health preparedness initiatives, including the
Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP)
grants to state and local health departments.  
Although much progress has been made since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and
the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita in 2005, there are still three crucial
areas that need to be addressed.  
 First, there is the issue of how to pay for health
care system preparedness and the develop-
ment and maintenance of surge capacity;  
 Second, there is the problem of helping the
health care sector weather and recover from the
economic fallout of a mass casualty event; and
 Finally, mass casualty care presents a serious
challenge to the nation.  There are person-
nel and logistics issues related to mass casu-
alty care that must be addressed, as well as a
much needed national dialogue and consen-
sus as to what constitutes a disaster standard
of care, which includes both the rationing of
scarce resources, legal liability issues, com-
pliance with health care laws and regulations,
and reimbursement.154
As the nation considered health reform, one im-
portant issue that was largely overlooked was
emergency care in mass emergency situations,
particularly for those who are uninsured or un-
derinsured.  The health reform legislation does
include provisions to increase our nation’s in-
vestment in prevention and wellness, including
a dramatic increase in core public health infra-
structure and workforce and a focus on commu-
nity prevention, which could improve the health
of some of our most vulnerable populations.  As
the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Re-
sponse Dr. Nicole Lurie outlined in an op-ed in
the New England Journal of Medicine (written be-
fore her appointment to this office), these in-
vestments could in turn boost community
resiliency and thus help increase public health
emergency readiness.155 However, a reformed
U.S. health system should not only have the nec-
essary policies in place, for example, setting na-
tional standards for surge medical response
capability, but also must tackle the central issue
of financing emergency preparedness.  
This section provides an overview of the current
challenges facing U.S. hospitals and health care
providers.  Strengthening our nation’s safety net
will require a collaborative effort by health care
providers, hospital administrators, public health
officials, private payers, and citizens, combined
with strong leadership from federal, state, and
local government.
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1. Crisis Standards of Care
A. MASS CASUALTY CARE
According to the U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO), as of 2005 there were ap-
proximately 950,000 staffed hospital beds in the
United States, meaning that health care staff was
available to attend to the patient occupying the
bed.  However, in a mass casualty event, such as
a severe pandemic influenza, HHS expects that
demand would far exceed capacity.157 
The question for hospitals, health care facilities,
clinicians, and hospital administrators is how to
handle the surge of patients.
Do they have the necessary space to treat to the
critically injured and sick?
How will they allocate scarce resources such as
ventilators and pharmaceuticals?
Will they have enough trained, licensed health
care workers to care for the patients?
What impact will legal issues have on the care of
patients during a public health emergency?
There is growing recognition in the United States
that a mass casualty event, particularly a pandemic
influenza, will result in the need to alter and adapt
the traditional standards of care appropriate to the
situation.  Unfortunately, as an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine notes, under current
federal and state law, governors can declare a state
of emergency during disasters, “suspending some
of the normal standards without giving any idea of
what the alternative standards ought to be.”158
According to HHS, “states in conjunction with
professional societies will determine the appro-
priate standards of care for the situation -- not
HHS or the federal government.”159 Although
AHRQ has published two documents on mass
casualty care – Altered Standards of Care in Mass
Casualty Events (2005) and Mass Medical Care with
Scarce Resources (2007) – these are intended
merely to serve as planning guidance for states
and professional associations as they develop
“definitive guidance.”160  
Although these guidance documents have been
helpful and have spurred further discussion at
the state and local level, a 2008 U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report on states’
planning for medical surge, found that fewer
than half of states surveyed were planning for cri-
sis standards of care to be used in a mass casualty
event.161 In order to further the planning for cri-
sis standards of care, GAO recommended that
the Secretary of HHS establish a clearinghouse
for sharing crisis standards of care guidelines de-
veloped by individual states or medical experts.
The Center for Biosecurity echoed that recom-
mendation in their evaluation of the first five-
years of the Hospital Preparedness Program.162
(See Section A for information on the Planning
and Development of Altered Standards of Care.)
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THE NATION’S TRACK RECORD IN PLANNING FOR, FUNDING AND ACHIEVING EVEN
MINIMALLY ADEQUATE DISASTER SURGE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE MEDICAL
COMMUNITY IS WOEFULLY DEFICIENT.
-- DR. JEFFREY W. RUNGE, FORMER CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, DHS156
“
”
2. Health Facility Planning Considerations
1. Health Care System Preparedness
During a mass casualty event, emergency de-
partments, critical care units, rehabilitation
beds, and ambulatory care centers can become
overwhelmed.  The H1N1 pandemic has shown
how quickly regular health care capacity can be
stretched to the limits.
Any sort of mass casualty event with increased
hospitalizations and heavy emergency depart-
ment and intensive care unit utilization will put
a strain on health care facilities and health care
workers.  To help hospitals prepare for such an
event, much of the current guidance focuses on
the three S’s -- supplies, staff, and space.
 Supplies:  Today’s hospitals and health care fa-
cilities function with a “just-in-time supply
chain,” meaning very limited supplies, includ-
ing pharmaceuticals, are stored on-site and in-
stead are replenished on an as-needed basis.
While the use of a just-in-time supply chain
keeps hospital storage costs down, it also “cre-
ates a significant threat to successful disaster re-
sponse.”163 Hospital administrators argue that it
is not feasible for hospitals to stockpile large
quantities of supplies as they lack both the space
to do so and the resources to pay for these extra
supplies.  In addition to the supplies, hospitals
are likely to run short of needed technologies,
such as ventilators and decontamination units.  
 Staff:  Workforce shortages plague hospitals and
health care facilities even in the best of times.  It
is no wonder then that workforce shortages are
a serious concern for mass casualty event plan-
ning.  According to a June 2008 report from the
Center for Studying Health System Change,
“the day-to-day shortages of key health person-
nel – such as nurses, physicians, pharmacists,
laboratory technicians, and respiratory thera-
pists – exacerbate the challenge of having suffi-
cient numbers of health workers in an
emergency.”164 The report goes on to note that
until elected officials and policy makers address
these challenges, “the ability to have adequate
personnel for an emergency will be limited.”165  
 Space:  During a mass casualty event, hospitals
will be pressed to treat a sudden influx of in-
jured and sick patients.  Hospitals will have to
take action to maximize the efficient delivery
of patient care.  This may include discharging
patients early if they can safely continue their
care at home, or canceling elective surgeries
and procedures.  In the H1N1 pandemic,
some hospitals were forced to set up alternate
care sites, such as large tents in parking lots,
where patients could be screened before en-
tering the hospital to reduce patient loads in
emergency departments.  An analysis of pa-
tients hospitalized with H1N1 during the first
wave (April - June 2009), found that among
those hospitalized 25 percent were admitted
to the intensive care unit (ICU).166  
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B. FINANCING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM PREPAREDNESS AND
CATASTROPHIC EMERGENCY CARE
SOME EXISTING MECHANISM FOR ONGOING INVESTMENT MUST BE FOUND TO
ACCOMPLISH [SURGE MEDICAL RESPONSE].  IT CAN’T BE COST-SHIFTED ONTO THE CUSTOMERS
OF THE SYSTEM, GRANTS WILL NOT BE ADEQUATE UNLESS BILLIONS MORE ARE APPROPRIATED,
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS TO THAT DEGREE TO COUNTER WHAT, IN THE CASE OF
TERRORISM, IS AN ATTACK ON OUR NATION.    
-- DR. JEFFREY W. RUNGE, FORMER CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY.167 
“
”
Currently, health care system preparedness is fi-
nanced through the Hospital Preparedness Pro-
gram (HPP), which focuses on improving the
clinical response to a large-scale health emer-
gency.  Initially run by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), HPP is now
run by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) as man-
dated by the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act.  ASPR awards one-year fund-
ing grants to hospitals and other health care fa-
cilities to improve surge capacity and enhance
community and health care system prepared-
ness for all-hazards, including bioterrorism and
pandemic influenza.  These grants average
around $80,000 a year per hospital.  An article in
the Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics notes
that “this barely permits the hiring of a pre-
paredness coordinator, leaving nothing for the
infrastructure development and maintenance
that would be required.”168   
The current approach to funding health care
system preparedness has frustrated many hospi-
tal administrators and clinicians.  Hospitals and
health care associations have argued that the
easiest way to address this problem is to boost
health care system preparedness program grants
from general revenue taxes.  
However, a 2006 study by the Center for Biose-
curity estimated that hospital preparedness for a
severe (1918-like) pandemic would require a
one-time investment of an average of $1 million
per hospital, for a total of $5 billion for the 5,000
general hospitals in the United States, plus an
additional $200,000 per hospital per year in
maintenance costs.169 Dr. Jeffrey Runge, the for-
mer Chief Medical Officer in the Office of
Health Affairs at DHS, notes that this amount
exceeds the entire homeland security grant
funding.  “Clearly,” he says, “the Federal gov-
ernment cannot grant its way to success.”170
A key lesson from the current H1N1 pandemic is
that the ambulatory care system needs more help
in preparing for emergencies.  Both this spring
and fall, doctors’ offices have been overrun by pa-
tients who have H1N1 or were concerned that
they or their children did.  During a public health
emergency, like a pandemic, health providers at
all levels have to adapt their regular practices to
treat a large number of patients very quickly.
Currently, however, there are no federal, state,
local programs to help clinics or private practices
to train or adapt to an emergency.  
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Expanding preparedness into the ambulatory care setting
As TFAH has noted in the 2007 and 2008 reports,
even if comprehensive health reform is passed, it
will take some years before the new system is in
place and all Americans have health insurance.
In the meantime, the federal government should
act now to create a framework for emergency
health coverage and reimbursement.
A public health emergency benefit would have
to address two separate concerns for providers
and patients.  It would have to guarantee
providers some level of compensation for the
services they provide during a pandemic, while
encouraging individuals to come forward for di-
agnosis or treatment.  
In fact, such legislation was introduced in the 111th
Congress by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) and
Representative Lois Capps (D-CA).  The bill, the
Public Health Emergency Response Act (PHERA),
would establish a temporary emergency health
benefit for uninsured individuals and individuals
whose health insurance coverage is not actuarially
equivalent to benchmark coverage.  The benefit
could only be triggered if the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS) declared that a public
health emergency existed under section 319 of the
Public Health Service Act and chose to activate the
benefit.  The benefit would last for up to 90 days;
the Secretary could extend it once for another 90
days.  The funding mechanism in the legislation is
the Public Health Emergency Fund; the bill would
clarify that using the Fund for uncompensated care
is permissible.  The legislation authorizes $7 mil-
lion each year for the administration of this fund
and for a public education campaign about the
program, and Congress would need to appropriate
money to the Fund only after the Secretary acti-
vated the benefit.  It would also ensure that cover-
age would be provided for individuals displaced by
a public health emergency and would clarify the
scope of coverage.
It is best to create these mechanisms prior to an
emergency, rather than in the heat of the mo-
ment when any delay would be counted in lives
lost.  In addition, prior planning may enable the
government to be more cost-effective in using
scarce resources.  Planning ahead for a cata-
strophic public health emergency is the best way
to avoid needless loss of life or wasted resources.  
2. Catastrophic Emergency Care
Recommendations
A. PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS FUNDING  
Overall, this report finds that significant progress has been made in the na-tion’s preparedness to respond to public health emergencies based on
state-by-state measures and available data.  All states have developed plans to receive
and distribute medical countermeasures from the federal stockpile.  Lab capacity
has grown exponentially in the seven years that TFAH has tracked state prepared-
ness, while electronic disease reporting and real-time syndromic surveillance are in
use in the majority of states.  State legislatures have enacted liability protection for
health care volunteers who serve in public health emergencies, and in some cases,
extended that protection to non-profit entities who donate goods and services.
Americans are seeing a return on the investments made over the past decade.
Gaps remain, however, in some critical areas, in-
cluding: health care system preparedness, col-
laboration between public health and private
providers, national real-time disease surveil-
lance, and the development of medical coun-
termeasures and domestic production capacity.
And the progress that has been made is threat-
ened by cuts in the federal and state budgets.
The ongoing H1N1 pandemic, which has sick-
ened more than one million by U.S. govern-
ment estimates, is further stressing a system that
has been chronically underfunded.  Our coun-
try is only as secure as the least prepared state;
there is a federal interest and responsibility to
assure a minimum level of preparedness
throughout the country.
To further strengthen emergency preparedness,
TFAH recommends action across the following
key areas:
A. Public health preparedness funding;
B. Health care system preparedness funding;
C. Financing catastrophic emergency care
D. Transparency, accountability, and oversight;
E. Health care preparedness;
F. Public health workforce;
G. Research and development;
H. Legal preparedness;
I. Health and sick leave benefits; and
J. Community resiliency.
Public health preparedness requires a well-trained
public health workforce, a sustained effort at re-
search and development, the building and main-
tenance of stockpiles of countermeasures, and
hospital surge capacity.  Yet federal funding for
public health emergency preparedness declined
by 27 percent between FY 2005 and FY 2009.  It’s
not surprising then, that federal, state, and local
public health agencies were forced to scramble in
the spring of 2009 when the H1N1 flu virus first
emerged in the United States.  Funding cuts fre-
quently result in workforce reductions or hiring
freezes.  Without a trained public health work-
force, preparedness suffers. Preparedness requires
that we have enough qualified laboratory scientists
who analyze lab specimens and transmit those re-
sults to federal, state, and local health officials; epi-
demiologists and health information specialists
who develop and run biosurveillance systems to
monitor disease rates and warn of bioterror or
foodborne disease outbreaks; stockpile managers
who receive, store, and dispense medical counter-
measures; and  public health nurses and doctors
who vaccinate populations against infectious dis-
eases such as H1N1.  The federal government
should provide increased and stable funding for
preparedness activities to state and local health de-
partments.  It is a shared responsibility between the
federal government and the states.  State-gener-
ated revenues invested in public health should,
therefore, increase as well.  As demonstrated in this
report, federal funding has fluctuated -- limiting
the ability of states to build the kind of response
capacity that is needed to prepare for everything
from a pandemic to a natural disaster to a terror-
ist attack.  The variation in critical state investment
in public health also reflects a significant variation
in geographic capacity.  
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Recommendations for Funding
Fully fund and stabilize funding for state FY 2009 funding for programs dedicated to bioterrorism and public health emergency 
public health emergency preparedness preparedness capabilities, specifically programs intended to support upgrading state 
activities. and local capabilities, was $746 million.  The PHEP Cooperative Agreement should
be funded at $1.02 billion, which is the FY 2005 level adjusted for inflation.
These funds are used to develop core boots-on-the-ground support for disaster 
response and any reduction in funding leaves the country at unnecessary levels of risk.
Inconsistencies in funding from year to year means that states cannot predict how 
much money they will receive and this affects their ability to hire and train staff, expand
capacity, and implement new programs.  A stable funding stream for public health
preparedness could also reduce the need for emergency supplemental dollars.
Pandemic influenza funding Any after-action reports completed by federal, state, and local public health authorities
on their response to the H1N1 pandemic, should include an assessment of how the
emergency supplemental funding was used.  This should be the basis to determine how
much funding is needed to maintain pandemic preparedness.
Increase funding for BARDA In FY 2009, BARDA received $275 million, which is nowhere near the amount 
needed for advanced research and development of medical countermeasures.
Congress should appropriate $1.7 billion for biological countermeasures and
diagnostics, and make the funds available over multiple years in the Public
Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF) for BARDA’s
Advanced Research and Development Fund.  
Funding should be appropriated for the HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius should give the president and Congress, a 
replenishment and maintenance of federal professional judgment budget that includes the cost of replenishing and maintaining 
and state stockpiles, as many parts of the stockpiles.  Funding to buy new medical countermeasures may require a new Act of 
stockpiles are set to expire in the coming Congress as the 2004 Project BioShield does not allow for replenishment and 
years.  Funding should also be provided to maintenance costs.
restore those supplies deployed in 
response to the H1N1 pandemic.
Funding should be appropriated for public PAHPA required HHS to work in coordination with the research community and 
health systems research, which is needed evaluation specialists and develop new objectives to measure how well states respond 
to develop evidence-based performance to major public health emergencies.  PAHPA specifically required CDC’s Centers for 
standards. Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) to focus on systems research, but overall CPHP
funding was not increased to account for the program.  CDC should provide
Congress with a professional judgment budget that includes the cost of fully funding the
CPHPs and the Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers (PERRCs) to
carry out their important work on public health workforce preparedness and public
health emergency preparedness research and evaluation.
A fully-funded and reliable funding stream Public health infrastructure has been underfunded for decades, according to assessments 
is needed to support public health. from CDC, IOM, and other experts.  It is important that states have a reliable, dedicated,
and sustained level of funding that is adequate to meet core capacities and to continue 
to keep pace with new technologies that can help the states better meet their needs of
their communities.  Congress should assure a robust, reliable funding stream through
health reform legislation for all core public health activities. 
Core public health infrastructure There is no system in place to ensure that basic public health systems and equipment 
capabilities must be modernized. keep pace with advances in science and technology.  There needs to be a systematic
way to ensure that the technology and equipment that support core functions, like
laboratory testing and communications, are routinely updated.
B. FINANCING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM PREPAREDNESS
Health care system preparedness requires signif-
icant investments in infrastructure, staff, and sup-
plies.  When funding declines -- whether at the
federal, state, or local level -- the immediate im-
pact on health care system preparedness may not
be evident.  After all, in the United States we are
fortunate that catastrophic health emergencies
are rare events.  However, funding cuts in the
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) have se-
verely curtailed preparedness activities across the
nation.  In a public health emergency, health care
systems and workers will be on the front lines, but
as a nation we have not equipped them with the
resources and training they need.  The federal
government should provide increased and sus-
tained funding for health care system prepared-
ness activities -- whether through the existing HPP
or through a new funding mechanism.  
C. FINANCING CATASTROPHIC EMERGENCY CARE
Even if health reform succeeds, it will be several
years before near-universal coverage is achieved.
In the meantime, a public health emergency will
create financial hardships for individuals and the
health care system.  Because compliance with rec-
ommendations to seek immediate care and/or
self-isolate or quarantine may be critical to con-
taining the spread of influenza or a terrorist-in-
troduced organism, TFAH believes the federal
government should take steps to assure that lack
of health insurance does not prevent compliance
with public health recommendations.
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Recommendations for Financing Health System Preparedness
Fully fund the Hospital Preparedness The HPP focuses on improving the clinical response to a large-scale health emergency, 
Program. which includes both developing surge capacity and continuity of operations planning.  On
average, hospitals receive about $80,000 per year, but some receive as little as $10,000
per year. In FY 2009, the HPP was funded at $393 million.  In the short-term, this
crucial program should be funded at $588 million, which is the FY 2004 level
adjusted for inflation.  ASPR is in the process of realigning the HPP funding with the
states’ fiscal year (July/June). ASPR also should consider transitioning the HPP one-year
grant to a multi-year grant which would enable states, health care coalitions, and hospitals
more time to implement their activities and to monitor and evaluate their effectiveness.  
Expand the hospital preparedness As we have seen over the course of the H1N1 pandemic, ambulatory care centers 
program to include the ambulatory and doctors’ offices have been overwhelmed by the surge in patients seeking care.  
care system. Presently, there is no system in place to help build capacity among these providers.
Congress should reexamine the PAHPA legislation and consider directing ASPR to
expand the existing HPP grants beyond hospitals to include both ambulatory care
clinics and private practitioners.  
Develop a long-term solution to funding In the long-term, the administration and Congress should examine ways to build 
hospital preparedness. hospital preparedness into the federal health care financing system, by providing, for
example, enhanced reimbursement rates under Medicare to those facilities that are
willing to expand and maintain their emergency response capacity.  This would
remove the funding of hospital preparedness from the unpredictability of the annual
appropriations cycle.
Recommendations for Financing Catastrophic Emergency Care
Establish an emergency health benefit. Congress should establish a short-term emergency health benefit, which would allow
hospitals and health care centers to keep functioning during a prolonged public health
emergency, while ensuring care to uninsured and underinsured individuals affected by
the crisis.  Legislation currently under consideration in Congress, the Public Health
Emergency Response Act (PHERA), would help ensure that victims of catastrophic
public health emergencies have meaningful and immediate access to medically
necessary health care services. 
D. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT
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Recommendations for Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Oversight
Publish regular progress reports on the HHS should regularly provide publicly available updates on the progress made on 
implementation of PAHPA. benchmarks and deliverables under the PAHPA statute.  The first and only progress
report was released in November 2007.  
Continue to develop new evidence-based CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness’ Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation 
benchmarks and objective standards. Branch is  working closely with PHEP program and evaluation specialists to develop a
new set of performance based metrics to measure organizational readiness and
response to public health emergencies.  As of November 2009, CDC had introduced
new, evidence-based benchmarks for two of the five areas identified for initial
performance measure development: Incident Management and Crisis & Emergency Risk
Communications (CERC).  Work continues on outcome oriented objectives for the
remaining three priority areas: Biosurveillance, Countermeasure Distribution, and
Community Containment strategies.  TFAH applauds this work and encourages CDC
and its federal, state, and academic partners to continue to work on developing metrics
that focus on outcome results from real-life drills and exercises.  
Develop and implement the use of CDC, in coordination with other government agencies, state and local health 
standardized preparedness exercises. departments, research organizations, and universities, should develop and implement
the use of standardized public health preparedness exercises.  The exercises should
include a thorough evaluation and after-action report that is made publicly available.
Any weaknesses or gaps identified in the evaluation should be addressed within a
specific amount of time. 
Incorporate lessons learned into future The federal government, working with state and local officials, should ensure that 
planning, in particular through all public health authorities conduct a systematic evaluation of the response to H1N1.  
assessment of this year’s response to the Lessons learned from these after-action assessments should be incorporated into 
H1N1 pandemic. pandemic and all-hazards preparedness planning.  
Collect performance data; assess the As required by PAHPA, HHS is in the process of developing a standardized reporting 
results; and, annually release the findings form for all states and hospital grantees.  The use of this form will allow HHS to rate 
publicly on a state-by-state basis. the performance of the grantees and to assure the proper expenditure of funds.  
Data from this form and other evaluations of states’ emergency preparedness should
be reported yearly on a state-by-state basis.  This allows Americans to appropriately
assess their states’ progress and document how states have used taxpayer-supported
preparedness funds.  
Continuous revision and strengthening Federal and state agencies need to keep preparedness plans updated to account for 
of preparedness plans changes in the environment and advancements in scientific knowledge.  This includes
updating the National Strategy on Pandemic Influenza and all state pandemic plans to
reflect the lessons learned in H1N1.
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act (PAHPA) gave the federal agencies, namely
HHS, a series of deliverables and deadlines to
produce and meet.  While much progress has
been made on the implementation of PAHPA,
which is notable in light of personnel and fund-
ing constraints, much remains to be done.  To
ensure HHS fully complies with PAHPA and
does so in an open and transparent manner,
pursuant to the provisions of the statute, Con-
gress should use its oversight powers to ensure
full implementation and execution of PAHPA.
E. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM PREPAREDNESS
The ability of the U.S. health care system to han-
dle a large influx of patients -- surge capacity --
remains the largest threat to the nation’s ability
to respond to a major catastrophe such as a pan-
demic influenza.  Much remains to be done to
ensure that the U.S. health care system is able to
function in a mass-casualty event.  In addition to
the funding recommendations discussed above,
TFAH suggests the following:
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Recommendations for Surge Capacity
Crisis standards of care planning and States currently are responsible for planning and developing crisis standards of care, 
development but progress on this front is quite varied, with some states much further along than
others.  Inconsistencies in standards of care among states could undermine the 
public’s trust and make it harder for them to accept crisis standards of care.  To
eliminate this potential barrier, the federal government should play a much more
active role in the planning and development of crisis standards of care, considering it
has experience making prioritization decisions in a public health emergency. For
example, federal agencies issued the H1N1 flu vaccine prioritization, so they should 
be able to offer more specifics for crisis standards of crisis standards of care planning
and development. The federal government should take steps to address the legal
issues associated with shifting to a different paradigm of providing health care when
the need for care overwhelms available resources (i.e., staff, supplies, space) during
catastrophic public health emergencies.   
Regional coordination of health care Hospitals, state and local health departments, and emergency management agencies 
facilities, including alternative care sites, should continue to build and strengthen regional consortiums to organize and plan for 
with public health and emergency public health emergencies.  Such regional collaboration can lead to more efficient use 
management of resources among hospitals and health departments, including personnel, and
facilitate the sharing of promising practices. This coordination should include all 
federal resources active in the region, including VA and DOD facilities. (Regional
efforts could be within a locality or across county and/or state lines depending on the
size of the communities involved.)
Alternate care sites Despite the clear need for alternate care sites following a mass casualty event, there 
are several barriers to their successful roll-outs.  To address these barriers, TFAH
recommends the following measures:  1) Increase local, state, and regional planning
with clear delineation of responsibilities and authority;  2) Foster public-private
partnerships among health care practitioners; 3) Employ operational drills to test the
deployment of mobile units and the creation of alternative care sites; and, 4) Address
licensing and liability concerns for health care workers, behavioral health professionals,
and volunteers and liability concerns for non-health care volunteers; and third-party
entities that play host to alternative care sites.  In addition, emergency planners will
need to obtain, stockpile, and store supplies, equipment and medicines for use in the
alternative care sites.  
Surge workforce Public and private health care organizations should develop means to boost staff
during a public health emergency, through the use of incentives for current staff, the
development of crisis standards of care to allow for changes in staffing ratios and
administrative work requirements for staff, and the use of volunteers or non-
traditional staff, such as emergency medical technicians and medical and nursing
students.  The surge workforce should be recruited in advance in order to ensure
licensing and accreditation issues are resolved before an emergency strikes.  
F. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
The growing workforce shortage in the health
care and public health fields threatens U.S. emer-
gency preparedness.  America’s response will be
severely limited, unless the workforce challenges
the public health system faces are addressed.
PAPHA contained two key provisions related to
workforce development, whose implementation
TFAH supports.  But much more remains to be
done to address the public health workforce crisis.
Current health reform legislation before Con-
gress includes a variety of provisions to strengthen
and support the U.S. public workforce.
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Recommendations for Public Health Workforce
Fund and implement PAHPA workforce Congress should appropriate and allocate the necessary funds to implement the HHS 
provisions. workforce demonstration project.  This student loan repayment project is intended
for individuals who: 1) are eligible for the National Health Service Corps loan
repayment program and 2) also agree to serve in a state health department that
provides service to a significant number of health professional shortage areas or has
areas that are at risk of a public health emergency.  Congress should also appropriate
and allocate monies necessary to execute the second PAHPA workforce provision,
which allocates grants to states to assist in operating state loan repayment programs.
Establish a public health workforce loan To attract the next generation of public health workers, the federal government 
repayment program. should establish a public health workforce loan repayment program.  Health reform
legislation currently under consideration in Congress includes a provision to establish a
public health workforce loan repayment program to eliminate critical public health
workforce shortages in federal, state, local and tribal public health agencies.  In FY 2010,
$195 million is authorized to be appropriated for this program, and such sums are
necessary for FY 2011-2015. 
Enact and fund comprehensive public More needs to be done to recruit, train, and retain a qualified public health workforce.  
health workforce scholarship initiatives. The current health reform bills under consideration in Congress include provisions that
would establish a public health workforce training and enhancement program consisting
of awarding grants and contracts for public health training programs and fellowships and
traineeships for students who participate in these programs and who plan to specialize
or work in the field of public health.  
Bolster the state and local public health The federal government should provide federal matching funds to state and local 
workforce. governments to invest in recruitment, retention, training, and retraining for public health
workers.  Legislation currently before Congress would establish a competitive health
workforce development grant program to enable state partnerships to complete
comprehensive planning and to carry out activities leading to coherent and
comprehensive health care workforce development strategies at the State and local
levels.  The proposed legislation authorizes $8 million for planning grants and $150 
million for implementation grants for FY 2010 and such sums for each subsequent year.
Strengthen the U.S. Public Health Congress should strengthen the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps by 
Service Commissioned Corps. increasing the number of active duty personnel, creating a “Ready Reserve Corps” to
train and respond to public health emergencies, and establishing a dedicated funding
stream for all Corps activities under the management and fiscal control of the Surgeon
General.  The health reform legislation under consideration in Congress includes
provisions that would both 1) eliminate the cap on Commissioned Corps, which is
currently set at 2,800, and 2) establish a Ready Reserve Corps to participate in training
exercises, be available and ready for involuntary calls to active duty during national
emergencies and public health crises, be available for deployment and for backfilling
positions left vacant during deployment of active duty Corps members, and be available
for service in isolated, vulnerable and medically underserved communities.
Recruit the next generation of public Congress and the Administration should develop programs to expose and recruit 
health workers. high school students into health careers, with a focus on careers in public health.  
The health reform bill before Congress includes such language for the creation of a
Youth Public Health Program.
Support public health systems research The U.S. government should support the establishment of a high-level commission or 
on workforce needs and capacity. advisory body to study the workforce needs of the 21st century public health system.
Health reform legislation before Congress would establish a commission to disseminate
information on: current and projected health care workforce supply and demand,
healthcare workforce education and training capacity, retention practices for health care
professionals, and recommendations on the development of a fiscally sustainable
integrated workforce.    
G. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The basic technology and tools of public health
need to be modernized.  Too often, front-line
health care professionals are relying on outdated
diagnostic tests and medications.  As new tests
and therapies are developed and as older ones
become obsolete, the SNS should be replenished.
77
Recommendations for Research and Development
Enhance research and development of Basic technology and tools of public health must be modernized to adequately 
vaccines and public health technologies. protect the American people.  This includes research and development of vaccines
and improved chemical laboratory testing capabilities.  Collaboration with the private
sector as envisioned under BARDA and Project BioShield will be essential.
Continue to assess new influenza The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should move forward in assessing new 
vaccine technologies. technologies that are already in use in influenza vaccines in other countries -- including
use of adjuvants and cell-based vaccines.  If data from other countries do not meet
FDA’s standards, FDA should work closely with industry and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) to collect the data needed for decision making.  
Clarify requirements and deliverables ASPR should coordinate with NIH, FDA and CDC to ensure future BioShield requests 
under Project BioShield contracts. for proposals and procurement contracts for new countermeasures have clearly
articulated requirements, expectations, and deliverables.
Bolster domestic production capacity for As we have seen during the course of the H1N1 flu pandemic, the United States has 
countermeasures, including vaccines, and limited production capacity for manufacturing flu vaccines and personal protective 
personal protective equipment (PPEs). equipment, such as N95 respirator masks.  These shortages have led to confusion, 
and in some cases fear and panic among the U.S. population.  The U.S. government,
working through BARDA or other federal agencies, should direct more money to
growing domestic production capacity for pandemic countermeasures.
Expand the Shelf Life Extension Program. Congress should extend the Shelf Life Extension Program (or establish a new, parallel,
SLEP-like program within FDA) to include states’ and locals’ antiviral and antibiotic
medications.  Currently, state and local stockpiles could have shorter shelf lives even
though the nation is depending on state and local stockpiles to meet national goals.
Modernize disease surveillance systems. Every health department and health agency should be part of a 21st century surveillance
system that meets national standards and is interoperable between jurisdictions and
agencies to ensure rapid information sharing.  Surveillance systems should be able to
detect and help manage response to infectious disease outbreaks or a bioterrorist attack.
Plans should ensure adequate laboratory surveillance of influenza and other infectious
diseases, as well as testing for pathogens such as E. Coli, Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), and extensively drug-resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB).
Modernize an obsolete food safety system. Congress should enact strong food safety modernization legislation that would give FDA
increased authority and tools to prevent foodborne illness.  Bills currently before 
Congress include provisions that would allow FDA to require food plants to identify
potential hazards and take steps to mitigate them, trace foodborne outbreaks, increase
inspection of facilities, and recall tainted foods. 
Public health should be a central part of Current health information technology is concentrated on electronic health records 
the design and implementation of health (EHRs), which are used to improve patient care and efficiency.  As the use of EHRs 
information technology systems. grows, public health officials’ need for near real-time data on disease surveillance
should be factored into their design and implementation.  Public health officials can 
use data from EHRs to monitor the health of the population and the demand for care,
making them invaluable tools to help detect and mitigate public health emergencies. 
In order to encourage the development of EHRs that also benefit public health, the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) is
releasing proposed meaningful use criteria that will define how new health IT 
systems developed with funds from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) function. 
H.  LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
This report has underscored the critical need
for states to develop full legal preparedness for
all-hazards public health emergencies.  All four
core elements of public health legal prepared-
ness should be addressed: laws and legal au-
thorities; competency in using law; coordination
across sectors and jurisdictions in implementing
law-based interventions; and legal best practices.
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Recommendations for Legal Preparedness
State liability protections for volunteer Liability concerns are a growing challenge to emergency preparedness officials.  
health professionals Volunteers and private entities have expressed reluctance to participate in response
and recovery efforts for fear that their actions may make them liable.  State
legislatures should adopt the UEVHPA, which has been approved by both the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association, or enact similar legislation that extends liability protection to volunteer
health professionals in a public health emergency.  
State liability protections for volunteer Congress should amend the Public Health Service Act to provide Federal Tort Claims 
health professionals Act protection to qualified ESAR-VHP participants when they are activated by the
federal government in response to a public health emergency.  The federal Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorized
the ESAR-VHP to help states develop registry systems for the timely identification,
verification and use of volunteer health professionals during public health
emergencies.171 In 2006, PAHPA required the federal Secretary of Health and Human
Services to link the state systems into a single national network of systems.172 The
state systems continue to be maintained by the individual states, with guidance from
the federal government.  Despite ongoing efforts to build this national network, the
liability issues that can arise from activating the ESAR-VHP remain an area of
concern.173    
State entity emergency liability protection State legislatures should consider extending Good Samaritan liability protections to those
non-health care volunteers and business and non-profit entities that provide emergency
assistance.
State insurance laws should mandate the States should enact an insurance coverage mandate that requires insurers operating 
coverage of vaccines during declared in both the individual and group health insurance markets to cover and pay for vaccine 
public health emergencies. administration fees during periods of declared public health emergencies, when the
vaccines themselves have been distributed on a nationwide basis.  The benefit of an
insurance mandate is that it would utilize standard insurance claims payment methods
for assuring payment to participating providers.  Insurers could trigger their claims
payment system once a public health emergency is declared, allowing providers,
whether in- or out-of-network, to submit vaccine administration claims on members’
behalf, using specially designed claims forms. 
J. COMMUNITY RESILIENCY
HSPD-21 identifies community resilience as one
of “the four most critical components of public
health and medical preparedness,” along with
mass casualty care, mass distribution, and bio-
surveillance.  The U.S. government defines
“community resiliency” as the ability of a com-
munity to cope and recover from a disaster or
public health emergency.  A CDC-funded study
states that in order “for a community to be re-
silient, its members must put into practice early
and effective actions, so that they can respond
to adversity in a healthy manner.”174  
Taking this into account, preparedness plans
need to consider the diverse needs of the U.S.
population, in particular, “at-risk,” “special
needs,” and “vulnerable” populations.  Only by
effectively reaching out to all segments of the
U.S. population can the country appropriately
be prepared to survive and overcome crises.  
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I. HEALTH AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
A public health emergency will create financial
hardships for individuals and the health care sys-
tem.  Because compliance with recommenda-
tions to seek immediate care and/or self-isolate
or quarantine may be critical to containing the
spread of influenza or a terrorist-introduced or-
ganism, TFAH believes the federal government
should take steps to assure that lack of health in-
surance or sick leave do not prevent compliance
with public health recommendations.
Recommendations for Health and Sick Leave Benefits
Establish minimum paid sick leave The H1N1 flu pandemic has once again validated public health officials’ concerns that 
standards. employees who lack paid sick leave will show up for work when they are sick and infect
coworkers and/or customers.  Congress should enact legislation that would require
employers to offer paid sick leave, which also could be used by employees to care for sick
children or other family members.  Proposed legislation that seeks to address this need
includes the Healthy Families Act, sponsored by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and Sen.
Christopher Dodd (D-CT).  This legislation would require employers with 15 or more
employees to offer up to seven days of job-guaranteed paid sick leave each year, to be 
used to deal with individual medical needs or to care for sick family members.  
Set up emergency sick leave policies The federal government should clarify whether the Department of Labor’s Disaster 
and procedures. Unemployment Assistance Program as currently established would cover workers without
sick leave who self-quarantine in the event of a pandemic flu.  
Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Guard against complacency. One of the biggest challenges facing public health emergency preparedness is
complacency.  Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments must maintain a
sense of urgency regarding preparedness.  Officials should communicate the
importance of preparedness to the public while not resorting to scare tactics.
Engagement with media is the key to building a heightened sense of awareness around
the issues of emergency preparedness, especially at the community level.    
Engage communities in planning. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments must engage communities in
local emergency and pandemic planning.  Too often emergency planners just look to
their grantees and ignore other key stakeholders, such as volunteer organizations,
religious institutions, and schools and universities.  Planners must proactively approach
these diverse groups and bring them to the table.  
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Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Develop a community education The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), working with other 
campaign promoting vaccination for federal, state, and local partners, should develop an education campaign to assure 
H1N1 and all other influenza vaccines, the American people about the safety and effectiveness of the H1N1 (and all other) 
and all vaccines in general. influenza vaccines and all vaccines in general. It is important to remind Americans that
even with the delays in vaccine availability, they should get vaccinated as soon as they
can. It is not clear that the pandemic has peaked, and even if it has, many who might
still get sick are still at risk and could be protected by a vaccine. Moreover, historically
there is always the danger of a third pandemic wave, which may or may not be more
severe than the previous two waves. So being vaccinated now will give critical
protection for those who have not become ill during the initial waves.  Vaccine
hesitancy during the H1N1 vaccination campaign has highlighted the need for ongoing
education and outreach to Americans, including underserved populations, about the
importance and safety of regular inoculations.
Focus on disease prevention and Americans cannot be prepared if they are unhealthy, yet chronic disease rates are 
health promotion. spiraling out of control in this nation.  More than two-thirds of American adults are
overweight or obese.  One in four has heart disease; and one in three has high blood
pressure.  Twenty-four million Americans have type 2 diabetes and another 54 million
are pre-diabetic.  These underlying health conditions pose a challenge when residents
are asked to evacuate due to a public health emergency.  And we have seen during the
H1N1 pandemic that those with chronic conditions are more at risk for complications.
Persons dependent on prescription drugs also face challenges when asked to shelter-in-
place as they may run out of their medicines.  The 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) included $650 million for community-based interventions,
which can be used to bolster resiliency.  In addition, the health reform legislation 
before Congress includes a dedicated funding stream for core public health functions,
including prevention of chronic disease.  
Communicating effectively with Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials must design culturally competent 
at-risk individuals risk communication campaigns that use respected, trusted, and culturally competent
messengers.  Current research and best-practices regarding emergency preparedness
communication strategies for at-risk populations should direct the creation and
dissemination of these messages.  
Children are not small adults and Children are inherently vulnerable as they depend upon adults for food, shelter, 
pandemic and all-hazards preparedness supervision and guidance.  As such, their needs should be taken into account in all 
plans must consider the unique needs public health emergency and pandemic preparedness efforts.  Because disease 
of children. susceptibility, outcome, and transmission will likely differ for children when compared
to adults, recommendations for child social distancing during a pandemic will likely
differ from social distancing recommendations for adults.  Evacuation and reunification
planning should reflect the fact that children are often separated from their parents for
much of the day. These plans should also take into account children with special needs.
Child advocates, such as teachers and pediatricians, should be consulted as plans are
made.  Preparedness plans should be clearly communicated to parents, schools, and
daycare facilities.   
The president and Congress should The National Commission on Children and Disasters, a bi-partisan panel appointed 
carefully consider the recommendations by the president and Congressional leaders, is tasked with examining and assessing 
from the National Commission on the needs of children independently, and in relation to the preparation, response and 
Children and Disasters, which are due recovery from all emergencies, hazards and disasters.  Following its two-year 
out in 2010. investigation, the Commission will issue a final report, complete with findings and
recommendations, to the president and Congress.  These recommendations should
be acted upon with utmost urgency.
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APPENDIX A:  CDC AND ASPR PREPAREDNESS GRANTS BY STATE
BIOTERRORISM FUNDING BY SOURCE AND YEAR
FY 2008 FY 2009 % Change 
State CDC ASPR Total State CDC ASPR Total FY 08-FY 09
Alabama $10,241,093 $6,073,401 $16,314,494 Alabama $9,984,931 $5,528,753 $15,513,684 -5.16%
Alaska $5,015,000 $1,312,013 $6,327,013 Alaska $5,015,000 $1,232,661 $6,247,661 -1.27%
Arizona $14,227,671 $7,972,742 $22,200,413 Arizona $13,658,394 $7,242,486 $20,900,880 -6.22%
Arkansas $7,435,489 $3,906,396 $11,341,885 Arkansas $7,279,503 $3,573,514 $10,853,017 -4.50%
California $50,161,370 $32,625,884 $82,787,254 California $49,341,755 $29,486,456 $78,828,211 -5.02%
Colorado $11,141,885 $6,260,449 $17,402,334 Colorado $10,637,403 $5,697,522 $16,334,925 -6.53%
Connecticut $8,927,705 $4,747,354 $13,675,059 Connecticut $8,704,406 $4,332,291 $13,036,697 -4.90%
Delaware $5,000,000 $1,534,297 $6,534,297 Delaware $5,000,000 $1,433,223 $6,433,223 -1.57%
D.C. $6,698,743 $1,707,585 $8,406,328 D.C. $6,461,359 $1,589,577 $8,050,936 -4.41%
Florida $32,940,501 $22,422,494 $55,362,995 Florida $32,906,612 $20,280,168 $53,186,780 -4.09%
Georgia $18,689,009 $11,847,828 $30,536,837 Georgia $18,146,190 $10,738,888 $28,885,078 -5.72%
Hawaii $5,228,184 $2,057,849 $7,286,033 Hawaii $5,144,507 $1,905,612 $7,050,119 -3.35%
Idaho $5,405,739 $2,277,157 $7,682,896 Idaho $5,330,380 $2,103,488 $7,433,868 -3.35%
Illinois $19,912,211 $12,605,863 $32,518,074 Illinois $19,985,919 $11,422,845 $31,408,764 -3.53%
Indiana $13,335,867 $8,151,131 $21,486,998 Indiana $12,979,201 $7,403,442 $20,382,643 -5.42%
Iowa $7,702,063 $4,113,883 $11,815,946 Iowa $7,540,433 $3,760,725 $11,301,158 -4.56%
Kansas $7,598,339 $3,849,684 $11,448,023 Kansas $7,446,545 $3,522,344 $10,968,889 -4.37%
Kentucky $9,750,535 $5,597,192 $15,347,727 Kentucky $9,510,505 $5,099,081 $14,609,586 -5.05%
Louisiana $9,998,186 $5,696,194 $15,694,380 Louisiana $9,756,363 $5,188,408 $14,944,771 -5.02%
Maine $5,271,144 $2,102,569 $7,373,713 Maine $5,183,337 $1,945,059 $7,128,396 -3.44%
Maryland $13,038,391 $7,305,500 $20,343,891 Maryland $12,690,042 $6,640,448 $19,330,490 -5.24%
Massachusetts $14,805,770 $8,301,006 $23,106,776 Massachusetts $14,323,704 $7,538,670 $21,862,374 -5.69%
Michigan $20,453,241 $12,734,552 $33,187,793 Michigan $20,123,542 $11,538,958 $31,662,500 -4.82%
Minnesota $12,616,406 $6,761,826 $19,378,232 Minnesota $12,055,280 $6,149,904 $18,205,184 -6.44%
Mississippi $7,629,747 $4,027,180 $11,656,927 Mississippi $7,467,891 $3,682,495 $11,150,386 -4.54%
Missouri $13,029,088 $7,580,577 $20,609,665 Missouri $12,475,814 $6,888,644 $19,364,458 -6.43%
Montana $5,022,876 $1,644,766 $6,667,642 Montana $5,019,036 $1,532,896 $6,551,932 -1.77%
Nebraska $5,877,064 $2,642,978 $8,520,042 Nebraska $5,774,382 $2,433,560 $8,207,942 -3.80%
Nevada $7,652,253 $3,524,243 $11,176,496 Nevada $7,292,961 $3,228,706 $10,521,667 -6.22%
New Hampshire $5,317,054 $2,093,475 $7,410,529 New Hampshire $5,244,492 $1,937,756 $7,182,248 -3.18%
New Jersey $18,788,803 $11,072,985 $29,861,788 New Jersey $18,247,856 $10,039,764 $28,287,620 -5.56%
New Mexico $7,054,780 $2,868,709 $9,923,489 New Mexico $6,853,141 $2,637,233 $9,490,374 -4.56%
New York $22,518,790 $13,941,707 $36,460,497 New York $22,171,004 $12,628,147 $34,799,151 -4.77%
North Carolina $16,696,497 $11,232,884 $27,929,381 North Carolina $16,224,492 $10,184,038 $26,408,530 -5.76%
North Dakota $5,023,132 $1,270,585 $6,293,717 North Dakota $5,023,393 $1,195,281 $6,218,674 -1.21%
Ohio $21,838,104 $14,409,789 $36,247,893 Ohio $21,312,180 $13,050,486 $34,362,666 -5.49%
Oklahoma $8,740,269 $4,837,520 $13,577,789 Oklahoma $8,536,905 $4,413,646 $12,950,551 -4.84%
Oregon $9,100,217 $4,984,817 $14,085,034 Oregon $8,884,916 $4,546,549 $13,431,465 -4.87%
Pennsylvania $23,758,643 $15,576,347 $39,334,990 Pennsylvania $22,975,362 $14,103,046 $37,078,408 -6.09%
Rhode Island $5,012,619 $1,793,799 $6,806,418 Rhode Island $5,000,000 $1,667,365 $6,667,365 -2.09%
South Carolina $9,968,869 $5,736,768 $15,705,637 South Carolina $10,097,336 $5,225,017 $15,322,353 -2.50%
South Dakota $5,000,000 $1,447,580 $6,447,580 South Dakota $5,000,000 $1,354,980 $6,354,980 -1.46%
Tennessee $12,844,807 $7,818,211 $20,663,018 Tennessee $12,495,537 $7,103,056 $19,598,593 -5.43%
Texas $43,355,376 $28,988,249 $72,343,625 Texas $42,816,952 $26,204,300 $69,021,252 -4.81%
Utah $7,162,839 $3,590,331 $10,753,170 Utah $7,018,990 $3,288,335 $10,307,325 -4.33%
Vermont $5,041,316 $1,256,092 $6,297,408 Vermont $5,042,969 $1,182,205 $6,225,174 -1.16%
Virginia $17,222,047 $9,762,140 $26,984,187 Virginia $16,613,973 $8,857,019 $25,470,992 -5.94%
Washington $14,012,182 $8,250,841 $22,263,023 Washington $13,561,976 $7,493,408 $21,055,384 -5.74%
West Virginia $5,933,288 $2,703,739 $8,637,027 West Virginia $5,839,235 $2,488,384 $8,327,619 -3.72%
Wisconsin $12,188,297 $7,233,733 $19,422,030 Wisconsin $12,177,579 $6,575,694 $18,753,273 -3.57%
Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,124,115 $6,124,115 Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,063,125 $6,063,125 -1.01%
CDC Total ASPR Total Grand Total CDC Total ASPR* Total Grand Total Grand Total 
FY 08** FY 08** FY 08** FY 09** FY 09** FY 09** Percent Change
FY 08 - FY 09
$636,383,499 $363,379,009 $999,762,508 $623,373,683 $330,359,658 $953,733,341 -4.83%
*Note FY 2008 CDC total funding includes CRI, Level 1 chemical lab capacity, and EWIDS funding. 
**Note that totals do not include funds for 3 major U.S. metropolitan areas, Chicago, L.A. County, and New York City, U.S. Territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, and Freely As-
sociated States of the Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands. 
Source: FY2009 Funding 1) CDC. Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program Announcement AA154 - FY 2009 (Budget Period 10).  At-
lanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009, p. 24-26.  <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/10/FinalPHEP_BP10_Guidance_5-01-09.pdf> (ac-
cessed September 11, 2009). 2) HHS/ASPR.  FY09 Hospital Preparedness Program Funding Opportunity Announcement.  Washington, D.C.: HHS/ASPR/OPEO/DNHPP, August
2009, p. 84-85.     FY2008 Funding 3) HHS.  HHS Provides More Than $1 Billion to Improve All Hazards Pubilc Health.  News Release, June, 3, 2008.
<http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/06/20080603a.html> (accessed June 6, 2008). 4) CDC. Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness
Program Announcement AA154 - FY 2008 (Budget Period 9).  Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008, p. 22-24.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/08/pdf/fy08announcement.pdf   (accessed September 16, 2008)
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APPENDIX B:  H1N1 AND SEASONAL FLU SUPPLEMENTAL 
GRANTS BY STATE
H1N1 & SEASONAL FLU PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS
FY2009 SUPPLEMENTAL
State PHER Phase I PHER Phase II PHER Phase III Total PHER Funding
Alabama $5,293,293 $3,981,585 $13,144,433 $22,419,311 
Alaska $770,350 $1,861,553 $3,623,681 $6,255,584 
Arizona $7,097,515 $4,827,276 $16,942,309 $28,867,100 
Arkansas $3,234,809 $3,016,715 $8,811,345 $15,062,869 
California* $30,516,050 $15,804,211 $66,238,117 $112,558,378 
Colorado $5,470,974 $4,064,869 $13,518,450 $23,054,293 
Connecticut $4,033,652 $3,391,156 $10,492,903 $17,917,711 
Delaware $981,504 $1,960,526 $4,068,155 $7,010,185 
D.C. $791,155 $1,313,787 $2,409,172 $4,514,114 
Florida $20,823,635 $11,261,100 $45,835,672 $77,920,407 
Georgia $10,778,540 $6,552,677 $24,690,834 $42,022,051 
Hawaii $1,478,835 $2,193,640 $5,115,037 $8,787,512 
Idaho $1,687,161 $2,291,288 $5,553,559 $9,532,008 
Illinois* $11,506,481 $6,895,159 $26,228,868 $44,630,508 
Indiana $7,266,971 $4,906,704 $17,299,011 $29,472,686 
Iowa $3,431,906 $3,109,100 $9,226,230 $15,767,236 
Kansas $3,180,938 $2,991,464 $8,697,946 $14,870,348 
Kentucky $4,840,932 $3,769,550 $12,192,218 $20,802,700 
Louisiana $4,934,975 $3,813,631 $12,390,180 $21,138,786 
Maine $1,520,366 $2,213,106 $5,202,457 $8,935,929 
Maryland $6,463,689 $4,530,183 $15,608,109 $26,601,981 
Massachusetts $7,409,340 $4,973,437 $17,598,697 $29,981,474 
Michigan $11,620,858 $6,947,495 $26,463,905 $45,032,258 
Minnesota $5,947,241 $4,288,110 $14,520,992 $24,756,343 
Mississippi $3,349,544 $3,070,495 $9,052,862 $15,472,901 
Missouri $6,724,990 $4,652,662 $16,158,145 $27,535,797 
Montana $1,086,439 $2,009,713 $4,289,046 $7,385,198 
Nebraska $2,034,662 $2,454,172 $6,285,045 $10,773,879 
Nevada $2,871,794 $2,846,559 $8,047,201 $13,765,554 
New Hampshire $1,512,677 $2,209,503 $5,186,272 $8,908,452 
New Jersey $10,042,502 $6,207,674 $23,141,477 $39,391,653 
New Mexico $2,249,089 $2,554,680 $6,736,412 $11,540,181 
New York* $12,767,560 $7,484,987 $28,877,702 $49,130,249 
North Carolina $10,194,394 $6,278,870 $23,461,208 $39,934,472 
North Dakota $730,996 $1,843,107 $3,540,842 $6,114,945 
Ohio $13,212,199 $7,693,403 $29,813,666 $50,719,268 
Oklahoma $4,119,303 $3,431,303 $10,673,197 $18,223,803 
Oregon $4,259,224 $3,496,887 $10,967,729 $18,723,840 
Pennsylvania $14,320,340 $8,212,819 $32,146,289 $54,679,448 
Rhode Island $1,228,009 $2,076,070 $4,587,048 $7,891,127 
South Carolina $4,973,517 $3,831,697 $12,471,312 $21,276,526 
South Dakota $899,128 $1,921,915 $3,894,757 $6,715,800 
Tennessee $6,950,724 $4,758,470 $16,633,313 $28,342,507 
Texas $27,060,583 $14,184,535 $58,964,392 $100,209,510 
Utah $2,934,572 $2,875,985 $8,179,349 $13,989,906 
Vermont $717,231 $1,836,654 $3,511,863 $6,065,748 
Virginia $8,797,303 $5,624,014 $20,520,344 $34,941,661 
Washington $7,361,687 $4,951,101 $17,498,388 $29,811,176 
West Virginia $2,092,381 $2,481,226 $6,406,542 $10,980,149 
Wisconsin $6,395,515 $4,498,228 $15,464,604 $26,358,347 
Wyoming $591,861 $1,777,890 $3,247,965 $5,617,716 
Phase I Total Phase II Total Phase III Total Grand Total
TOTAL $350,000,000 $248,000,000 $846,000,000 $1,444,000,000 
*Note that totals include funds for 3 major U.S. metropolitan areas, Chicago, L.A. County, and New York City, and U.S. Territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, and Freely
Associated States of the Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands. 
APPENDIX C:  DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR STATE INDICATORS
The data for the state indicators come from a va-
riety of publicly available sources.  
Indicator 1:  Mass Distribution -- Antiviral
Stockpiling 
Information available online at http://www.pan-
demicflu.gov/plan/states/antivirals.html (ac-
cessed November 25, 2009).
Indicator 2:  Hospital Preparedness -- Hospital
Bed Availability Reporting
Information provided to TFAH by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.
Indicators 3:  Public Health Laboratories -- Lab
Pickup and Delivery Services 
The Association of Public Health Laboratories
(APHL) surveyed state public health laboratories
between September and October 2009.  All 50
states and D.C. responded to the survey.  APHL
confirmed each state public health laboratory’s
answer before submitting the final data to TFAH.
Respondents were asked:  
Do you currently have courier systems (non-
mail) in place to assure the timely transporta-
tion (pick-up and delivery) of samples 24/7 365
days to the appropriate public health LRN ref-
erence laboratory?
 Yes
 No (SKIP PATTERN)
 If no, why not
 Decline to Respond (SKIP 1a-1c)
Indicator 4:  Public Health Laboratories -- Surge
Workforce
APHL surveyed state public health laboratories
between September and October 2009.  All 50
states and D.C. responded to the survey.  APHL
confirmed each state public health laboratory’s
answer before submitting the final data to TFAH.
Respondents were asked:  
In response to an infectious disease outbreak,
such as novel influenza A H1N1, does the state
public health lab have the staffing capacity to
work five, 12-hour days for six to eight weeks? 
 Yes
 No
 Decline to Respond
Indicator 5:  Biosurveillance  -- NEDSS
Compatibility
In order to determine FY 2010 grant allocations,
CDC’s Division of Integrated Surveillance Sys-
tems and Services queried state health depart-
ments on their NEDSS status.  According to
CDC, for a state to be considered NEDSS-com-
patible, the state health department must have
systems that meet three basic requirements: 
1) An internet browser-based system;
2) Electronic laboratory results (ELR) report-
ing; and 
3) An integrated data repository.
As of November 25, 2009, 44 states and the Dis-
trict met these requirements.  The six states that
did not meet this indicator were contacted via
ASTHO to confirm CDC’s results.  In cases
where state health departments disagreed with
CDC’s finding, TFAH worked with both parties
to settle any discrepancies.
Indicator 6:  Food Safety -- Detection and 
Diagnosis
Data for this indicator were obtained from CDC’s
Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System
(publicly available at http://www.cdc.gov/food-
borneoutbreaks/outbreak_data.htm.)  State
health department are responsible for reporting
foodborne disease outbreaks to CDC through the
Electronic Foodborne Disease Outbreak Report-
ing System (eFORS).  
TFAH analyzed data from 2005 through 2007
(the most recent year for which data were avail-
able at the time of publication).  For each year,
TFAH calculated the total number of reported
outbreaks per state and the total number of re-
ported outbreaks with confirmed etiology (bac-
terial, chemical, parasitic, viral, or multiple) per
state.  TFAH also calculated the national total
number of reported outbreaks and national pro-
portion of confirmed outbreaks.  TFAH com-
bined the 2005 to 2007 data and calculated the
three-year average for each state and the nation.
States that met or exceeded the national aver-
age of confirmed outbreaks (46 percent)
achieved a point on this indicator; states that fell
below the national average of confirmed out-
breaks earned zero points.
All data for 2005-2007 were collected electroni-
cally through eFORS without confirmation of
etiology by CDC staff; all etiologies are as re-
ported by the state.
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Indicator 7:  Medical Reserve Corps Readiness
The Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Re-
serve Corps (OCVMRC) provided TFAH with
data on 866 MRC units nationwide as of Octo-
ber 29, 2009.  Variables included: state; MRC
State Coordination, date established; NIMS
compliance, and ESAR-VHP integration.  
Indicator 8: Community Resiliency -- Children
and Preparedness
Data for this indicator was obtained from Save the
Children’s 2009 report on The Disaster Decade:
Lessons Unlearned for the United States.  Save
the Children contracted with a law firm to review
child care licensing, and K-12 school laws and reg-
ulations, for all 50 states and the District of Co-
lumbia focused on emergency preparedness.
States were contacted when state laws or regula-
tions were not found online or required clarifica-
tion.  Separate calls were made to child care
licensing staff and to school personnel identifying
the Save the Children project and criteria and
seeking verification that the data found online was
accurate.  More information on the methodology
and the report findings are available online at
http://www.savethechildren.org/programs/us-
programs/disaster-decade-lessons.html (accessed
November 24, 2009).
Indicator 9:  Entity Emergency Liability Protection
Faculty and staff at The George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services and the University of North Carolina
Gillings School of Global Public Health con-
ducted the research and analysis for “Indicator
9:  Entity Emergency Liability Protection.”  The
GWU team also provided the analysis of Liability
Protection for Volunteer Health Care Profes-
sionals.  TFAH thanks:
 Nancy Lopez, JD, Senior Research Scientist,
Department of Health Policy, George Wash-
ington University School of Public Health and
Health Services;
 Ross Margulies, JD/MPH anticipated 2011,
Research Assistant, Department of Health Pol-
icy, George Washington University School of
Public Health and Health Services; 
 Sara Rosenbaum, JD; Chair and Hirsh Profes-
sor, Department of Health Policy, George
Washington University School of Public
Health and Health Services; and 
 Gene Matthews, JD; Senior Fellow, North Car-
olina Institute for Public Health, University of
North Carolina Gillings School of Global Pub-
lic Health.
Indicator 10:  Funding Commitment -- State
Public Health Budgets
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spending
on public health for the last budget cycle, fiscal
year 2008-2009.  For those states that only report
their budgets in biennium cycles, the 2009-2011
period (or the 2008-2010 and 2009-2010 for Vir-
ginia and Wyoming respectively) was used, and
the percent change was calculated from the last
biennium, 2007-2009 (or 2006-2008 and 2007-
2008 for Virginia and Wyoming respectively).
This analysis was conducted from September to
October of 2009 using publicly available budget
documents through state government web sites.
Based on what was made publicly available,
TFAH used either executive budget document
that listed actual expenditures, estimated ex-
penditures, or final appropriations; appropria-
tions bills enacted by the state’s legislature; or
documents from legislative analysis offices.
“Public health” is defined to broadly include all
health spending with the exception of Medicaid,
CHIP, or comparable health coverage programs
for low-income residents.  Federal funds, mental
health funds, addiction or substance abuse-re-
lated funds, WIC funds, services related to devel-
opmental disabilities or severely disabled persons,
and state-sponsored pharmaceutical programs
also were not included in order to make the state-
by-state comparison more accurate since many
states receive federal money for these particular
programs.  In a few cases, state budget documents
did not allow these programs, or other similar
human services, to be disaggregated; these ex-
ceptions are noted.  For most states, all state fund-
ing, regardless of general revenue or other state
funds (e.g. dedicated revenue, fee revenue, etc.),
was used.  In some cases, only general revenue
funds were used in order to separate out federal
funds; these exceptions are also noted.
Because each state allocates and reports its budget
in a unique way, comparisons across states are dif-
ficult.  This methodology may include programs
that, in some cases, the state may consider a pub-
lic health function, but the methodology used was
selected to maximize the ability to be consistent
across states.  As a result, there may be programs
or items states may wish to be considered “public
health” that may not be included in order to
maintain the comparative value of the data.
Finally, to improve the comparability of the budget
data between FY 2007-2008 and FY 2008-2009 (or
between biennium), TFAH adjusted the FY 2008-
2009 numbers for inflation (using a 0.9975 con-
version factor based on the U.S. Dept. of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics; Consumer Price Index
Inflation Calculator at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).   84
After compiling the results from this online re-
view of state budget documents, TFAH coordi-
nated with the Association of State and
Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) to con-
firm the findings with each state health official.
ASTHO sent out emails on October 23, 2009
and state health officials were asked to confirm
or correct the data with TFAH staff by Novem-
ber 6, 2009.  TFAH followed up via email with
those state health officials who did not respond
by the November 6, 2009 deadline.  In the end,
eight states did not respond by November 25,
2009 when the report when to print.  Only one
state, Colorado, refused to confirm or correct
the data.  These states were assumed to be in ac-
cordance with the findings.  
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Methodology for Health Care Volunteer Emergency
Liability Protection 
TFAH contracted with the George Washington University
School of Public Health and Health Services.  A research team
consisting of an experienced lawyer and team members with ex-
perience in reading and interpreting statutory text assembled all
relevant statutes and then assessed the statutes using methods of
plain text analysis. Because of growth in the adoption of
UEVHPA and the comprehensiveness of the statute, researchers
adopted the following three-tier approach to the review: 
1) States adopting the UEVHPA or enacting its full equivalent,
as measured by the terms of state statutory law; 
2) States whose laws offer some, but not all, of the emergency
volunteer protections available under UEVHPA; and 
3) States offering only minimal protections in the form of
Good Samaritan Statutes.
The “minimal protections” or “low” category represents
those states with only Good Samaritan or similar laws under
which volunteers may be provided with an affirmative de-
fense, but not necessarily immunity from liability. The “some
protections” or “medium” group of states extend protections
to volunteers during times of emergency, but may not explic-
itly identify health practitioners, may require affiliation with a
regional or local emergency compact, or may not provide cov-
erage to volunteers in the event of injury during rendering of
services.  Finally, the “UEVHPA” or “high” protection states
have adopted the model statute or all of its elements.  
Methodology Strategic National Stockpile 
CDC’s Coordinating Office on Terrorism Preparedness and Emer-
gency Response (COTPER) provided states’ technical assistance
review (TAR) scores to TFAH.  Scores are from the 2008-2009
review of state SNS plans.  According to CDC, states must score
69 or higher out of 100 to satisfactorily document their SNS plan-
ning efforts.  The passing grade will move to 79 for the Budget Pe-
riod 10 (August 10, 2009 - August 9, 2010) funded reviews.
Methodology for Flu and Pneumococcal Vaccination Rates 
TFAH contracted with Edward N. Okeke, PhD, MBBS, MPH,
Department of Health Management and Policy, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor to conduct the statistical analyses.
Data for this analysis was obtained from the Behavioral Risk Fac-
tor Surveillance System (BRFSS) dataset (publicly available on the
web at www.cdc.gov/brfss). BRFSS is an annual cross-sectional
survey designed to measure behavioral risk factors in the adult
population (18 years of age or older) living in households. Data
are collected from a random sample of adults (one per house-
hold) through a telephone survey. The BRFSS currently includes
data from 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands. The most recent data available was 2008. 
To account for the complex nature of the survey design and
obtain estimates accurately representative at the state level,
researchers used sample weights provided by the CDC in the
dataset. The main purpose of weighting is to reduce bias in
population estimates by up-weighting population sub-groups
that are under represented and down-weighting those that
are over represented in the sample. Also estimation of vari-
ance, which indicates precision and is used in calculating confi-
dence intervals, needs to take into account the fact that the
elements in the sample will generally not be statistically inde-
pendent as a result of the multistage sampling design.  
Researchers specified the sampling plan to STATA175 using the
svyset command and the following set of weights: sample weight
variable (FINALWT), first-stage stratification variable (STSTR),
and primary sampling unit variable (PSU). Omission of the strati-
fication variable in STATA implies no stratification of PSUs prior
to first-stage sampling. Omission of the primary sampling unit
variable implies one-stage sampling of elements and no clustering
of sampled elements. Omission of the sample weight implies
equally weighted sample elements. Mean proportions for each
variable were estimated using the svy: proportion command. 
Researchers estimated state-by-state influenza and pneumococcal
vaccination rates among adults aged 65 and older. The influenza
vaccination variable asks about flu vaccination within the past 12
months, while for pneumococcal vaccination, the individual is
asked whether he/she has ever received a pneumonia shot. In all
cases researchers exclude observations with missing data as well
as observations where the individual either refused to answer, or
replied, “Don’t know”. This never amounted to more than five
percent of the observations.
Researchers used rolling three-year averages, first averaging data
from 2005-2007 and then averaging data from 2006-2008 (after
merging data from the relevant time periods). Researchers report
mean proportions for each three-year period as well as standard
errors and 95 percent confidence intervals for all variables of in-
terest. Researchers also report p-values from a Pearson statistical
test of proportions and indicate which states experienced a signif-
icant increase or decrease (significant at the five percent  level). 
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